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Zusammenfassung 
Das übergreifende Thema dieser Dissertation ist die Frage nach der Entscheidungs-
kompetenz von Kindern. Da bei vielen Entscheidungen Wahrscheinlichkeiten eine Rolle 
spielen, habe ich in einer Reihe von Studien untersucht, ob und wann Kinder probabilistische 
Inferenzentscheidungen bewältigen. Dies sind Entscheidungen bei denen Hinweisreize aus 
der Umwelt, sogenannten Cues, genutzt werden können, um zukünftige Entscheidungs-
konsequenzen vorherzusagen. Diese Konsequenzen treten allerdings nicht mit Sicherheit ein, 
sondern nur mit einer gewissen Wahrscheinlichkeit, die in Abhängigkeit von der Stärke des 
stochastischen Zusammenhangs zwischen Cue und Entscheidungskonsequenz bestimmt 
werden kann. Diese Konstellation ahmt reale Entscheidungssituationen nach, in denen 
Hinweisreize genutzt werden, um Entscheidungskonsequenzen zu antizipieren. Zum Beispiel, 
nutzen wir nonverbale Signale wie Mimik und Körpersprache um vorherzusehen, ob andere 
Menschen freundlich auf Kontaktaufnahme reagieren werden. Oder wir nutzen Merkmale 
eines Produktes, wie Preis, Marke und Verarbeitungsqualität, um dessen Langlebigkeit 
abzusehen.  
Bislang war nicht bekannt, ob und wie Kinder im Vor- und Grundschulalter mit diesen 
Entscheidungen umgehen können. Erste Forschung mit 6- und 9-jährigen zeigte, dass Kinder 
die probabilistischen Zusammenhänge zwischen Cues und Entscheidungskonsequenzen nicht 
nutzen, um Entscheidungen zu optimieren (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014; siehe 
auch Mata, van Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011 für Kinder ab 9 Jahren). Während 6-Jährige 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten gar nicht berücksichtigten, nutzten 9-Jährige sie nur teilweise. Dies ist 
gemäß dem Stufenmodel der kognitiven Entwicklung nach Piaget zu erwarten, da bis zum 
Alter von 7-8 Jahren kein Verständnis von Zufall oder Wahrscheinlichkeit und bis zum Alter 
von 11-12 Jahren nur ein eingeschränktes Verständnis angenommen wird (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1975). Weitere Forschung zeigte allerdings über viele Situationen hinweg, dass Kinder 
durchaus in der Lage sind Wahrscheinlichkeiten zu nutzen, um ihr Verhalten zu optimieren 
(z.B. Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2010; Gonzalez & Girotto, 2011; Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007; Schlottmann, 2001). Dies führte zu der Annahme, dass 
Kinder bereits sehr früh in der Lage sind, Wahrscheinlichkeiten auf intuitive Weise zu nutzen 
(z.B. Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). Die Vernachlässigung von Wahrscheinlichkeiten bei 
probabilistischen Inferenzentscheidungen steht somit im Widerspruch zu dieser Auffassung 
und der sie stützenden Befunde. 
Die Studien der Dissertation ergründen deshalb, warum Kinder Wahrscheinlichkeiten 
vernachlässigen und fokussieren dabei auf die Rolle von Feedback. In Entscheidungen mit 
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Feedback erlebt der Entscheider die Konsequenz seiner Wahl unmittelbar. Dies kann sich 
potentiell negativ auf die Nutzung von Wahrscheinlichkeiten auswirken, wenn Feedback eine 
interferierende Informationsquelle darstellt und von Wahrscheinlichkeiten ablenkt (z.B. 
Harvey, 2011). Es kann sich aber auch positiv auswirken, wenn es die Salienz des 
probabilistischen Zusammenhangs zwischen Cue und Entscheidungskonsequenzen erhöht und 
ermöglicht, angemessenes Entscheidungsverhalten zu lernen (z.B. Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). 
Artikel 1: Vernachlässigung von Wahrscheinlichkeiten in kindlichen Entscheidungen 
mit und ohne Feedback. 
Der erste Artikel prüft, ob Kinder Feedback im Vergleich zu expliziter 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsinformation bevorzugen. Die Darbietung von Feedback könnte somit 
Abweichung von normativen Entscheidungsmodellen, die eine systematische Nutzung von 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten verlangen, erklären. 
6-Jährige, 9-Jährige und Erwachsene trafen eine Reihe von Entscheidungen, bei denen 
Vorhersagen probabilistischer Cues genutzt werden konnten, um Entscheidungskonsequenzen 
zu optimieren. Die Verfügbarkeit von Feedback wurde variiert: Kinder wurden entweder nach 
jeder Entscheidung sofort über die positive oder negative Konsequenz der getroffenen 
Entscheidung informiert, oder erfuhren dies erst nachdem alle Entscheidungen getroffen 
waren. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass jüngere Kinder besonders sensitiv auf negative 
Entscheidungskonsequenzen reagieren und ihre Entscheidungen somit von unmittelbar 
erlebten Feedback verzerrt sind. Allerdings nutzten Kinder Feedback nicht auf systematische 
Weise, um Entscheidungen zu treffen. Unabhängig von der Verfügbarkeit von Feedback, 
vernachlässigten alle jüngeren und ein Großteil der älteren Kinder Wahrscheinlichkeiten bei 
ihren Entscheidungen. Wenn überhaupt Entscheidungsstrategien von Kindern angewendet 
wurden, dann stützten sich diese häufig auf irrelevante Informationen und führten nicht zu 
optimalen Entscheidungen. 
Dies zeigt, dass die Vernachlässigung von Wahrscheinlichkeit robust ist, unabhängig 
von Feedback stattfindet und erst ab dem Schulalter abnimmt. 
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Artikel 2: Nutzung und Überwindung nicht-adaptiver Entscheidungsstrategien bei 
Kindern. 
Artikel 2 erfasst adaptive und nicht-adaptive Entscheidungsstrategien bei 6-Jährigen, 
9-Jährigen und Erwachsenen und untersucht wie häufig, wie präzise und wie beharrlich sie 
genutzt werden. Bislang wurde angenommen, dass Kinder unter 9 Jahren eher zufällig 
entscheiden, ohne jede Systematik. Allerdings lag der Fokus der Forschung auch darauf 
adaptive, wahrscheinlichkeitsbasierte Entscheidungsstrategie aufzuspüren. Nicht gesucht 
wurde nach Strategien, die normativ irrelevante Informationen nutzen und somit auch nicht-
adaptiv sind und zu suboptimalen Entscheidungen führen. 
Die Studie untersuchte deshalb Entscheidungsstrategien in unterschiedlichen 
Feedbackumwelten unter Berücksichtigung nicht-adaptiver Strategien. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass ungefähr die Hälfte aller Kinder Entscheidungsstrategien konsistent nutzt, wenn nicht-
adaptive Strategien berücksichtigt werden. 6-Jährige nutzten fast ausschließlich nicht-adaptive 
Strategien, 9-Jährigen sowohl adaptive als auch nicht-adaptive Strategien. Wenn Kinder 
umfassend über alle Entscheidungskonsequenzen informiert wurden, also über Konsequenzen 
der gewählten und nicht gewählten Option, wichen sie zunehmend von ihren nicht-adaptiven 
Strategien ab. 
Kinder sind also schon im Vorschulalter in der Lage, Entscheidungenstrategien 
systematisch anzuwenden. Analog zur Strategieentwicklung in anderen Bereichen, nutzen sie 
allerdings zunächst ineffiziente Entscheidungsstrategien, die sie mit zunehmenden Alter und 
Erfahrung ablegen. 
Artikel 3: Lernen Kinder einfache, aber adaptive Entscheidungsstrategien durch 
Feedback? 
Artikel 3 untersucht inwiefern Feedback adaptive Strategien bei Kindern fördern kann. 
In der ersten Studie, lernten 7- und 9-Jährige Kinder eine simple, wahrscheinlichkeitsbasierte 
Entscheidungsstrategie. Sie lernten sie weniger gut als eine erwachsene Vergleichsgruppe und 
besser, wenn konkurrierende Strategien häufiger zu Misserfolgen führten. 
In der zweiten Studie verstärkte Entscheidungsfeedback entweder dieselbe simple, 
wahrscheinlichkeitsbasierte Strategie oder eine ebenso einfache Strategie, die aber nicht auf 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten basierte. Jünger Kinder lernten letztere besser, ältere Kinder lernten 
beide Strategien gleich gut. In beiden Studien nutzten Kinder adaptive Entscheidungs-
strategien nur selten, wenn kein Feedback verfügbar war, obwohl deren Anwendung durch die 
Dispersion der verfügbaren Wahrscheinlichkeiten indiziert war. 
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Unter idealen Umständen, einer eindeutigen Feedbackumwelt und wenn einfache 
Entscheidungsstrategien verstärkt werden, kann Feedback also adaptive 
Entscheidungsstrategien fördern und somit die Entscheidungen von Kindern erheblich 
verbessern. 
Artikel 4: Nutzung probabilistischer Cues in Urteilen von Kindern 
Artikel 4 untersucht die Nutzung der probabilistischen Zusammenhänge von Cues und 
Entscheidungskonsequenten in Urteilen von 6- und 9-jährigen Kindern und Erwachsenen. Die 
Ergebnisse von vier Studien zeigen, dass die Nutzung dieser Wahrscheinlichkeitsinformation 
in Urteilen vergleichsweise spät beginnt und demselben Entwicklungsverlauf folgt wie in 
Entscheidungen: 6-Jährigen berücksichtigen Wahrscheinlichkeiten nicht, 9-Jährige 
berücksichtigen sie nur teilweise. Die Urteile von Kinder zeigen, dass ihre Erwartungen an 
Entscheidungskonsequenzen bis zum Alter von 9 Jahren nicht an Wahrscheinlichkeiten 
orientiert sind. 
Die Ergebnisse sind über mehrere Studien hinweg und unabhängig von Erfahrungen 
der Teilnehmer oder Skalen zur Erfassung der Urteile stabil. Die Befunde widersprechen einer 
frühen und intuitiven Nutzung von Wahrscheinlichkeiten bei Urteilen und zeigen 
persistierende Defizite in wahrscheinlichkeitsbasierten Urteilen von Kindern bis zu 9 Jahren. 
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Four of these articles contribute to this dissertation. All of which investigate the 
influence of decision feedback on children’s probabilistic judgment and decision making. 
Altogether, they entail six empirical studies. Article 1 has been published in an international, 
peer-reviewed, academic journal. Articles 2-4 are currently reviewed. 
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Research Highlights 
 
Article 1 
 6-year-olds, but not 9-year-olds’ decisions were biased by, but did not 
systematically follow recent negative outcomes. 
 6-year-olds fully and 9-year-olds partly neglected probabilistic information in 
decisions with and without feedback. 
 Neglect of probabilities is robust and independent of feedback. 
Article 2 
 Half of 6-year-olds and 9-year-olds applied decision strategies systematically. 
 6-year-olds only used non-adaptive strategies focusing on irrelevant information. 
 9-year-olds used adaptive as well as non-adaptive decision strategies. 
 Children abandoned non-adaptive strategies when given full feedback about 
decision outcomes. 
Article 3 
 Feedback that reinforces simple decision strategies increases adaptive strategy use 
in children. 
 Strict feedback benefits children slightly more than lenient feedback. 
 7-year-olds learn an Equal Weight-strategy better than a Lexicographic strategy; 
9-year-olds learn both equally well. 
Article 4 
 Probability utilization for judgments is absent in 6-year-olds and emerging in 
9-year-olds. 
 Judgments remain unaffected by participant’s experience with decisions, decision 
feedback, or scale formats used to assess judgments. 
 Deficits in probabilistic judgments persist until the age of nine and follows the 
same developmental trajectory as in decisions. 
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Scope 
Data collection. The dissertation presents six studies with more than 1.200 child and 
adult participants (Table 1). Each participant was supervised by a trained experimenter during 
the whole procedure. Child data were collected either in separate rooms of kindergartens and 
after-school day-care centers or in the lab. For lab studies, groups of children were invited to 
participate in “Science Workshops” at the University of Erfurt. For that purpose, we 
developed several workshops for different age groups. All workshops were designed to 
promote children’s understanding of science and of experimental methods.  
Parents and teachers were informed in advance about the procedure and purpose of the 
data collection and consented to participation. Child participants were rewarded with two to 
five prizes contingent on their performance. In the lab, children were debriefed according to 
their age. In schools, we informed children, parents, and teachers about the studies’ purpose 
through posters or flyers.  
Adult participants were students of the University of Erfurt, consented to participation, 
and were debriefed in accordance with the guidelines of the Hermann-Ebbinghaus-Laboratory 
at the University of Erfurt. They were rewarded with money contingent on performance. All 
procedures were approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of Erfurt. 
 
 
Table 1 
Overview of sample sizes for Study 1-6 
 Study  
  Child 
Data  
  
Pre-
schoolers 
  
First 
Graders 
  
Third 
Graders 
  
Adult 
Controls 
  
  
Analyzed 
N 
  
5-6 years 
 
6-7 years 
 
8-10 years 
 
20-22 years  
 
1 
 
Lab 
 
69 
 
— 
 
56 
 
56 
 
181 
2 
 
Lab 
 
80 
 
— 
 
62 
 
53 
 
195 
3 
 
Day-Care 
 
81 
 
— 
 
91 
 
85 
 
257 
4 
 
Lab 
 
— 
 
110 
 
107 
 
99 
 
316 
5 
 
Lab 
 
— 
 
92 
 
96 
 
77 
 
265 
6  Day-Care  42  —  41  —  83 
Total       272   202   453   370   1.297 
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Selection of age groups. In each study, we compared two child groups, children who 
attended preschool or grade 1 (5-7 years) and children at middle elementary school age (8-9 
years). This age comparison is especially illuminating when investigating the development of 
probabilistic decision making. Piaget’s stage theory claims that children’s idea of chance 
starts to develop at age six to eight, but remains impaired until late elementary school age 
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1975). In contrast, current research suggests intuitive probability 
utilization at preschool age (e.g., Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). Accordingly, we 
concentrated in all studies on the interesting period between preschool and elementary school 
age.  
Research questions & experimental designs. All articles investigate how decision 
feedback affects children’s utilization of probabilistic information. While Article 1 focuses on 
detrimental effects of feedback on decisions, Article 2 and 3 investigate the beneficial effects 
of feedback on decisions and decisions strategies. Article 4 investigates utilization of 
probabilistic information in children’s judgments and the moderating role of feedback in this 
process. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Overview of experimental factors 
Article & Studies   Age Factor   Additional Factor 
Article 1 including decision 
data from Studies 1 and 2 
 
 3 (Age Group: 6-year-olds 
vs. 9-year-olds vs. Adults) 
 
2 (Feedback: No feedback 
vs. Feedback)  
Article 2 including decision 
data from Study 3 
 
 3 (Age Group: 6-year-olds 
vs. 9-year-olds vs. Adults) 
 
3 (Feedback: No feedback 
vs. Selective Feedback vs. 
Full Feedback)  
Article 3 including decision 
data from Studies 4 and 5 
 
 3 (Age Group:7-year-olds 
vs. 9-year-olds vs. Adults) 
 
3 (Feedback: No feedback 
vs. Lenient Feedback vs. 
Strict Feedback) & 3 
(Feedback: No feedback vs. 
Feedback for LEX vs. 
Feedback for Equal Weight) 
Article 4 including 
judgment data from Studies 
1-3 and Study 6 
   3 (Age Group: 7-year-olds 
vs. 9-year-olds vs. Adults) 
  2 (Scale Format: Intuitive 
vs. Analytical)  
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Author Contributions 
 
Article 1 Lang, A., & Betsch, T. (2018). Children’s neglect of probabilities in decision 
making with and without feedback. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 191. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00191 
 Conceived and designed the experiments: AL, TB 
 Performed the experiment & analyzed the data: AL 
 Wrote the paper: AL 
 Approved the final draft: AL, TB 
 
Article 2 Lang, A., & Betsch, T. (2018). Children use but overcome non-adaptive 
decision strategies. Paper under review. 
 Conceived and designed the experiment: AL, TB 
 Performed the experiment & analyzed the data: AL 
 Wrote the paper: AL 
 Approved the final draft: AL, TB 
 
Article 3 Lang, A., & Betsch, T. (2018). Children learn simple, adaptive decision 
strategies from probabilistic feedback. Paper under review. 
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General Introduction 
  
 General Introduction 2 
 
As there a few sure things in life, most decision situations entail a fair amount of 
chance. Consequences of decision seldom occur for sure, but are more or less probable. If we 
are lucky, we have some notion of how probable outcomes are. For example, when deciding 
which of our friends to ask for help, past experience tells us who will be most likely to help 
out. When we decide, what medicine to take for a sore throat, probabilities of negative 
outcomes, such as side effects, are stated in the package insert. Since probabilities are so 
crucial, competent decision making inevitably includes utilizing probability in judgments and 
decisions (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Finucane, 
Slovic, Hibbard, Peters, Mertz, & MacGregor, 2002; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Stanovich & 
West, 1998; Weller, Levin, Rose, & Bossard, 2011). 
If we want to determine whether and when children are competent in making their 
own decisions, we must therefore ask at what age children utilize probability in judgment and 
decision making. From an educational perspective, this begs the question, whether and when 
we should teach children to appropriately utilize probabilities (Bryant & Nunes, 2012); 
especially, since without formal education, some misconceptions about probability persist into 
adulthood (e.g., Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974). 
Probabilistic Decision Making in Children 
Do children utilize probabilities in their decisions or judgments? According to Piaget 
& Inhelder (1975), children’s understanding of chance and probability is limited. Their stage 
model of cognitive development claims that children have no notion of probability until 
reaching the concrete-operational stage (7-8 years), and cannot fully consider probability in a 
normative fashion until reaching the formal-operational stage (11-12 years). While early 
research partially supported this view (see Reyna & Brainerd, 1994, for an overview), 
manifold research has shown that preschool aged children—around the age of five—adapt 
behavior in line with probability over a wide range of situations (Acredolo, O’Connor, Banks, 
& Horobin, 1989; Boyer, 2007; Brainerd, 1981; Davies, 1965; Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, & 
Griffiths, 2010; Girotto, Fontanari, Gonzalez, Vallortigara, & Blaye, 2016; Girotto & 
Gonzalez, 2008; Goldberg, 1966; Gonzalez & Girotto, 2011; Hoemann & Ross, l992; 
Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007; Reyna & Brainerd, 1994; Zhu & Gigerenzer, 
2006; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010). Moreover, even infants seem to base 
their expectations on probability (Denison, Reed, & Xu, 2013; Denison & Xu, 2010; Teglas, 
Girotto, Gonzalez, & Bonatti, 2007; Teglas, Vul, Girotto, Gonzalez, Tenenbaum, & Bonatti, 
2011; Xu & Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008). This supports the view that intuitions about 
probability emerge early in life and allow even very young children to utilize probability in 
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judgments and decisions (Anderson & Schlottman, 1991; Dension & Xu, 2014; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1994; Schlottmann, 2001, Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). Empirical findings 
remain nevertheless heterogeneous: At the age of five, children can for example estimate 
posterior probability (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001) but cannot use probabilistic relations to 
predict distributions of attributes (Kalish, 2010); they can judge expected values of gambles 
(Schlottmann, 2001) but not always choose successfully between them (Girotto, et al., 2016; 
Levin & Hart, 2003; Levin, Hart, Weller, & Harshman, 2007; Levin, Weller, et al. 2007). 
In line with this mixed findings, dual-process models assume that two distinct systems 
are involved in judgment and decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Hogarth, 2001, 
2005; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000; Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977). The first system—described as intuitive, automatic, or experiential—handles 
decision making intuitively, which allows effortless and quick decisions (see Glöckner & 
Wittmann, 2010, and Evans, 2008, for more detailed discussions of dual-process theories). 
This intuitive system is available early, potentially since birth (Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002; 
Klaczynski, 2005; Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). The second system—described as 
controlled, deliberate, or analytical—handles decisions in an analytical, effortful and slower 
fashion and is thought to develop slowly with age (Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012; 
Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008; cf. Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Children might utilize 
probability in judgment and decisions if they can do so intuitively, but may not be able to do 
so if the analytical system is required. Accordingly, the question is not if children utilize 
probability but when they do so intuitively or analytically. 
Probabilistic Inference Decisions 
In this thesis, I investigate children’s judgment and decision making in probabilistic 
inference situations. Many real-world decisions allow to predict future consequences 
probabilistically by currently available cues. For example, in social decisions, when reactions 
of social partners can be predicted by present behavior such as mimics or body language 
(Brunswick, 1955); or in consumer decisions, where the durability of a product, such as a 
smartphone, is predicted by its prize and manufacturer. This structure is mimicked in 
probabilistic inferences decisions: Available cues predict outcomes of options 
probabilistically, and this probability varies, some cues predict outcomes better than others. 
The probabilistic cue-outcome relation—the cue validity—can either be available as 
summarized description provided by others (This cue predicts 70% of cases correctly; e.g., 
Bröder, Glöckner, Betsch, & Link, 2013) or can be learned gradually by personal observing 
cue-outcome contingencies (e.g., Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 2006). Cue validities 
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and predicted values can then be integrated into a judgment for each alternative and lastly 
allow a decision between choice alternatives. All probabilistic inference decisions thus require 
to utilize probabilistic cues to predict a criterion. Still, they vary on a multitude of facets, such 
as the type of the criterion variable (continuous vs. categorical), the relation between criterion 
variable and cues (linear vs. non-linear; same vs. different variable), the display of options 
(option as cue-compounds vs. as distinct entities) and the framing of the task (city size task 
vs. weather prediction task; e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1991; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; 
Lagnado et al., 2006). 
How do adults master such decisions? The research has produced a variety of theories. 
Cue Abstraction models assume that adults form mental representations of each cue validity 
(Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979). These representations can either be informed by 
stated cue validities and or be learned from observing cue-outcome contingencies as long as 
they are not overly complex (e.g., Brehmer, 1980; Harvey & Fisher, 1997; Lagnado et al., 
2006, see Karealaia & Hogarth, 2008, and Harvey & Fischer, 2005, for overviews). 
Normative decision theory, its subjective variants, and network models then assume that 
decision makers integrate cue validities and values using a universal mechanism: they weight 
all cue values with their (subjective) validity and add them up to an expected value (Edwards, 
1954; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1981; see Glöckner & Betsch, 2008, for an automatic 
integration in a network model). 
In contrast, adaptive decision models assume that not all information is integrated, but 
that decision makers apply simple strategies using different integration mechanisms. For 
example, considering values of the most valid cue and ignoring others (Gigerenzer, Todd, & 
the ABC Research Group, 1999; Payne et al., 1988). 
Exemplar-models take a completely different approach (Juslin, Jones, Olsson, & 
Winman, 2003): They neglect a mental representation and rule-based integration of cue 
validities. Instead, they assume that decision makers encode instances of cue value patterns 
and outcomes, store them, and retrieve them during judgments or decision making as a 
function of similarity between previous and current cue patterns. 
Empirical findings are inconclusive on the superiority of any theoretical approach. 
Potentially, adult decision making rely on all mechanisms depending on environmental 
factors, such as task complexity and framing (Bröder, Newell, & Platzer, 2010; Karlsson, 
Juslin, & Olsson, 2007). 
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Probabilistic Inference Decisions in Children 
Children also face probabilistic inference decisions. Imagine for example, when the 
child wishes to maximize suspense of the bedtime story and can choose which parent will tell 
it. The child knows that one of the parents—for example, the mother—is more talented in 
telling stories. Accordingly, suspense is more likely to be maximized in her story. However, 
tiredness is another predictor, which is negatively correlated with suspense of the story. Since 
the mother seems to be more tired than the father, both observable cues point to different 
options. Tiredness may be a more valid predictor for an exciting bed time story than general 
talent of the storyteller and therefore this cue’s prediction should receive more weight in the 
decision. 
Research on children’s probabilistic inferences shows that children until the age of 
nine fail to consider differences in cue validities when making these decisions: At the age of 
five, all children, at the age of nine most children do not utilize cue validities in their 
decisions, and even older children’s decisions diverge from adult controls (Betsch & Lang, 
2013; Betsch, Lang, Lehmann, & Axmann, 2014; Mata, van Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011). 
However, reasons for this probability neglect are still unknown, and are further investigated in 
this thesis. 
Feedback in Decision Making 
In most real-world decisions, we experience some consequences when making a 
decision. The feedback we receive might not be immediate or of urgent importance, but can 
affect future decisions. Despite this conceivable notion, the role of feedback had initially been 
neglected in judgment and decision making theory, due to its origin in economic theories of 
rational choice. These theories were occupied with fully described one-shot decisions, that is, 
probabilities were provided in a summarized fashion and the decision was made only once, 
not recurrently. Expected value theory and its subjective variants claimed that decision 
makers integrate (subjective) stated probability and (subjective) stated value to an (subjective) 
expected value in a normative fashion (EV = p  v and EU = p  u; Edwards, 1954; 
Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; see 
Machina, 1987, for an overview). 
Feedback was thus theoretically not incorporated until the idea of adaptive decision 
making (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Payne, et al., 1988). It postulates a multitude of decision 
strategies apart from normative probability-value-integration and thus requires a mechanism 
of strategy selection. Decision feedback can function as such a mechanism: It informs the 
decision maker how accurately a strategy performs and allows to adaptively select strategies 
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depending on their performance (Beach and Mitchel, 1978; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Payne et 
al., 1988; Rieskamp, 2008; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). 
In addition, research focused on the origin of decision-making routines (Betsch & 
Haberstroh, 2005), on feedback processing in pure experience-based decision (that is, when 
feedback is the only source of information, for example in the IOWA gambling task; Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), and on differences in decisions based on stated 
probabilities compared with  probabilities learned from feedback (description-experience gap; 
Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev et al., 2010; Erev & Barron, 2005; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & 
Erev, 2004). 
The direction and size of feedback’s effect on judgment and decision making is 
theoretically and empirically non-uniform. Feedback can either be helpful or harmful 
depending on its properties, such as its complexity, timing, and format and on its functions 
(Bangerts-Drowns, Kulik, Kulil, & Morgan, 1991; Fyfe & Rittle-Johnson, 2015; Hattie & 
Timperley, 2007; Karelaia & Hogarth, 1998; Kluger & deNisi, 1996; Narciss & Huth, 2004; 
Shute, 2008). Generally, feedback can fulfill at least three distinct functions in decision 
making (but see the aforementioned references for more detailed analysis): 
First, feedback enables to learn from trial and error which behavioral response—which 
choice, for example—produces reward and punishment. In line with classical conditioning 
(Pavlow, 1926), Thorndike’s law of effect (1911), and more specified reinforcement learning 
models (Sutton & Barto, 1998), reinforced behavioral actions are repeated more frequently 
over time, and individuals learn, for example, to choose options with larger or more frequent 
rewards. This learning process is thought to work automatically, explains decision making in 
simple, uninformed decisions in humans and other animals (see Daw & Tobler, 2014; Dayan 
& Niv, 2008; for an overview, see Worthy & Maddox, 2014), and improves in humans until 
adulthood (Cassoti, Aïte, Osmont, Houdé, & Borst, 2014; van den Bos, Güroğlu, van den 
Bulk, Rombouts, Crone, 2009). 
Second, feedback provides the decision maker with information and allows to build up 
a valid mental model of the environment (Byrnes, Miller & Reynolds, 1999; Daw, Gershman, 
Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; Fyfe & Rittle-Johnson, 2015). The informational value of 
feedback—it can for example be representative of the feedback distribution or biased (Fiedler, 
2008)—and an individual’s prior knowledge, beliefs, or feedback attribution affects what can 
be learned. Thus, the interaction between decision maker and environment determines the 
match of the mental model and reality, and whether feedback improves judgments or 
decisions. 
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Third, feedback can affect motivation, perceptions of self-efficacy and can increase or 
decrease the cognitive effort individuals are willing to invest (Bandura, 1977; Deci & Ryan, 
1985; Weiner, 1974). This illustrates that effects of feedback on decision making are 
inevitably complex and must account for properties of the decision environment and decision 
maker. 
Feedback in Children’s Probabilistic Decision Making 
Learning from outcomes is nevertheless a powerful tool to improve judgment and 
decision making. It is thus an important factor from a developmental perspective, because it 
might help to overcome deficits, boost development, or even eradicate age-dependent 
differences in performance. 
In children the role of feedback in probabilistic decisions has mainly been investigated 
in variants of gambling tasks: Children of different ages (the youngest at age three, Bunch, 
Andrews, & Halford, 2007) repeatedly encounter the same choice-options. Options differ in 
expected value. Children draw samples, gradually learn the expected value of each option, 
and maximize outcomes by choosing the option highest in expected value. Importantly, in 
such uninformed decision situations, feedback is the only source of information to elicit 
expected value of options (but see van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Bredman, & Huizenga, 2012, 
for informed gamble situations). This research has shown that children learn expected values 
from feedback, but less efficiently than adults (see Cassoti et al., 2014; Defoe, Dubas, Figner, 
& Aken, 2015, for developmental reviews). Moreover, they show some biases, such as over-
responsiveness to negative outcomes and overweighting of large values (Cassoti et al, 2014; 
van Duijvenvoorde, et al., 2012). 
Research on feedback in probabilistic inference decisions is scarce (Lang & Betsch, 
2013; see Mata et al., 2011, for 9-11year olds). This thesis is thus the first attempt to 
systematically investigate the role of feedback in probabilistic inference decisions from a 
developmental perspective. In contrast to aforementioned gambling paradigms, decisions are 
more complex and informed, that is probabilities are stated before judgment or decisions, in 
form of cue validities. Crucially, stated cue validities and values are sufficient and feedback is 
unnecessary to maximize decision outcomes or to give accurate judgments. 
This mixed-source situation constitutes the—specifically human—conflict between 
stated probability and self-sampled decision outcomes. When stated probabilities are valid, 
single decision outcomes do not add informational value to the decision and should be 
disregarded. In adults, feedback nevertheless detrimentally affects decisions and increases 
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deviance from normative benchmarks (Jessup, Bishara, & Busemeyer, 2008; Lejarraga & 
Gonzalez, 2011; Newell & Rakow, 2007; Yechiam, Erev, & Barron, 2006). 
Beneficial as well as detrimental effects of feedback on children’s decision making are 
conceivable in mixed-source situations. Detrimental to decisions might be that feedback 
increases task complexity and causes cognitive overload (Harvey, 2011). Further, children 
might prefer feedback over stated probability, and rely on merely feedback-based decision 
strategies, like adults (Jessup, Bishara, & Busemeyer, 2008; Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011; 
Newell & Rakow, 2007; Yechiam, Erev, & Barron, 2006). Lastly feedback might encourage 
exploration of the pay-off structure instead of exploitation of stated probabilities (see 
Mehlhorn et al., 2015, for the trade-off between exploration and exploitation in decisions). As 
a result, providing decision outcomes after each choice might impair probability utilization in 
children. 
At the same time, feedback might benefit children: It allows to observe cue-outcome 
contingencies and might increase saliency of the probabilistic relations between cues and 
outcomes. Further, it allows to update misbeliefs about the task’s structure and about the 
performance of decision strategies. If children do have misconceptions about how valid each 
cue is or how well a decision strategy performs, they might acquire more accurate beliefs over 
time with feedback. 
In six studies, I investigated detrimental (Article 1) and beneficial (Article 2, 3) effects 
of feedback on children’s probabilistic decisions and judgments (Article 4). 
Research Approach 
In all studies, I confronted participants with the same probabilistic inference decision 
task and varied decision feedback (except in Study 6). The paradigm, first used by Betsch & 
Lang (2013), adapts the classic MouseLab paradigm (Payne et al., 1988). In the child-friendly 
adaption, participants choose repeatedly between two options, which can yield positive or 
negative consequences. Before each decision, participants inspect three probabilistic cues that 
predict options’ outcomes but differ in validity, that is, some cues predict outcomes better 
than others. Throughout all studies the cues’ predictions were organized in a 2 × 3 matrix of 
an information-board, that is, three cues predict the outcomes of two options (see Figure 1). 
This results in a simple information-board in comparison to adult decision research (e.g., 
Payne et al., 1988) and to non-probabilistic child research (Davidson, 1991a, 1991b, 1996; 
Gregan-Paxton & John, 1995, 1997; Howse, Best, & Stone, 2003; Klayman, 1985; Lindow, 
Lang, & Betsch, 2017). It is rather complex though, in comparison to research in children’s 
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probabilistic decision making, where children are often confronted with winning probabilities 
and values of one or two gambles (e.g., Levin & Hart, 2003; Schlottmann, 2001). 
This high complexity has two methodological benefits: First, it allows to detect 
individual differences in decision strategies. In particular, decisions with more than two cues 
allow to differentiate between prominent decision strategies (but see Betsch & Lang, 2013, for 
decisions with two cues and the following sections for more details on decision strategies). 
Second, the paradigm offers probabilistic and other kinds of information. It is therefore suited 
to investigate whether children prefer probabilistic information in the presence of irrelevant 
information (Lang & Betsch, 2013). Arguably, this decision situation resembles real-world 
decisions much closer, where probability is hardly ever encountered in isolation. 
We also used an open information-board in all studies except Study 1. In comparison 
to a closed board, which requires to search covered cue values sequentially, it reduces the 
effortful information search and allows to inspect all cue values at once (Betsch et al., 2014; 
see Glöckner & Betsch, 2008, for discussions).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The structure of a probabilistic inference decision with three cues predicting 
positive (+) or negative (−) outcomes for Option 1 and 2 (A). A real-world example (B): the 
decision maker wants to buy a durable smart phone, and tries to predict the future durability 
based on probabilistic cues, such as prize, battery quality and brand. The child-friendly 
adaption shows the Treasure Hunt (C). Cues are represented by animals and options by 
houses; positive and negative cue values are pictorial. 
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Stated Cue Validities 
Whereas in adult decision making, probabilities are mainly given in numerical 
formats—mostly as percentages (80% winning probability) or relative frequencies (8 out of 
10)—there are various ways to address this challenge in child participants. The first and most 
straightforward way is to provide children with a natural event-space that defines the 
probability. A winning probability of p = .33 for a lottery can, for example, be constructed by 
three boxes with only one containing a prize (e.g., Levin et al., 2007). The second approach is 
to substitute this event-space by an easy to grasp variable co-varying with probability, for 
example a magnitude. Accordingly, the lottery’s winning probability is illustrated by a 
spinner wheel consisting of two colored areas, when the winning area takes up one third of the 
total (e.g., Schlottmann, 2001). Third, frequencies can be observed over time in a defined 
sample, for example when the lottery wins in one out of three times (e.g., Pasquini et al., 
2007). Percentages or other numerical formats can be used at late elementary school age, 
when children understand them sufficiently (e.g., Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2002; Mata, et al., 2011; van Dujvenvoorde et al., 2012). 
We used a relative frequency format to demonstrate each cue’s validity to children 
(Figure 2A-C). Encoding of frequencies is automatic and effortless (Hasher & Zacks, 1979) 
and frequency formats are simpler to process than probability formats even for adults 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Participants thus observed cue predictions and the respective 
outcome several times in a defined sample and encoded how often the cue predicted outcomes 
correctly (e.g., in three out of six times). All variables (that is, cue predictions and outcomes) 
were binary (positive, negative) and pictorial (treasure and spider) to reduce complexity and 
facilitate encoding (Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997). 
The relation between the cue and the predicted outcome variable is given by the cue 
validity. A cue can predict a positive outcome correctly (+ | +) or a negative outcome 
correctly (− | −). It can also incorrectly predict a positive outcome (+ | −) or incorrectly predict 
a negative outcome (− | +). Exact definitions of cue validities vary between research fields, 
researchers, and specifics of the task (e.g., Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002; Platzer & Bröder, 
2012). We calculated each cue’s validity as the probability that the cue predicts the outcome 
correctly, given by the ratio of the number of correct to all predictions. 
 
p = 
(+ | +) + (- | -)
(+ | +) + (- | -) + (+ | -) + (- | +)
 
 
Note, that alternative accounts to describe the statistical relation result in similar cue 
hierarchies. 
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Importantly, the range of cue validity is constrained in binary worlds: A cue validity of 
p = .50 is uninformative but cue validities below can be inversely used (e.g., p = .10 ≡ .90). 
Cue validities can thus at most vary between .50 ≤ p < 1, if each cue is probabilistically 
related to the outcome. However, since we introduced cue validities as frequencies, the range 
of cue validities was further constraint by the sample size n (i.e., the number of times each cue 
predicted outcomes and was granted or denied a smart point). Thus, the most dispersed cue 
validities for n = 6, were p = .50, p = .83, in accordance with three and five correct 
predictions; and for n = 7, p = .56, p = .86, in accordance with four and six correct 
predictions.  
Expected Value Calculations and Decision Strategies 
Normative decision theory prescribes to weight cue values by their validity, add them 
up to the weighted sum for each option (for example in Figure 2D, EVleft 
option = w1 × 0 + w2 × 0 + w3 × 1 and EVright option = w1 × 1 + w2 × 0 + w3 × 0), and choose the 
option with the maximum expected value. 
It is still debated whether and how cue validities must be transformed to be used as 
weights in these calculations. For illustration, consider an uninformative cue with p = .5. 
When calculating the expected value, this cue’s values should be assigned a weight of 0. A 
log-transformation of cue validities accounts for that fact, (𝑙𝑜𝑔
p
1-p
 , Lee, 2014). Other 
suggestions are to subtract .5, and use these “chance-corrected” cue validities (p − .50; Hilbig 
& Moshagen, 2014; Jekel, Glöckner, Fiedler, & Bröder, 2012), or use cue validities as 
weights without any correction (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Rieskamp and Otto, 2006). 
Transforming weights can lead to different predictions for weighted-additive models. 
Previous results using the Treasure Hunt suggest that some adults applied a weighted-additive 
model with uncorrected cue validities (which prescribes to choose the left option in Figure 
2D, E, but the right option in Figure 2F; Betsch et al., 2014). 
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Figure 2. Figure shows the Treasure Hunt with n = 6 and p1 = .50, p2 = .66, p3 = .83. 
Participants encoded cue validities prior to decision making (A-C). They observed the 
prediction of one cue and the outcome. If the cue predicted correctly, they granted a smart 
point to the cue. Cue validities were thus depicted graphically as a magnitude of smart points. 
Participants then made several decisions between two options and could inspect varying 
predictions of three cues (D-F). 
 
The bounded rationality approach to decision making suggests that expected value 
calculations are cognitively effortful and time consuming (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Payne et 
al., 1988; Simon, 1954). Thus, humans rely on simplifying decision strategies (Gigerenzer, et 
al, 1999). The adult decision making literature has produced a variety of strategies that can be 
applied to probabilistic inferences apart from the normative weighted-additive model. The 
most prominent is the Lexicographic or take-the-best strategy (Fishburn, 1974; Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). It prescribes to consider only the values of the most valid cue and to choose 
the option for which this cue’s value is positive (e.g., the left option in Figure 2D). When the 
cue is indifferent, the strategy prescribes to go to the next highest valid cue or to guess 
between options. 
Another prominent example, is the Equal Weight strategy (Payne et al., 1988). It 
neglects differences in cue validities, only counts the number of positive values for each 
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option, and choses the option with the maximum positive values (e.g., right option in Figure 
2F) or guesses in case of a tie. 
Dispersion of Cue Validities 
The dispersion of cue validities and thus whether a strategy was adaptive varied 
between studies. In all studies except Study 5, we created highly dispersed decision 
environments. In order to maximize decision outcomes, a Lexicographic strategy that only 
considers the most valid cue’s values is sufficient and allows fast and frugal decision making 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer, et al, 1999). More complex strategies, such as 
weighted-additive yield equally good results, but request more time and cognitive efforts (but 
see Glöckner & Betsch 2008, for automatic, non-effortful implementation of a weighted-
additive-like process). Accordingly, the environment invites the application of simple 
strategies. 
Assigning the same validity to both the low valid cues in Study 4, further increased the 
salience of the most valid cue. Study 5 implemented a low dispersion of cue validities, in 
which decision strategies like Equal Weight were also adaptive. 
Decision Feedback 
In all studies, except Study 6, we additionally varied the presence of feedback on 
decisions outcomes as an experimental factor (Table 3). Control conditions offered no 
immediate feedback after decisions. Participants were confined to stated cue validities to 
inform judgments or decisions. When feedback maintained cue validities, the stated cue 
validities were reproduced in the feedback structure, for example, a cue with a stated validity 
of p = .50 correctly predicted outcomes in 50% of decisions. When feedback reinforced 
decision strategies, one defined strategy yielded the best outcomes while competing strategies 
performed worse. To achieve these differences in reinforcement, cue validities were allowed 
to vary over the course of decisions. Note, that feedback was normatively irrelevant to 
maximize outcomes. All relevant information, that is cue validities and values, were available 
in advance. 
To sum up, we used a mixed-source paradigm that stated probabilistic information 
prior to decision making in form of probabilistic relations between cues and outcomes—the 
cues’ validities—and varied immediate feedback on decision outcomes. 
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Table 1 
Overview of decision environments in Study 1-6 
Study  
  
Stated probabilities 
  Feedback  
 
 None  Maintain  Reinforce 
1  p1 = .5, p2=.66, p3 = .83  X  X  — 
2  p1 = .5, p2=.66, p3 = .83  X  X  — 
3  p1 = .5, p2=.66, p3 = .83  X  X  — 
4  p1 = .57, p2=.57, p3 = .86  X  X  X 
5  p1 = .72, p2=.72, p3 = .86  X  —  X 
6   p1 = .5, p2=.66, p3 = .83   —   X   — 
Note. Maintain = feedback maintains stated probabilities; Reinforce = feedback reinforces a 
specified decision strategy; probabilities are allowed to diverge from stated values over time. 
 
Measuring decisions, decision strategies and judgments. In Articles 1-3, we 
analyzed participants’ decisions. The approach was two-folded: Choice data at the group level 
was compared with a normative benchmark. In addition, conclusions about each individual’s 
strategy in a series of decisions were drawn from individual data patterns, using an outcome-
based maximum likelihood classification method (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). Other methods, 
such as verbal protocols or tracking of active information search might bias strategy 
application (e.g., Betsch, Funke, & Plessner, 2011; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008 for discussions). 
Article 4 analyzes probability utilization in predictive judgments. Participants 
predicted event frequencies that should be based on cue validities. There, I likewise analyzed 
judgments on group level, comparing each age groups to a normative benchmark, and 
additionally individual judgments. 
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Summary of the Research. Article 1 investigates whether children prefer feedback 
over stated probabilistic information and whether interference of feedback can explain 
deviations from normative models of choices. Six-year-olds’, 9-year-olds’, and adults’ 
decision making was examined in a decision environment where probabilistic information 
about choice outcome had to be actively searched (N = 166) or was available without search 
before choices (N = 183). This information was provided as predictions of cues differing in 
validity. The presence of outcome feedback was varied. 
Six-year-olds, but not 9-year-olds were over-responsive to negative outcomes leading 
to choices biased by recent feedback. However, children did not systematically utilize 
feedback in choices. Irrespective of feedback, 6-year-olds fully and 9-year-olds partly 
neglected stated probabilistic information in their choices. When 6-year-olds chose 
systematically, they only relied on irrelevant information, which did not maximize outcomes. 
Nine-year-olds still applied invalid choice rules, but also choice rules based on probability. 
Results suggest that neglect of probabilities in complex decisions is robust, 
independent of feedback, and only starts to subside at elementary school age. 
Article 2 assessed both adaptive and non-adaptive decision strategies in 6-year-olds, 
9-year-olds and adults to investigate how often, accurately and persistently children apply 
them. Previously, children aged nine and younger seemed to decide randomly without any 
systematic plan in probabilistic decision environments. Research focused on detecting 
adaptive decision strategies that consider probabilistic information embedded in the 
environment and are used by adults. However, it ignored non-adaptive decision strategies that 
focus on irrelevant information and might be used by children. 
Results show that half of the children in each age group applied a decision strategy 
accurately. Six-year-olds predominantly used non-adaptive strategies, while 9-year-olds used 
adaptive strategies as well. Full feedback positively affected strategy use: children abandoned 
non-adaptive strategies, or applied them less consistently. 
Results suggest that children are able to systematically apply decision strategies very 
early in life. Similar to other cognitive areas, they initially use inefficient strategies, but 
overcome them with increasing age and experience. 
In Article 3, we investigated 7- and 9-year-old children’s learning of simple adaptive 
strategies from feedback. In Study 1 (N = 316), both age groups learned the selective 
Lexicographic decision strategy, which only focused on the most valid cue, equally good. 
Strategy learning was slighty better in a stricter compared with a more lenient feedback 
condition and worse than in adult controls. In Study 2 (N = 259), feedback either reinforced 
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the selective Lexicographic strategy or the holistic Equal Weight strategy. Younger children 
learned the holistic strategy better, while older children learned both equally well. In both 
studies, children rarely used adaptive decision strategies without feedback, although a priori 
stated dispersion of probabilities suggested their use.  
Under ideal circumstances, that is, in highly dispersed probabilistic environments and 
when adaptive strategies are not too complex to perform, feeding back decision outcomes 
improves children’s, otherwise very deficient, decision making. 
Article 4 investigates whether children at the age of six and nine utilize probabilistic 
relations between cues and outcomes in predictive judgments. It shows that probability 
utilization in judgments emerges late and follows the same developmental trajectory as in 
decisions: Probability utilization is absent in 6-year-olds and emerging in 9-year-olds. 
Children’s judgments show that their expectations of outcomes are not informed by 
probability until late elementary school age. Results remain consistent across studies and are 
unaffected by experience of participants or scale formats used to assess judgments. 
The findings contradict the notion that children utilize probabilities in judgments 
earlier than in decisions and highlight that deficits in probabilistic judgments persist until the 
age of nine. 
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Abstract 
We investigated whether children prefer feedback over stated probabilistic information and 
whether interference of feedback can explain deviations from normative models of choices. 
6-year-olds’, 9-year-olds’, and adults’ decision making was examined in a decision 
environment where probabilistic information about choice outcome had to be actively 
searched (N = 166) or was available without search before choices (N = 183). This 
information was provided as predictions of cues differing in validity. The presence of 
outcome feedback was varied. Six-year-olds, but not nine-year-olds were over-responsive to 
negative outcomes leading to choices biased by recent feedback. However, children did not 
systematically utilize feedback in choices. Irrespective of feedback, 6-year-olds fully and 9-
year-olds partly neglected stated probabilistic information in their choices. When 6-year-olds 
chose systematically, they only relied on invalid information, which did not maximize 
outcomes. Nine-year-olds still applied invalid choice rules, but also choice rules based on 
probability. Results suggest that neglect of probabilities in complex decisions is robust, 
independent of feedback, and only starts to subside at elementary school age. 
Keywords: child decision making, probabilistic inference, feedback, win-stay-lose-
shift, information board 
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Children’s Neglect of Probabilities in Decision Making with and without Feedback 
Children, like adults, must make decisions in an uncertain world. Distributions of 
behavioral outcomes are governed by the rules of probability. It is a developmental challenge 
to become sensitive and responsive to the probabilistic relations between choices and 
outcomes in order to achieve decision competence. Information about these relations can be 
conveyed prior to choices in a summarized form in terms of stated probabilities, for example 
by stating winning probabilities of gambles (Edwards, 1954; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Such information can also be gradually acquired when choices are performed and met with 
feedback from the environment. When sequentially sampled feedback is valid and properly 
stored in memory, it can provide a powerful source for subsequent intuitions and decisions 
(Hogarth, 2001).  
There is large body of research on the utilization of stated probabilities—not only in 
the adult but also in the child decision making literature (e.g., Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008; 
Levin, Hart, Weller, & Harshman, 2007; Schlottman, 2001). There is also a great number of 
studies on experience-based decision making where children learn from feedback (e.g., Boyer, 
2007; Bunch, Andrews, & Halford, 2007; Van den Bos, Güroglu, van den Bulk, Rambouts, & 
Crone, 2009). Mixed-source paradigms in which decision makers have access to both stated 
probabilities and feedback, however, are rare in child decision making research (Betsch, 
Lang, Lehmann, & Axmann, 2014; Van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Bredman & Huizenga, 2012; 
Mata, van Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011). 
In addition, so far research lacks the systematic variation of access to both kinds of 
information to understand their respective influence on decision making in children. As a first 
attempt to fill this gap, we varied the presence of feedback in an environment that provided 6-
year-olds and 9-year-olds with probabilistic cues and compared their performance to adults.  
Children’s Utilization of Stated Probabilistic Information in Decision Making 
In a variety of paradigms, children are confronted with stated probabilistic information 
in child-friendly formats, such as relative frequencies of options’ wins and losses, which they 
can subsequently utilize in choices. According to the classical Piagetian view, children up to 8 
years of age completely lack an understanding of probability and thus the ability to properly 
utilize such probabilistic information (Piaget & Inhelder, 1951). However, more recent 
research has documented sensitivity for probabilistic information in 8-months-old infants who 
distinguished probable from less probable samples based on statistical properties of their 
environment (Xu & Garcia, 2008). Preschool-aged children are able to utilize stated 
probabilistic information for decisions in social contexts when choosing whom to trust or 
 Probability Neglect and Feedback 33 
 
imitate (Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 
2010) but also to judge gambles with different expected values. Children as young as 5 years 
consider winning probabilities and values and even integrate these variables in a 
multiplicative fashion (Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & Tring, 2005). 
When it is required to not only judge but to choose between two or more risky options 
the findings have been strikingly different. Employing an information board paradigm, Betsch 
and co-workers (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014; Betsch, Lehmann, Lindow, Lang, 
& Schoemann, 2016) assessed probabilistic inference decisions in preschoolers (6-year-olds) 
and elementary schoolers (9-year-olds). Preschoolers were not able to systematically use 
stated probabilistic information as decision weights. Moreover, only about one third of 
elementary schoolers was able to do so. This is consistent with studies that have shown that 
children up to 8 years of age do not systematically consider stated probabilistic information 
when choosing between lotteries (Levin & Hart, 2003; Levin, Weller, Pederson, & Harshman, 
2007, but see Levin, Hart, et al., 2007). Thus, the evidence on children’s abilities to utilize 
stated probabilistic information for decision making is mixed. Judgment tasks so far suggest 
that children at preschool age consider such information (Acredolo, O'Connor, Banks, & 
Horobin, 1989; Anderson & Schlottmann, 1991; Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & Tring, 
2005); results in choice tasks are rather inconclusive with some demonstrating its utilization 
prior to school age (Levin, Hart, et al., 2007; Pasquini et al. 2007; Zmyj et al., 2010), while 
others do not (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014, 2016; Levin & Hart, 2003; Levin 
Weller, et al. 2007). 
Children’s Utilization of Feedback in Decision Making 
Children’s ability to improve their decisions through feedback has been studied with 
gambling tasks in which participants repeatedly choose between options of different expected 
value (e.g., decks of cards), and only learn about frequencies and magnitudes of associated 
gains and losses through experiencing outcomes. Children up to 13 years of age typically fail 
to properly learn from feedback to avoid inferior options when multiple pieces of information 
such as gains and losses for different options have to be considered to make a choice 
(forbreviews see, Cassotti, Aïte, Osmont, Houde, & Borst, 2014; Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & van 
Aken, 2014). The high complexity of this type of game presumably accounts for the poor 
performance (but cf. Crone, Bunge, Latenstein, & van der Molen, 2005). In simpler versions, 
children at preschool age learn to choose the advantageous option more frequently (Boyer, 
2007; Kerr & Zelazo, 2004). When options only differ on one dimension (e.g., only gains) 
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even 3-year-olds can adapt their choices and improve their decisions over time (Bunch et al., 
2007). 
Further, children’s deficits in feedback processing are, at least partly, caused by their 
over-responsiveness to negative outcomes. When choosing between options, children are 
highly sensitive towards negative feedback (Crone et al., 2005; Eppinger, Mock, & Kray, 
2009; Huizenga, Crone, & Jansen, 2007) and tend to switch behavioral responses after 
experiencing failure (Cassotti, Houdé, & Moutier, 2011; Van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2012). In a 
probabilistic environment where even the best performing behavior sometimes provides 
negative outcomes, this tendency leads children to abandon the superior response and thus 
prevents optimal choice performance (see Brehmer, 1980, for similar findings in adults) 
Mixed-Information Paradigms 
Studies that provide children with both stated information about probabilistic relations 
between choices and outcomes and self-sampled experience are rare. Mata et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that 9-year-olds can adapt their decision strategies to feedback in an 
information-board paradigm, when probabilistic information is provided before choices. Van 
Duijvenvoorde et al. (2012) observed children’s abilities to identify the advantageous option 
in a gambling task to be much improved when outcome probabilities and values were made 
explicit. However, even then children up to 13 years could not overcome the tendency to 
switch options after experiencing failure. 
While these findings show that decisions can improve when the probabilistic 
properties of the environment are stated, research in child decision making provides little 
insight into how feedback influences choices that should be based on stated probabilistic 
information. Importantly, even in adults, feedback does not always improve decision making 
(see Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008, for a review) and can increase deviations from normative 
models (Barron & Erev, 2003; Newell & Rakow, 2007). Betsch and co-workers (Betsch & 
Lang, 2013M; Betsch et al., 2014, 2016) found that 6-year-old preschoolers fully neglected 
stated probabilistic information, available as validities of different cues, and 9-year-olds partly 
did so when feedback could also be used for subsequent choices. Especially preschoolers 
switched between options in line with the last experienced outcome (Betsch & Lang, 2013). 
This leads to the question whether children’s neglect of such probabilistic information is due 
to the presence of feedback. As a second source of information, feedback can be used mal-
adaptively by children and decrease the reliance on stated probabilistic information. If this is 
the case, children’s utilization of stated probabilistic information should be increased when no 
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feedback is available. On the other hand, if feedback does not contribute to children’s 
probability neglect, it should be observed with and without feedback. 
Research Goal and Approach 
In two studies we investigated whether feedback can account for children’s neglect of 
stated probabilistic information in a mixed-source paradigm. We followed the research 
approach from Betsch et al. (2014) in which probabilistic information was available as 
validities of predictive cues while feedback about decision outcomes could be experienced 
after each choice. Crucially, the information was redundant. Feedback reinforced the structure 
of the cues’ validities and reinforced both options equally. To investigate whether children’s 
decision making deteriorates when they can sample choices outcomes themselves, we 
manipulated the presence of feedback. When feedback was provided we expected children to 
demonstrate over-responsiveness to negative outcomes, and to prefer feedback information 
over cue validities, reflected in relying on a simplifying feedback-heuristic, that is, staying 
with one option until it fails. When feedback was absent, we expected children to increasingly 
utilize cue validities. 
Research Paradigm 
In both experiments, we used a computerized version of an information-board 
paradigm (Mousekids) which adapted the classic Mouselab tool (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson 
1988). It resembles different tasks applied in adult decision making research, such as 
probabilistic inferences (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Kleinbölting, 1991), probabilistic 
category learning (e.g., Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 2006), and advice taking (e.g., 
Harvey & Fisher, 1997). Participants recurrently chose between two houses (i.e., decision 
options) in which either a treasure (i.e., positive outcome) or a spider (i.e., negative outcome) 
was hidden. Decision makers could inspect the predictions of three different animals (i.e., the 
cues), which were correct with a certain probability (i.e., cue validity, here p = .50, .66, .83). 
Participants were informed about cue validities in advance, and could utilize this information 
to maximize outcomes. Replicating the procedure from previous research (Betsch et al., 
2014), participants were confronted with different patterns of cues’ predictions. Although not 
the focus of our analysis, this allowed us to differentiate between probability-based decision 
strategies (specifically WADD and LEX, see section 1.4.2). Each participant was confronted 
with each cue pattern eight times in a fixed order resulting in 24 choices (Figure 1). The 
decision environment was non-compensatory: In order to make good decisions, simple 
heuristics were sufficient, that is, only the predictions of the high valid cue had to be 
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considered (Lexicographic rule, Fishburn, 1974; take-the-best, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). 
 
Figure 1. Types of prediction patterns. Each pattern was used four times in the depicted 
manner and four times in a mirrored version. Types were alternated starting with Type 1. In 
the first pattern, the low validity cue contradicts the high validity cue’s prediction, whereas 
the medium validity cue is indifferent and predicts a negative outcome for both options. In the 
second pattern, the medium validity cue predicts a positive outcome for both options and the 
low and high validity cues contradict each other. In the last pattern, both lower validity cues 
contradict the high valid cue’s prediction. 
 
Following each decision, participants either received selective outcome feedback—
that is, they were informed about the consequence of the chosen option—or no feedback. The 
probabilistic feedback structure during choices was adopted from previous research (Betsch et 
al., 2014) and matched each cue’s validity, that is, for example the prediction of a positive 
outcome by the high valid cue was correct 83% of the trials while the prediction by the low 
valid cue was correct in only 50%. Either one or both options could result in positive 
outcomes in each trial. The feedback schedule further reinforced options equally, that is, each 
option provided positive and negative outcomes equally often. Thus, no option was superior. 
Normatively, the decisions should be based on the stated probabilistic information, that is, the 
cue validities and the encountered cue predictions.  
Choice Strategies in Children 
 In addition to group-level analysis, the inspection of individual strategies can reveal 
further within-age group variability. Therefore, we analyzed individual choice behavior using 
an outcome-based strategy classification method to test for a variety of choice strategies in 
children (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). In addition to the Lexicographic rule (LEX) predicts 
reliance on the high valid cue’s prediction only, we considered the weighted additive rule 
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(WADD: integrating weighted predictions of all cues; e.g., Payne et al., 1988)1 and an option-
based win-stay-lose-shift rule (WSLS) for the feedback conditions. According to this decision 
rule, the cues’ predictions are ignored and recent feedback predicts choices. A decision maker 
would thus stay with one option until it fails once and then switch to the other option until the 
next failure. This decision rule fits well with children’s tendency to switch after experiencing 
a negative outcome and represents a simple heuristic utilizing recent feedback. Additionally, 
we considered the strategy of following the low valid, but first selected cue (LVC, see section 
2.1.2), since previous research has demonstrated that children sometimes rely on how much 
they like a cue rather than on its validity (Betsch & Lang, 2013). Finally, we tested a simple 
alternation strategy, consisting of systematically switching between options regardless of 
feedback (SW, i.e., choosing the option rejected in the last trial; Brainerd, 1981). 
The considered strategies differ with regard to the amount and type of information 
taken into account. Two strategies are based on cue validities (LEX, WADD); one is based on 
recent feedback alone and can only be applied in feedback conditions (WSLS). Two rely on 
invalid information and neglect cue validities as well as feedback (LVC, SW). Based on prior 
findings (Betsch et al., 2016), we expected large differences between age groups, with the 
vast majority of adults, some proportion of elementary schoolers and only very few, if any, 
preschoolers using probability-based strategies when feedback is available. Instead we 
expected children to mal-adaptively use recent feedback for choices. On a group level, this 
would be indicated by over-responsiveness to negative outcomes, and on an individual level 
by the use of WSLS as a choice strategy. Without feedback we expected children of both age 
groups to systematically rely on cue validities in their choices. However, if probability-based 
strategies are equally rare, interference by feedback can be ruled out as a cause for children’s 
neglect of cue validities. 
Information Presentation 
We conducted two studies that used the same factorial design and age groups but differed in 
the presentation of the cues’ predictions. In Study 1 we used a closed information-board: 
Predictions were hidden and active information search was required (see Figure 2B). 
                                                 
1 For WADD all cue predictions should be weighted by cue validities (CV) and added up to determine the 
expected value for each option. In order to achieve a non-compensatory decision environment, we included a cue 
whose predictions were at chance level and could therefore be ignored. However, whether CVs are used as 
weights or must be transformed is discussed controversially (e.g., correcting for chance level, CV−.5, Hilbig & 
Moshagen, 2014; Jekel, Glöckner, Fiedler, & Bröder, 2012; or log-transforming, log(CV/1−CV), Lee, 2014). For 
determining predictions of WADD we used CVs without any correction as weights, thus WADD would predict 
following the HVC in the Type 1 and Type 2 predictions patterns but not in Type 3 where both other cues 
overrule predictions of the HVC (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999). Based on previous research (Betsch et al., 2014) 
we assumed that a substantial proportion of adults would apply an uncorrected form of WADD in this decision 
environment although it contradicts normative expectations, see also Footnote 2 and 3. 
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Individuals could access predictions by sequentially opening doors in the board. This format 
is most common in comparable studies conducted with adults (e.g., Payne et al., 1988), and 
allowed to investigate children’s information search behavior. We tested, whether the 
presence of feedback affected search behavior. Specifically, we investigated whether 
children’s search behavior was biased by over-responsiveness to negative feedback and 
systematically guided by cue validities without feedback. 
However, prior studies (Betsch et al., 2014; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008) have shown that 
the presentation format influences strategy application. Thus, in Study 2 we used an open 
board where all predictions are uncovered right from the start. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mousekids during cue observation and choices. Figure shows a screen during the 
observation of cue validities (A), and choices in the closed presentation format of Study 1 (B) 
and of the open presentation format of Study 2 (C). Prior to choices, probabilistic information 
is presented as validities of different cues. Specifically, participants observe relative 
frequencies of correct predictions of three cues. Each animal predicts outcomes six times; for 
example, the first animal predicts a positive outcome (i.e., treasure). Smart points at the left of 
each cue serve as a visual aid of cue validity during decision making (B, C). Participants then 
choose between two options and can inspect cue predictions. In the closed presentation 
format, participants uncover cue predictions before making a choice. In the open presentation 
format, cue predictions are uncovered. For example, participants can assess directly that the 
low valid cue predicts a negative outcome (spider) for the option on the left and a positive 
outcome (treasure) for the option on the right. At the top, a treasure point is granted for each 
treasure found in feedback conditions. 
 
Study 1: Closed Board 
Method 
The study implemented a 3 (age group: preschoolers vs. elementary schoolers vs. 
adults) × 2 (feedback: yes vs. no) full factorial design. Pattern was varied within subjects 
(Type 1 vs. Type 2 vs. Type 3). 
Sample. The sample consisted of 69 6-year-old preschoolers (28 female, M = 67.9 
months, SD = 7.3), 56 9-year-old elementary schoolers (25 female, M = 107.4 months, 
SD = 5.7), and 56 adults (46 female, M = 281.18 months, SD = 44.66) who were randomly 
assigned to feedback conditions. Children were recruited from day care centers and schools 
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with different socio-economic backgrounds from a middle-sized city in Germany. The 
recruitment procedure, selection of age groups, and target sample size followed considerations 
from prior work that used the same experimental tool (Betsch et al., 2014). Children took part 
in the study during a workshop at the lab and were randomly assigned to experimenters. 
Parents consented to participation prior to data collection. Adult participants were students of 
different majors. 
Eight preschoolers were excluded from analyses because they did not complete the study. 
Five preschoolers and two elementary schoolers were excluded because they did not identify 
the high valid cue correctly before choices. The final sample consisted of 56 preschoolers (23 
female, M = 68.0 months, SD = 7.3), 54 elementary schoolers (24 female, M = 107.5 months, 
SD = 5.7) and 56 adults. 
Procedure.  Each child was supervised by a trained experimenter who first introduced 
the child to the game’s purpose and the cues. The child selected three animals as cues. The 
first chosen animal was placed on the top row, the last chosen on the bottom row (see Figure 
2A). Thus, the favored animal, that is, the first chosen one, was always associated with the 
lowest validity. 
Observing cue validities. The experimenter told the child: “Now we will find out how 
smart the animals are. The animals will tell you whether there is a treasure or a spider hidden 
in this house. But the animals are not always right. We will find out how often they are right”. 
She then started with the low valid cue. The experimenter opened the door next to the animal, 
interpreted the picture and then opened the house on top of the screen, interpreting the picture 
again and explained: “The dog knew that there was a treasure in the house. It was right and 
gets a smart point.” The experimenter clicked on the first of the smart points next to the cue, 
which turned red. In subsequent trials, the experimenter continued to verbalize the content of 
each door and house. Each time, the child was asked to indicate whether the animal should get 
a smart point. If the child did not answer correctly, the experimenter explained it once more. 
After six trials, the experimenter summarized the performance of the cue by stating that it had 
received three out of six smart points and continued with the next cue. 
Finally, the child had observed each cue’s prediction and the particular outcome six 
times. This allowed us to create three cues that correctly predict outcomes with varying 
probability, yet perform at least at chance level (i.e., p ≥ .5). This is important, because 
otherwise, in a binary world, inverse probability could be used to infer outcomes (i.e., cue 
validities = .1 is equivalent to cue validity = .9). The first cue’s predictions were correct in 
three, the second cue’s predictions were correct in four, and the third cue’s predictions were 
 Probability Neglect and Feedback 40 
 
correct in five out of six cases. The children translated this information into smart points, 
which subsequently served as a cognitive aid for representing the cue’s validity. To ensure 
that all children encoded differences in cue validities they were asked which animal was the 
smartest as a manipulation check. 
Choice phase. The experimenter explained the game’s purpose, procedure and 
checked in two training trials that the child understood the choice procedure and the 
information board matrix. To ensure that the children’s goal was to maximize the number of 
treasures found, they were informed that treasures could be traded for gifts afterwards. 
Participants then made 24 decisions between two options represented by two houses (see 
Figure 2B). Cue predictions were covered by doors and could be uncovered before making 
each choice to inspect each cue’s predictions for the two options. Participants could inspect as 
many cue predictions as they pleased and as often as they liked. The doors covering the cues’ 
predictions stayed open for 3500 ms. In the feedback conditions, participants were informed 
about outcomes by opening the house and finding either a treasure or a spider. In conditions 
without feedback, the participants did not observe outcomes during the choice phase, but were 
informed about their performance at the end of the game. Participants were unaware of the 
number of decisions and prediction patterns they would encounter. 
Afterwards, the manipulation check was assessed a second time to rule out that 
children forgot about cue validities during the course of the game. Children were rewarded 
with two to four prizes contingent on their performance. Additionally, participants answered 
several questions concerning the cues and their motivation during the game, which we do not 
address in this paper. 
Procedure for adults. Following previous research (Betsch et al., 2014), we used the 
same procedure for adults as for children with the exception that adults were informed in 
advance that they served as a control group for children and would receive money according 
to their performance (€4 on average). 
Results 
Information search. Children searched less information than adults did. Specifically, 
preschoolers on average uncovered 3.58 of the six cue predictions (SD = 1.77), elementary 
schoolers uncovered 3.72 (SD = 1.59) and adults 4.74 (SD = 1.34) predictions. In accordance 
with this observation, a GLM ANOVA with age group and feedback condition as between 
factors revealed a main effect for age, F(2, 154) = 8.49, p < .001, η2G = .10. Withholding 
feedback did not significantly affect the amount of information searched in any age group, all 
other ps ≥ .08.  
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If search behavior is guided by stated probabilistic information, the search should start 
on the most important information, that is, the high valid cue’s prediction. We analyzed the 
frequency of searches starting on the high valid cue in a GLM ANOVA with age and 
feedback as between factors. Adults’ searches started in 17.63 (SD = 9.24) of the 24 decisions 
on the most valid cue, while children did not systematically start their search on the high valid 
cue, M = 9.72, SD = 6.19; elementary schoolers, M = 11.29, SD = 6.21; F(2, 154) = 18.25, 
p < .001, η2G =.19. However, large variability in search behavior suggests that individuals in 
each age group applied different search strategies. Most importantly, searches did not start 
more often on the high valid cue without feedback in any age group, all other ps ≥ .16. 
To test whether children’s over-responsiveness to recent negative feedback biased 
their information search, we compared how often it started at the non-chosen option after a 
negative and after a positive outcome in feedback conditions (OR = percentage of searches 
starting at the non-chosen option after losses/ percentage of searches starting at the non-
chosen option after gains). If children were biased by negative feedback, they should more 
often start their search at the non-chosen option after failure (OR >1). This was only the case 
in preschoolers, OR = 1.39, 95% Bootstrap CI [1.10, 1.72]; elementary schoolers, OR = 0.94, 
CI [0.80, 1.07]; adults, OR = 0.90, CI [0.80, 1.00]. Comparison to preschoolers’ search 
behavior without feedback ensured that this was indeed due to experiencing feedback, 
OR = 0.98, CI [0.81, 1.15], t(53) = 2.21, p = .031, d = 0.28.  
In line with previous research, children’s information search was not guided by cue 
validities (e.g., Betsch et al., 2014). In both child groups, information search was equally 
unsystematic with and without feedback. Interestingly, over-responsiveness to negative 
outcomes biased younger but not older children’s information search.  
Choices. We first analyzed choices on the aggregate level with our focus on over-
responsiveness to recent outcomes in feedback conditions and an increased use of stated 
probabilistic information, that is, cue validities, in conditions without feedback. Secondly, we 
analyzed individual choice patterns, expecting children to use the feedback-based choices rule 
WSLS with feedback and to use probability-based choice rules substantially more frequently 
without feedback. 
Over-responsiveness to negative outcomes in choices. To test whether children 
tended to stay with an option and switch between options based on recent feedback, we 
compared the percentage of option switches after a negative outcome to option switches after 
a positive outcome (OR = percentage of switches after losses / percentage of switches after 
gains). Over-responsiveness is reflected in increased switching after losses in feedback 
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conditions (OR > 1). In adults, switches were equally likely following positive and negative 
outcomes, OR = 0.96, 95% Bootstrap CI [0.87, 1.04]. Likewise, in elementary schoolers, 
switches were equally frequent, OR = 1.11, CI [0.92, 1.38]. In contrast, preschoolers switched 
significantly more often after losses than after gains, OR = 1.31, CI [1.11, 1.52]. To ensure 
that this was indeed a result of the experienced outcomes and not due to a strategy 
independent of feedback, preschoolers’ option switching without feedback served as a 
standard of comparison, OR = 1.10, CI [0.98, 1.25], t(54) = 1.61, p = .017, d = 0.5. Thus, only 
preschoolers’ choices were over-responsive to negative outcomes indicating a bias by 
feedback that was absent in elementary schoolers. 
Choices following the high valid cue (HVC). Normatively, in this environment 
participants should always follow the HVC. Figure 3 depicts the mean frequencies of choices 
following the HVC’s prediction for each age group, separated for feedback conditions and 
prediction patterns. A GLM analysis of variance with the frequency of following the HVC as 
dependent variable, and age group, feedback condition (between) and pattern (within) as 
factors revealed large age and pattern effects as well as an age-pattern interaction, Age, F(2, 
160) = 57.46, p < .001, η2G = .22; Pattern, Huynh-Feldt F(1.79, 289.38) = 67.89, p < .001, 
η2G = .20; Age × Pattern, Huynh-Feldt F(3.58, 288.48) = 18.65, p < .001, η2G = .12; all other 
ps ≥ .400. 
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Figure 3. Mean frequencies of choices in line with the high valid cue’s predictions for each 
pattern type and feedback condition in Study 1. Chance level is four out of eight choices. Bars 
represent 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. 
 
Adults approximated normative decision making in Type 1 and Type 2 prediction 
patterns with choices following the HVC’s predictions in 7 out of 8 cases. However, when 
both other cues contradicted the HVC this rate dropped to about half the cases. Similarly, 
elementary schoolers followed the HVC’s prediction less often in Type 3 patterns and chose 
generally less systematically than adults but still above chance level in the first two prediction 
patterns. Preschoolers, in contrast, performed at chance level in each prediction pattern. 
Crucially, children without feedback did not follow the HVC’s prediction more often, 
neither in any of the prediction patterns nor when analyzed over all 24 choices, preschoolers, 
MNo feedback = 10.74, SD = 2.68, MFeedback = 10.96, SD = 3.11; elementary schoolers, 
MNo feedback =12.34, SD = 3.88, MFeedback = 11.86, SD = 3.09; adults, MNo feedback = 17.89, 
SD = 4.05, MFeedback = 17.11, SD = 4.02; all ps ≥ .83. Thus, the assumption that feedback 
prevented children from choosing in line with normative expectations was not supported. 
Individual choice strategies. To account for individual differences, we classified 
participants according to their choice behavior over all patterns using an outcome based 
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strategy classification method (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). Predictions were derived from five 
different choice models (LEX; WADD; WSLS; SW; LVC, see method section). For each 
individual, we calculated the likelihood of the observed choice pattern under each of these 
models, assuming that strategies are not applied flawlessly but with a constant error 
maximizing the likelihood. Individuals were classified to a choice model, if their choices 
fitted the model predictions perfectly or if (a) the likelihood for the classified strategy was 
higher than for any other strategy and at least twice as high as for a Random Model (OR > 2), 
and (b) at least 66% of choices were successfully predicted by the model. Otherwise 
participants were classified to the Random Model. Individuals with equal likelihoods for two 
strategies remained unclassified. Error rates were allowed to vary over participants. Table 1 
shows the results of the classification and the mean error rates for each age group and 
strategy. 
The individual strategy classification largely confirmed aggregate findings. Contrary 
to our expectations, WSLS was not a common choice rule in either child age group, and 
application of probability-based strategies was not more prevalent without feedback. Most 
children’s choices were captured best by the Random Model (63% in preschoolers, 50% in 
elementary schoolers), only a minor percentage of children applied a choice rule 
systematically (16% in preschoolers, 30% in elementary schoolers). Intriguingly, all 
preschoolers that followed any strategy at all relied on invalid information with a simple 
switching rule being most common (11%). Elementary schoolers, on the other hand, while 
employing invalid strategies as often as preschoolers (17%), also and almost as often applied 
probability-based strategies (13%). 
While the majority of adults were classified as users of probability-based strategies, 
30% were classified to the Random Model. This was mainly due to inconsistent behavior by 
these adults in decisions with the Type 3 pattern.2 Nonetheless, the prevalence of probability-
based decision strategies was strongly determined by age, χ2(2, N = 166) = 61.42, p < .001, 
Cramer’s V = .61. Probability-based strategies were mainly used by adults (61%), rarely by 
elementary schoolers (13%), and not found in preschoolers. Complementary, invalid choice 
rules were not found in adults and were observed equally often in preschoolers (16%) and 
elementary schoolers (17%), χ2 (1, N = 110) =.007, p =.93. 
                                                 
2 The vast majority of adults classified to the Random Model did not choose randomly in all types of predictions 
patterns. Only in Type 3 patterns their choices followed the HVC at chance level, Mdn = 4, interquartile range 
(IQR): 2.5-6; while in Type 1 and 2 they were closely aligned with normative choice behavior, MdnType1 = 7, 
IQR: 5-8; and MdnType2 = 8, IQR: 6-8 (see also Footnote 1). However, since the classification method assumes a 
constant application error in all prediction patterns, and therefore cannot account for deviations in only one 
pattern, these adults were not classified to any of the choices models.  
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Table 1 
Strategy classification in Study 1 
 No feedback Feedback Overall 
Preschoolers n = 27 n = 29  n = 56  
 n % n % n % Error  
LEX — — — — — —  
WADD — — — — — —  
LVC — — 2 6.9 2 3.6 .29 
SW 3 11.1 3 10.3 6 10.7 .18 
WSLS   1 3.4 1 1.8 .21 
Random 15 55.6 20 69.0 35 62.5   
Unclassified 9 33.3 3 10.3 12 21.4   
Elementary 
schoolers n = 26 n = 28 n = 54 
 n % n % n % Error  
LEX 1 3.8 1 3.6 2 3.7 .15 
WADD 2 7.7 3 10.7 5 9.3 .21 
LVC 1 3.8 — — 1 1.9 .21 
SW 4 15.4 3 10.7 7 13 .15 
WSLS   1 3.6 1 1.9 .25 
Random 15 57.5 12 42.9 27 50.0   
Unclassified 3 11.5 8 28.6 11 20.4   
Adults n = 28 n = 28 n = 56 
 n % n % n % Error  
LEX 7 25.0 7 25.0 14 25.0 .08 
WADD 10 35.7 10 35.7 20 35.7 .07 
LVC — — 1 3.6 1 1.8 .25 
SW — — 1 3.6 1 1.8 .17 
WSLS   — — — —  
Random 8 28.6 9 32.1 17 30.4   
Unclassified 3 10.7 — — 3 5.4   
Note. Unclassified = individuals who could not be classified in one of the considered 
strategies; Random = random choice. Probability-based choice rules: LEX = Lexicographic 
rule, WADD = weighted-additive rule. Invalid choice rules: LVC = following low valid cue; 
SW = switching rule. Feedback-based choice rule, only applicable in feedback conditions: 
WSLS = win-stay-lose-shift rule. Error = mean error rate, that is, the mean proportion of trials 
in which strategy inconsistent choices were observed for the corresponding strategy and age 
group. For example, the error rate of .08 in adults being classified as LEX users means that on 
average strategy-incongruent choices were observed in 8%, that is, in less than two out of 24 
choices. In case of n = 1, absolute values are displayed.  
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Discussion 
In prior studies, no preschoolers and only a small proportion of elementary schoolers 
utilized stated probabilistic information presented as cue validities in their search and choice 
behavior (Betsch et al., 2014). We suspected that choice feedback led children to rely on 
recent outcomes rather than cue validities and could thus be the reason for the observed 
probability neglect. If this assumption were true, over-responsiveness to negative outcomes in 
search and choice behavior and systematic use of feedback in terms of WSLS as a choice rule 
should be observed. Withholding feedback should lead to an increased utilization of cue 
validities in children’s searches and choices. Study 1 provided some evidence of the former 
but no indication of the latter. Preschoolers showed over-responsiveness in search and choice 
behavior; children’s behavior was not increasingly guided by cue validities without feedback. 
We address both results in the general discussion. However, we first wanted to corroborate 
the findings and rule out that expected differences in utilization of cue validities were 
disguised by the presentation format of the information board. 
Specifically, the application of choice strategies can be hampered in a closed 
information board. The predictions of the cues need to be looked up sequentially and kept in 
memory until a decision is made. Such an environment binds cognitive resources and, hence, 
may impede successful strategy implementation (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). This is especially 
the case in children who have demonstrated significant deficits in searching for relevant 
information in information board paradigms until late elementary school age (Betsch et al. 
2016; Davidson, 1996; Katz, Bereby-Meyer, Assor, & Danziger, 2010). For example, in order 
to apply a normatively correct strategy like LEX, children have to look for the prediction of 
the HVC first and keep it in mind until they choose an option. Even when applying WSLS, 
where a search of cue predictions is not necessary, the delay between choices could 
nevertheless hinder successful strategy application. Accordingly, the lack of usage of WSLS 
in feedback conditions and of probability-based strategies without feedback might have been 
a consequence of a decision environment that impeded application of strategies. 
Study 2: Open Board 
We replicated the first study in a decision environment without constrained access to 
information to facilitate the application of choice strategies and thereby the detection of 
differences in strategy application between feedback conditions. 
Method 
The design, stimulus material, and procedure were identical to Study 1, with the 
exception that the information board matrix in the choice phase was open so that all 
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predictions could be inspected at once for every decision (see Figure 2C). Search data is 
therefore not available. 
The sample consisted of 80 preschoolers (49 female, M = 69.2 months, SD = 5.3), 62 
elementary schoolers (28 female, M = 104.4 months, SD = 4.7), and 53 adults (39 female, 
M = 258.59 months, SD = 31.96). Two preschoolers, one elementary schooler, and one adult 
had to be excluded because they did not complete the study. Seven preschoolers and one adult 
did not pass the manipulation check. The final sample consisted of 71 preschoolers (46 
female, M = 69.1 months, SD = 5.3), 61 elementary schoolers (27 female, M = 104.4, months 
SD = 4.7), and 51 adults (37 female, M = 267.0 months, SD = 31.2). The recruitment 
procedure was the same as in Study 1. 
Results 
Over-responsiveness to negative outcomes in choices. Again, only preschoolers 
switched options more frequently after negative than after positive outcomes, OR = 1.29, 95% 
Bootstrap CI [1.11, 1.49]; without feedback, OR = 1.07, CI [0.99, 1.16]; t(69) = 2.02, 
p = .003, d = 0.49. Elementary schoolers in feedback conditions showed no such tendency, 
OR = 1.08, CI [0.95, 1.24], neither did adults, OR = 0.78, CI [0.68, 0.90]. 
Choices following the high valid cue (HVC). Figure 4 depicts the mean frequencies 
of following the HVC’s predictions for every age group, feedback condition and prediction 
pattern. The results largely matched those in Study 1. Again, feedback did not affect choices 
in any age group, not in any of the patterns nor when analyzed over all 24 choices, 
preschoolers, MNo feedback = 10.09, SD = 4.63, MFeedback = 10.78, SD = 4.42; elementary 
schoolers, MNo feedback = 13.50, SD = 5.02, MFeedback = 14.21, SD = 4.35; and adults, 
MNo feedback = 18.52, SD = 2.58, MFeedback = 18.70, SD = 3.65; all ps ≥ .40. A GLM ANOVA 
resulted in similarly large age and pattern effects, and a pattern-age interaction as in Study 1, 
Age, F(2, 177) = 54.65 p < .001, η2G = .26; Pattern, Huyn-Feldt F(1.59, 281.64) = 93,24, 
p < .001, η2G = .19; Age × Pattern, Huyn-Feldt F(3.81, 281.64) = 42.79, p < .001, η2G = .18, 
all other ps ≥ .170. Adults followed the HVC’s prediction except when both other cues 
contradicted its prediction. The same pattern effect was observed in elementary schoolers, 
who followed the HVC’s prediction less systematically but above chance level in the first two 
prediction patterns. Preschoolers performed at chance level, regardless of the prediction 
pattern. 
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Figure 4. Mean frequencies of choices in line with predictions of the high valid cue for each 
pattern type and feedback condition in Study 2. Chance level is four out of eight choices. 
Error bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. 
 
Individual choice strategies. The results of the individual strategy classification are 
shown in Table 2. Similar to Study 1, feedback did not influence the prevalence of 
probability-based strategies in either child age group and WSLS was used rarely. 
Adults applied probability-based choice strategies to a large extend (49%, LEX, 
WADD). However, like in Study 1, a relatively large proportion was classified to the Random 
Model. Again, that was mainly due to their indifferent choice behavior in Type 3 prediction 
patterns (43%).3 Among children that chose systematically, elementary schoolers used valid 
(16%) as well as invalid strategies (28%, LVC, SW) while preschool-aged children relied 
predominantly on invalid ones (48%). The prevalence of probability-based strategies was 
again strongly dependent on age, with 49% of adults (n = 25), and 16% of elementary 
schoolers (n = 10) using such strategies, but only 3% of preschoolers (n = 1), χ2(2, 
N = 183) = 43.20, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .47. Likewise, the use of invalid strategies was most 
                                                 
3 For adults classified to the Random Model, MdnType1 = 8, IQR: 8-8; MdnType2 = 8, IQR: 8-8; and MdnType3 = 3, 
IQR: 2-5. 
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common in preschoolers, (48%), still found at elementary school age (28%) and only 
sporadically present in adults (2%). However, in contrast to Study 1, invalid choice rules were 
more common in preschoolers than in elementary schoolers, χ2(2, N = 132) = 4.64, p = .031, 
Cramer’s V = .19. 
Discussion 
In an open board, no active search processes are needed to access information. We tested 
whether this would foster children’s systematic utilization of the provided sources of 
information—either stated probabilistic information, that is, cue validities, or feedback. 
However, the findings of Study 2 were strikingly similar to those of Study 1. Thus, we are 
confident that the lack of systematic utilization of cue validities or feedback is not the result 
of the presentation format requiring too much of children’s limited cognitive resources. 
However, compared to Study 1 more children of each age group applied systematic choice 
rules, indicating that open presentation facilitated strategy application, but not utilization of 
probabilistic information or feedback. 
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Table 2 
Results of strategy classification in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Unclassified = individuals who could not be classified in one of the considered 
strategies; Random = random choice. Probability-based choice rules: LEX = Lexicographic 
rule, WADD = weighted-additive rule. Invalid choice rules: LVC = following low valid cue; 
SW = switching rule. Feedback-based choice rule, only applicable in feedback conditions: 
WSLS = win-stay-lose-shift rule. Error = Mean error rate for the corresponding strategy and 
age group. In case of n = 1, absolute values are displayed. 
  
 No feedback Feedback Overall 
Preschoolers n = 34 n = 37 n = 71 
 n % n % n % Error  
LEX — — 1 2.7 1 1.4 .17 
WADD — — — — — —   
LVC 3 8.8 4 10.8 7 9.9 .14 
SW 16 47.1 11 29.7 27 38.0 .12 
WSLS   — — — —   
Random 13 38.2 17 45.9 30 42.3   
Unclassified 2 5.9 4 10.8 6 8.5   
Elementary schoolers n = 32 n = 29 n = 61 
 n % n % n % Error  
LEX 4 12.5 4 13.6 8 13.1 .12 
WADD 2 6.3 — — 2 3.3 .08 
LVC 2 6.3 — — 2 3.3 .17 
SW 10 31.3 5 17.2 15 24.6 .19 
WSLS   1 3.4 1 1.6 .29 
Random 9 28.1 12 41.4 21 34.4   
Unclassified 5 16.5 7 24.1 12 19.7   
Adults n = 27 n = 24 n = 51 
 n % n % n % Error  
LEX 3 11.1 5 20.8 8 15.7 .04 
WADD 8 29.6 9 37.5 17 33.3 .05 
LVC — — 1 4.2 1 2.0 .25 
SW — — — — — —   
WSLS   — — — —   
Random 13 48.1 9 37.5 22 43.1   
Unclassified 3 11.1 — — 3 5.9   
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General Discussion 
Achieving decision competence requires, as a prerequisite, that individuals develop 
sensitivity and responsiveness to the probabilistic relations between choices and outcomes. 
We employed a research paradigm in which information about these relations was provided 
prior to choices—predictions of cues with different validities—in addition to self-sampled 
feedback about the choices’ consequences. Previous studies using this paradigm found that 
preschoolers around the age of six years are virtually insensitive to stated probabilistic 
information in choices while a minority of 9-year-old elementary schoolers is able to utilize it 
in a systematic fashion (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014, 2016). This evidence as 
well as the present studies contradict findings from other domains of developmental research 
where the utilization of stated probabilistic information prior to school age has been observed 
(e.g., Pasquini et al., 2007; Schlottmann, 2001). To investigate the potentially interfering 
effect of experience on utilization of stated probabilistic information, we manipulated the 
presence of feedback in a closed and open information board paradigm. We hypothesized that 
experiencing decision outcomes provides an interfering second source of information and can 
account for children’s neglect of stated probabilistic information.  
The results, however, show that the removal of feedback from the decision task did not 
improve children’s performance. Normative utilization of probability in choices prescribes to 
rely only on the high valid cue’s predictions. In either study, though, the frequency of 
following the high valid cue did not differ as a function of the presence of feedback. 
Compared to conditions with feedback, choices did not follow the high valid cue’s prediction 
more often without feedback in any age group; preschoolers, dStudy1 = -0.08, 95% CI [-0.61, 
0.44], dStudy2 = -0.15, CI [-0.62, 0.31], doverall = -0.12, CI [-0.47, 0.23]; elementary schoolers, 
dStudy1 = 0.14, CI [-0.40, 0.67], dStudy2 = -0.15, CI [-0.65, 0.36], doverall = -0.01, CI [-0.38, 0.35]; 
adults, dStudy1 = 0.19, CI [-0.33, 0.72], dStudy2 = -0.06, CI [-0.61, 0.49], doverall = 0.07, CI [-0.31, 
0.45]. Individual analysis of choice patterns further showed that the prevalence of probability-
based strategies was not increased without feedback and that when feedback was available 
children did not use a feedback-based choice strategy. Tracing information search behavior in 
Study 1 demonstrated additionally that younger children’s over-responsiveness to negative 
outcomes also affected their search behavior, although searches were equally unsystematic 
without interfering feedback.  
We conclude that children did not neglect stated probabilistic information because 
they preferred feedback as a source of information. Consequently, the reasons for children’s 
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probability neglect must lay elsewhere (see 4.2). Our two studies yielded three important new 
insights: 
Over-Responsiveness to Negative Outcomes but no Systematic Use of Feedback-Based 
Strategies. 
Children overreact to negative feedback and tend to switch responses. This behavior 
has been attributed to deficits in inhibitory control (Crone & van der Molen, 2007; Van 
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2012), and linked to the assumption, that negative consequences lead to 
an affective reaction to avoid this option, which must be actively overruled (Damasio, 1994, 
but see Brehmer, 1980). At the age of nine, children in our studies no longer showed over-
responsiveness. This contrasts prior findings of over-responsiveness to negative outcomes 
until late school age (Cassotti et al, 2011), even when winning probabilities of options are 
stated explicitly (Van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2012). 
Importantly, although over-responsiveness biased preschool-aged children’s search 
and choice behavior, they did not strategically utilize recent outcomes and consistently rely on 
an option-based Win-Stay-Lose-Shift rule for choices, which solely considers recent 
feedback. On individual level, Win-Stay-Lose-Shift did not fit children’s choice patterns 
when compared to other plausible models of choice. This apparent contradiction underlines 
the important distinction between data analysis at the aggregate and the individual level. It is 
still possible, that children applied a more sophisticated form of Win-Stay-Lose-Shift as a 
feedback-based strategy, for example switch and stay in relation to the option’s expected 
value calculated over several trials (e.g., Worthy & Maddox, 2014). However, application of 
such a strategy is inconsistent with the overall lack of differences between feedback 
conditions on both aggregated and individual level.  
Robustness of Probability Neglect 
In line with previous findings, we observed large differences between age groups in 
the utilization of stated probabilistic information for choices in both studies. The majority of 
adults used strategies based on stated probabilistic information such as the Lexicographic or 
Weighted Additive Rule consistently while only few elementary schoolers and only one 
preschooler did so. Previous studies with the same paradigm have found that such probability 
neglect is only marginally affected by variations of the decision environment such as 
information search constraint (Betsch et al., 2016) or lure information (Betsch & Lang, 2013). 
The present findings further underline the robustness of probability neglect in children’s risky 
decision making. Across two decision environments—one requiring an active search for cue 
predictions, the other displaying all cue predictions without search—preschool-aged children 
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at the age of six were unable to utilize stated probabilistic information to adapt choices, 
whereas 9-year-old elementary schoolers were partly able to do so. Further, withholding 
feedback had no facilitating effect on the utilization of stated probabilistic information at the 
aggregate or the individual level. Thus, probability neglect is not a consequence of the mixed-
source paradigm which offers feedback as a second and possibly preferred source of 
information. 
Our findings contribute to the complex picture of children’s ability to utilize stated 
probabilistic information for decisions and are in line with findings from gambling studies 
that highlight children’s deficits until late school age (Levin & Hart, 2003; Levin, Weller, et 
al., 2007). However, there is also contradicting evidence stemming from selective trust tasks 
(Pasquini et al., 2007), judgments tasks (Schlottmann, 2001), and low-complex experienced-
based gambling tasks (Bunch et al., 2007), in which utilization at preschool age was observed. 
Although these paradigms differ much in terms of information presentation and complexity, 
they all share that probabilities are directly assigned to options. The challenge for children is 
to make advantageous choices between these options. In a probabilistic inference task, 
however, the relations between options and outcomes are moderated by cues, to which these 
probabilities are assigned. Therefore, they pose a greater challenge to children’s conceptual 
understanding of probabilities, which might overburden them and explain the contradictory 
results. Probability neglect in children might therefore strongly depend on specifics of the 
probabilistic environment created by the research paradigm. 
Development of Decision Strategies 
Our results corroborate prior findings regarding the prevalence of probability-based 
strategies in individuals of different age groups (e.g., Betsch et al., 2014; Mata et al., 2011). 
At the age of six, children do not rely on probability-based choice rules, at the age of nine this 
ability is still emerging. This is in line with research from other areas that suggests a strong 
developmental improvement in cognitive strategy use during that period (see Björklund & 
Causey, 2018, for an overview). Yet, while most children neglected both sources of 
potentially valid information—stated probabilistic information and feedback—many 
nonetheless did not chose randomly between options. Instead, they systematically relied on 
invalid information, that is, information that was not useful to maximize choice outcomes, 
such as, which cue was liked the most and which option had been chosen in the preceding 
decision. This is not only interesting from a theoretical point of view, but holds important 
implications for the improvement of decision quality in children. Rather than just introducing 
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or teaching appropriate strategies, children’s current strategies must be directly addressed and 
revealed as inappropriate. 
Implications of Individual Strategy Classification 
In each age group we observed rather large proportions of individuals that could not be 
classified to a decision strategy (i.e., Random). This finding has two important implications. 
First, it shows that adults’ decision behavior is a more appropriate benchmark for children’s 
decision than normative standards, that is, ideal choices under all circumstances. Second, 
though, it points to a limitation of our strategy classification method. Many adults remained 
unclassified because they choose indifferently in Type 3 prediction patterns. We cannot rule 
out, however, that these participants used different strategies for different prediction patterns, 
which the applied method cannot detect or might have used decision strategies not considered 
a priori. For example, participants might have applied an Equal Weight Rule (e.g., Payne et 
al., 1988), which prescribes to follow the majority of predictions and, in case of a tie, to guess 
between options. This would lead to guessing in two thirds of the investigated choices and 
choices in line with the majority in Type 3 prediction patterns. We cannot rule out that single 
participants might have used this strategy; however, choices in Type 3 prediction patterns are 
not in line with this model4. It is therefore unlikely, that it was widely-used in any age group.  
Further, it is conceivable, that participants classified to WADD instead used a 
compound-strategy that favors the option with more positive predictions and only in case of 
indifferences considers cue validities. Although, this strategy would lead to exactly the same 
choices as WADD, the underlying cognitive steps are quite different. Nonetheless, it would 
still rely on the probabilistic cues. As our main focus was to differentiate choice rules based 
on on which kind of information was used—probabilities, feedback, or invalid information—
the possibility of a compound-strategy does not alter our interpretation of the results. 
Beneficial Aspects of Feedback 
This paper aimed to investigate potentially interfering effects of feedback on 
children’s utilization of probabilities. However, feedback does not have to be harmful. A 
study by Mata et al. (2011) suggests that 9-year-olds can adapt decision strategies via 
feedback learning and our own results demonstrate that even 6-year-olds are generally 
                                                 
4In two thirds of all choices, that is, prediction patterns Type 1 and 2, Equal Weight and Random predict 
guessing, and can therefore not be reliably distinguished from each other on an individual level. In Type 3 
prediction patterns, Equal Weight prescribes following the majority (e.g., Option 1 in Figure1). In Study 1, 9% 
of preschoolers, 11% of elementary schoolers, and 29% of adults followed the majority systematically in choices 
in this pattern type (i.e., 6 out of 8). In Study 2, 6% of preschoolers, 12% of elementary schoolers, and 20% of 
adults followed the majority in at least 75% of choices. Accordingly, the proportion of individuals who may have 
applied an Equal Weight Rule is low, especially in child groups. 
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responsive to feedback in probabilistic inferences, even if this resulted in over-responsiveness 
to negative outcomes. Unfortunately, in order to reveal such beneficial aspects of feedback, 
the number of decisions has to be large enough to enable learning in all age groups while 
learning rates may vary with age. Since the number of decision was limited in our studies, no 
conclusion about potential beneficial aspects of feedback can be drawn. 
Conclusion 
So far, research had demonstrated that children up to late school age fail at utilizing 
probabilities in a complex environment with multiple predictive cues (Betsch & Lang, 2013; 
Betsch et al., 2014, 2016). Our studies replicated these findings and ruled out the interference 
of feedback information as a cause for this probability neglect. Below school age, children’s 
choices are not ruled by probabilities. If at all, irrelevant features of the task guide their 
choices. At elementary school age, utilization of probabilities is only emerging, yet not 
consolidated in all children. At that age, children are still far from being competent when 
decisions are risky and complex. 
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Abstract 
Previously, children aged nine and younger seemed to decide randomly without any 
systematic plan in probabilistic decision environments. Research focused on detecting 
adaptive decision strategies that consider probabilistic information embedded in the 
environment and are used by adults. However, it ignored non-adaptive decision strategies that 
focus on irrelevant information and might be used by children. The present study assessed 
both adaptive and non-adaptive decision strategies in 6-year-olds, 9-year-olds and adults to 
investigate how often, accurately and persistently children apply them. Participants repeatedly 
made decisions in a probabilistic environment that either provided no feedback, selective or 
full feedback about strategies’ performances. Results show that half of the children in each 
age group applied a decision strategy accurately. Six-year-olds predominantly used non-
adaptive strategies, while 9-year-olds used adaptive strategies as well. Full feedback 
positively affected strategy use: children abandoned non-adaptive strategies, or applied them 
less consistently. Results suggest that children are able to systematically apply decision 
strategies very early in life. Similar to other cognitive areas, they initially use inefficient 
strategies, but overcome them with increasing age and experience. 
 Keywords: decision strategy, strategy development, decision feedback, adaptive 
decision making 
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Children Use but Can Overcome Non-adaptive Decision Strategies 
Successful probabilistic decision making requires consistently applying decision 
strategies that consider probabilities embedded in the environment. The Weighted Additive 
strategy weights outcomes with their probability and maximizes decision outcomes (Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). In some probabilistic environments, the simpler Lexicographic 
strategy that considers only the most probable outcome yields equally good outcomes 
(Fishburn, 1974; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). In previous developmental research, 
children up until late elementary school age failed to apply such adaptive strategies. Instead 
all 6-year-old children and the majority of 9-year-old children seemed to decide randomly 
without any systematic plan (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch, Lang, Lehmann, & Axmann, 
2014, Betsch, Lehmann, Lindow, Lang, & Schoemann, 2016). This research however, 
concentrated on detecting strategies derived from normative decision theory, such as the 
above-mentioned; strategies that deviated from normative expectations were ignored. More 
recent research suggests that children do apply strategies, but use strategies non-adaptive to 
the decision environment, such as option alternation and following favored but less accurate 
probabilistic cues (Lang & Betsch, 2018). Assessment of individuals’ strategies, however, 
was not reliable enough to investigate the dimensions of strategic change, such as how often, 
how accurately, and how persistently children used these strategies. In this paper, we 
thoroughly measure adaptive and non-adaptive decision strategies to show that non-adaptive 
strategies are widespread in 6-year-olds, and become less prevalent with age, when, in return, 
adaptive strategies become more prevalent.  
We further investigated how persistently children apply non-adaptive strategies. 
Monitoring feedback of strategies’ performances can initiate changes in strategy use. Decision 
feedback can be used to update erroneous strategy expectations and eventually elicit shifting 
to better strategies (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Shrager & Siegler, 1998). Children might thus 
overcome non-adaptive decision strategies when they monitor their performance. To test this 
assumption, we assessed children’s decision strategies in three different environments: One 
offered no immediate feedback about decision outcomes, therefore did not allow monitoring 
strategy performance and might have invited non-adaptive decision strategies. The second 
immediately fed back decision outcomes. Mimicking most real-world decisions, the feedback 
was selective, that is, it provided the outcome of the actual and not the counterfactual 
decision. With selective feedback, belief updating can remain fragmentary and biased by the 
individual’s decisions (Fiedler, 2008; Hogarth & Soyer, 2011). A third, full feedback 
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environment—informing about all outcomes—established an ideal environment to monitor 
and eventually overcome non-adaptive decision strategies. 
Method 
We confronted children and adult controls with a child-friendly information-board 
paradigm, in which three probabilistic cues predicted binary outcomes of two options. 
Participants repeatedly chose between options (i.e., houses) in order to yield as many positive 
outcomes (i.e., treasures) as possible. Cue predictions varied from choice to choice 
(Figure1D-F). 
Before making choices, participants picked three animals as cues and encoded the 
relevant probabilistic information; that is, the cue validities. Participants observed that cues 
differed in validity; the first cue predicted outcomes correctly in three, the second cue in four 
and the third cue in five out of six cases (corresponding to p = .50, .66, .83). This is further 
graphically depicted next to each cue as a magnitude of “smart points”; one for each correct 
prediction. 
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Figure 1. The Decision Game. Figure shows screenshots from the decision game during the 
encoding of cue validities and decisions between options. Cue predictions varied between 
decisions (D-F). For example, the first cue predicts a spider (i.e., negative outcome) for the left 
option and a treasure (i.e., positive outcome) for the right option (D). Each cue prediction 
pattern was used 12 times in this and in the mirrored version. In feedback conditions, 
participants were selectively (E) or fully (F) informed about decision outcomes. Feedback 
maintained each cue’s validity and reinforced both options equally. 
 
Decision Strategies 
Strategies that are adaptive to this probabilistic decision environment account for the 
cue validities and predictions: The Lexicographic strategy considers only the predictions of 
the most valid cue and prescribes to follow them in all choices. The Weighted Additive 
Strategy weights predictions according to their uncorrected cue validities and prescribes to 
follow the high valid cue unless both other cues contradict it.1  
However, the decision environment is perceptively rich and offers additional 
information, that is irrelevant to but can be utilized for decision making. Thus, children can 
also solve the decision problem without considering probabilistic information. Recent 
research suggests three non-adaptive decision strategies (Lang & Betsch, 2018): First, Take-
                                                 
1
 For Weighted Additive all predictions should be weighted by cue validities and added up to determine the 
expected value for each option. However, whether and how cue validities must be transformed before they are 
used as weights is discussed controversially; we used untransformed cue validities (see Lang & Betsch, 2018; 
Betsch et al., 2014, for a discussion). 
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your-Favorite, prescribes to follow the predictions of the favored, first-chosen cue despite its 
low validity (see also Betsch & Lang, 2013). Second, option alternation prescribes to 
systematically alternate between the choice option on the right and on the left of the decision 
matrix. It considers which position was rejected in the last trial and neglects all other 
information (see also Brainerd, 1981). The third strategy, Win-Stay-Lose-Shift, considers 
only the last decision outcome (and can only be applied in feedback conditions); it prescribes 
to select the option on the same position as long as it yields positive results, but to switch if it 
does not. It accounts for children’s over-sensitivity to recent negative outcomes (see also van 
Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Bredman, & Huizenga, 2012). 
Crucially, when participants choose repeatedly, all strategies result in different choice 
patterns (Figure 1D-F, e.g., the Lexicographic Strategy prescribes choosing the first option in 
all three decisions; Weighted Additive prescribes choosing the first option in the first two and 
the second option in the third decision). We applied an outcome-based maximum likelihood 
strategy classification to identify each individual’s decision strategy (Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003). Each individual’s choices were compared with predictions derived from each of the 
strategies. If they fitted the strategy predictions flawlessly, the individual was assigned to this 
strategy. Otherwise, we calculated how likely the individual choice pattern would be 
produced by each of the strategies. We assumed that the individual applied the strategy with a 
constant error rate maximizing the likelihood. We assigned individuals to the strategy that 
produced the highest likelihood, if at least 66% of their decisions were strategy-consistent. 
Participants were classified to the Random model, if choosing randomly produced the highest 
likelihood or none of the other strategies fitted the participant’s choices well enough. 
Participants with equal likelihoods for two strategies remained unclassified. 
We assumed that participants might adapt strategies in feedback conditions and shift to 
more adaptive strategies over time. Therefore, we determined each individual’s strategy in the 
last third of the 72 decisions, when feedback effects should have been most pronounced (i.e., 
adaptive decision strategies should have been most and non-adaptive least prevalent). We ran 
the analysis a second time with the last two thirds of decisions. The main results did not 
change, but are more reliable the more choices are included, therefore we report the second 
analysis. 
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Design & Sample 
The study implemented a 3 (age group: 6-year-old preschoolers vs. 9-year-old 
elementary schoolers vs. adult controls) × 3 (feedback condition: no vs. selective vs. full 
feedback) between-subjects design. Participants were randomized to feedback conditions. 
The sample consisted of 81 6-year-old preschoolers (M = 68.61 months, SD = 5.15, 
Range = 60–78, 34 female), 91 9-year-old elementary schoolers (M = 107.25 months, 
SD = 8.64, Range = 84–149, 55 female), and 85 adults (M = 253.20 months, SD = 38.52, 66 
female). Children came from different socioeconomic backgrounds, and were recruited from 
different German schools and kindergartens. Parents consented to their child’s participation. 
One 6-year-old and one 9-year-old did not complete the study; eight more 6-year-olds and 
three 9-year-olds failed at selecting the most valid cue as a manipulation check. The final 
sample consisted of 72 preschoolers (M = 68.89 months, SD = 5.27, Range = 60–78, 31 
female), 87 elementary schoolers (M = 106.91 months, SD = 8.45, Range = 84–149, 52 
female) and 85 adults. 
Procedure 
Child data were collected by a trained experimenter in a separate room of the school or 
kindergarten on a touchscreen computer. She explained that the game’s purpose was to find 
treasures that would be traded for presents afterwards. The experimenter started the game 
with introducing the cues in the following fashion: “You don’t have to find the treasures on 
your own; somebody will be helping you. Do you see the animals on the screen? You are 
allowed to choose three of them to help you.” The first chosen animal was placed on the top 
row of the screen, the last chosen on the bottom row to ensure that the favored animal was 
lowest in validity. 
Encoding cue validities prior to choices. Cue validity was framed during the game as 
the smartness of the animals. Accordingly, the experimenter explained that animals would 
predict hidden outcomes of a house but differed in smartness. Supervised by the experimenter, 
children encoded differences in cue validities: The experimenter started with the animal 
placed on the top row; she opened the door next to the cue to uncover the cue’s prediction 
(e.g., “The dog says there is a treasure in the house.”, Figure 1A). Then she revealed the 
actual outcome by opening the house (e.g., “There is a treasure in the house.”, Figure 1B), and 
explained that for this correct prediction the animal was granted a “smart point”. In the 
following five trials, the participant was asked to indicate whether the animal should be 
granted a smart point. No child had difficulties in identifying correct predictions and granting 
smart points accordingly. For each smart point, the experimenter clicked on a point next to the 
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cue which turned red. After six trials, the experimenter summarized the cue’s validity by 
counting smart points together with the child and stating that it had received three out of six 
smart points. Similarly, participants observed the predictions of the second and third cue and 
corresponding outcomes. Subsequently each cue’s validity was displayed by a magnitude of 
smart points (i.e., three, four and five, cf. Figure 1C). Participants were required to identify 
the most valid cue as a manipulation check before choices and excluded from analyses if they 
failed to do so. 
Choices between options. Before the choices, the experimenter explained that the 
child would make several choices between two houses, would receive a treasure point for 
each treasure found, and ensured in two training trials that the child understood the procedure 
and the information board matrix. Participants made 72 decisions with varying cue predictions 
(Figure 1D-F), and two short breaks after the 24th and 48th decision. 
In the selective feedback conditions, participants experienced the consequence of their 
decision by opening the house and finding either a treasure or a spider. The experimenter 
provided additional verbal feedback (“Oh great, you found a treasure. Now you get a treasure 
point.” vs. “Oh no, a spider. You don’t get a treasure point.”, Figure 1E) and filled in a 
treasure point if a treasure was found. When full feedback was provided, the foregone 
outcome was revealed and verbalized additionally (“There was a treasure/spider in the other 
house.”, Figure 1F). In conditions without feedback, participants decided without observing 
the outcome. The whole study took 30 to 45 minutes. Children were rewarded contingent on 
their performance. Additionally, they answered several questions concerning the cues and 
their motivation during the game, which we do not address here. 
Procedure for adults. We informed adults that they served as a control group in a 
children’s study in advance. The procedure was identical, but adults received money 
contingent on their performance (M = €8). 
Results 
Table 1 shows frequencies of decision strategies. First, we observed consistent 
application of decision strategies in all age groups. Half of the children in both age groups 
applied adaptive or non-adaptive decision strategies. Second, as expected, we obtained 
striking differences between age groups: Only 6% of 6-year-olds applied adaptive strategies 
(i.e., Lexicographic, Weighted Additive), but 41% of 9-year-olds and 70% of adults did, 
χ2(2) = 68.38, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .53. Non-adaptive strategies (i.e., Favored Cue, Option  
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Table 1 
Participants’ decision strategies 
    
No 
feedback 
  
Selective 
feedback 
  
Full 
feedback 
  Overall 
6-year-olds   n = 27   n = 23   n = 22   n = 72   Error 
Lexicographic  —  9(2)  9 (2)  6 (4)  .06 
Weighted Additive  —  —  —  —   
Favored Cue  33 (9)  4 (1)  —  14 (10)  .05 
Option Switching  26 (7)  30 (7)  14 (3)  24 (17)  .13 
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift    22 (5)  5 (1)  8 (6)  .22 
Random  37 (10)  35 (8)  73 (16)  47 (34)   
Unclassified  4 (1)  —  —  1 (1)   
9-year-olds   n = 29   n = 30   n = 28   n = 87    Error 
Lexicographic  10 (3)  30 (9)  46  (13)  29 (25)  .06 
Weighted Additive  21 (6)  10 (3)  4 (1)  12 (10)  .07 
Favored Cue  10 (3)  —  —  3 (3)  .08 
Option Switching  17 (5)  7 (2)  7 (2)  10 (9)  .18 
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift    —  7 (2)  2 (2)  .20 
Random  41 (12)  53 (16)  32 (9)  43 (37)   
Unclassified  —  —  4 (1)  1 (1)   
Adults   n = 28   n = 28   n = 29   n = 85    Error 
Lexicographic  36 (10)  50 (14)  35 (10)  40 (34)  .06 
Weighted Additive  36 (10)  32 (9)  24 (7)  31 (26)  .05 
Random  25 (7)  18 (5)  41 (12)  28 (24)   
Unclassified   1   —   —   1 (1)     
Note. Table shows relative frequencies and absolute frequencies in parentheses. Error = Mean 
error rate in percentage = the averaged proportion of strategy-incongruent choices. For 
example, adults diverge from the Lexicographic strategy in 6%, that is, in less than 3 out of 48 
choices. 
 
Switching, Win-Stay-Lose-Shift) were most prevalent in 6-year-olds (46%), less prevalent in 
9-year-olds (15%) and absent in adults, χ2(1) = 16.73, p ≤ .001, Cramer’s V = -.32.  
Third, we expected decision feedback to encourage adaptive strategies and discourage 
non-adaptive strategies. Results only support the latter: 6-year-olds used non-adaptive 
strategies less often when they were fully informed about decision outcomes, χ2(2) = 9.79, 
p = .007, Cramer’s V = .37. The effect was only marginally significant in older children, 
χ2(2) = 4.88, p = .087, Cramer’s V = .24, possibly because non-adaptive strategies were 
overall less common in this age group. Unexpectedly, the prevalence of adaptive decision 
strategies remained unaffected by feedback condition in both age groups, all ps ≥ .15; instead 
Random decision making increased in 6-year-olds only, χ2(2) = 7.55, p = .023, Cramer’s 
V = .32. 
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In an exploratory analysis, we investigated how accurately children applied decision 
strategies: Error rates suggest that children executed adaptive strategies as accurately as 
adults, deviating from the strategy in 3 out of 48 decisions, MChildren= 6%, CI [4; 8]
2, MAdults= 
5%, CI [4; 7], p ≥ .47. Children further executed non-adaptive strategies very consistently 
without feedback, M =7%, CI [3; 10], but less consistently in feedback conditions, 
MSelective Feedback = 20%, CI [15; 25], t(27) = -4.737, p < .001, g = -1.81, MFull Feedback = 14%, CI 
[6; 21], t(17) = -1.78, p = .092, g = -1.23. 
We aimed to reliably identify non-adaptive and adaptive strategies in children. On 
average, participants’ choices were much more likely produced by the assigned strategy than 
by a Random model or the second-best fitting strategy, compared with Random, Mdn6-year-
olds = 88.99, Mdn9-year-olds = 71.49, MdnAdults = 87.51; compared with the second-best strategy, 
Mdn6-year-olds = 8.20, Mdn9-year-olds = 23.22, MdnAdults = 87.51. For the vast majority of 
participants, we achieved at least moderate evidence for the assigned strategy (i.e., OR > 3 in 
92% when compared with Random, in 86% when compared with the second-best strategy, 
Wassermann, 2000). Thus, we are confident that we could correctly identify strategy use. 
Analysis of decision times further supports the strategy classification: When children used 
simple strategies, like alternating options, they needed three seconds to make their decisions, 
M = 2.9s, CI [2.43;3.57], while more complex strategies such as Weighted Additive needed 
more time, M = 4.5s, CI [3.6; 5.6].  
Each age group included participants whose choices were best fitted by the Random 
model. This can be expected for children, who might indeed choose randomly or switch 
between strategies (which would likewise appear Random), but unexpected for adults, who 
should exclusively apply normative, adaptive decision strategies. A closer look at adults’ 
choices reveals that most individuals not classified to either a Lexicographic or Weighted 
Additive strategy were in fact switching between the two. Although their decisions did not fit 
either strategy, they were highly adaptive.3 
                                                 
2 All intervals are 95% confidence intervals bootstrapped with 10000 samples. 
3 This was due to choices when both low validity cues contradicted the high valid cue (Figure 1C)—the 
Lexicographic strategy prescribes to choose with the high valid cue while the Weighted Additive strategy 
prescribes to choose against it. Most adults classified as Random chose in line and against the Lexicographic 
Strategy in half of these choices. Because such systematic deviation leads to low likelihoods for the 
Lexicographic and Weighted Additive strategy, they were instead assigned to Random. Still, they otherwise 
chose in line with the Lexicographic strategy. In contrast, children assigned to Random did not chose adaptively: 
Choices in line with the Lexicographic strategy for individuals classified to Random in different prediction 
patterns, 6-year-olds, MdnFigure1D = 37%, inter quartile range (IQR):31–50; MdnFigure1E = 50%, IQR, 43–56; 
MdnFigure1F = 50%, IQR: 37–56; 9-year-olds, MdnFigure1D = 56%, IQR: 31–56; MdnFigure1E= 56%, IQR:43–72; 
MdnFigure1F = 50%, IQR: 31–56; adults, MdnFigure1D = 100%, IQR:: 100–100; MdnFigure1E = 100%, IQR: 95–100; 
MdnFigure1F= 43%, IQR: 37–56. 
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Analysis of decision outcomes further shows that children who used adaptive decision 
strategies were indeed the most successful decision makers with 77% of choices yielding 
positive outcomes, CI [76;78], while children applying non-adaptive strategies were less 
successful, 59%, CI [57;61]. Children assigned to Random succeeded in 65% of decisions, CI 
[63; 76]. This is in line with options’ average success rates of 66%. 
Discussion 
We investigated 6-year-olds’, 9-year-olds’ and adult controls’ strategies in 
probabilistic decisions. As expected, strategy use develops considerably from non-adaptive 
strategies—strategies that focus on irrelevant information and do not maximize outcomes—in 
6-year-olds, to co-existence of non-adaptive and adaptive strategies—strategies that focus on 
probabilistic information and maximize outcomes—in 9-year-olds and adaptive strategies in 
adults. Strategy use in 6-year-olds and 9-year-olds was not sporadic but prevalent, with 51% 
in younger children, CI [40; 63], and 56% in older children, CI [46;67]. When children 
applied adaptive strategies, they executed them very accurately resulting in error rates 
comparable to adults’. Decision feedback affected the prevalence and execution of strategies: 
6-year-olds monitored strategy performance and abandoned their otherwise frequently used 
non-adaptive strategies; both child groups executed non-adaptive strategies less accurately 
when receiving feedback.  
With increasing age, children’s decision strategies align to adults’ strategies. In non-
probabilistic environments, adult-like strategies emerge at preschool age (Lindow, Lang, 
Betsch, 2017); in more complex probabilistic environments they emerge but are not yet 
consolidated at late elementary school age (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2016; Lang & 
Betsch, 2018; Mata, van Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011). Consistent with strategy 
development in other domains, children initially use very inefficient strategies (see Björklund 
& Caussey, 2018, for an overview of strategy development across domains). These are un-
tailored to the specific demands of probabilistic decisions, but still allow children to make 
decisions at all. 
Presumably, children cannot apply better strategies because their strategy repertoire 
does not entail them yet. In probabilistic decision making, adaptive strategies require 
consideration of probabilistic information, a challenge that young children cannot meet in a 
complex multi-cue environment (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014, 2016). 
Additionally, children might rely on non-adaptive strategies for quite rational reasons: 
Such strategies might be successful in children’s everyday decision making. Children might 
for example, prefer advice of closer individuals, such as a parent, even when they are less 
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accurate in a specific situation (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Lucas, Burdett, Burgess, Wood, 
McGuigan, Harris, & Whiten, 2017). Thus, children might have developed a strong 
preference for such simple decision rules and apply them to new decisions by default 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Only after having learned that this strategy performs non-
satisfyingly, children might switch to better ones. Consistent with this thought, children used 
non-adaptive strategies less often when they received full feedback informing about the 
strategy’s ineffectiveness. However, we found no evidence of an uptake of adaptive strategies. 
This is anticipated under the assumption that children do not possess adaptive strategies yet, 
and thus must fall back to deciding randomly.  
Decision strategies are widespread in children. With a thorough measurement of 
decision strategies, we identified around half of the children as strategic. Still, we might 
underestimate this proportion. Obviously, our a-priori considered strategy repertoire might 
lack decision strategies actually used by children. For example, children might have counted 
the number of positive predictions and chosen the option with most positive predictions 
(Equal Weight, Payne et al., 1988). Also, children might have switched between multiple 
strategies, including non-adaptive and adaptive strategies (Siegler, 2007). Our approach 
cannot account for that, but adult data, demonstrating switching between two strategies (see 
Footnote 3), support this view. Thus, we assume that the proportion of children deciding 
strategically might be even higher. Nevertheless, that 6-year-olds can apply decision strategies 
and even monitor their performance is encouraging for future research attempting to improve 
children’s decision making. 
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Abstract 
In two studies, children learned simple but adaptive decision strategies from probabilistic 
feedback. In a probabilistic multi-cue decision task, we assessed children’s decision strategies 
in different feedback conditions. In Study 1 (N = 316), 7 and 9-year-old children learned the 
selective Lexicographic decision strategy. Strategy learning was slightly better in a stricter 
compared to a more lenient feedback condition and worse than in adult controls. In Study 2 
(N = 259), feedback either reinforced the selective Lexicographic strategy or the holistic 
Equal Weight-strategy. Younger children learned the holistic strategy better, while older 
children learned both equally well. In both studies, children rarely used adaptive decision 
strategies without feedback, although a priori stated dispersion of probabilities suggested their 
use. It illustrates, that under ideal circumstances, that is, in highly dispersed probabilistic 
environments and when adaptive strategies are not too complex to perform, feeding back 
decision outcomes improves children’s, otherwise very deficient, decision making.  
Keywords: decision making, feedback, strategies, development, Lexicographic 
strategy, Take-the-Best, Equal Weight 
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Children Learn Simple, Adaptive Decision Strategies from Probabilistic Feedback 
Adapting decision making to changing environments is a basic skill that children must 
acquire as soon as they make decisions on their own. Decision feedback can either lead to 
option learning—when children learn to adaptively select choice options, or to strategy 
learning—when children learn to adaptively select decision strategies. 
Probabilistic option learning is available quite early in life. When feedback indicates 
that one option is superior, that is, it provides higher or more frequent pay-offs for this option, 
children as young as three years learn to select better options more frequently (Bunch; 
Andrews & Halford, 2007). However, a large amount of research shows that option learning 
is still deficient in childhood and improves considerably until adolescents and beyond (ee 
Cassoti et al., 2014; Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & Aken, for developmental reviews). 
Probabilistic strategy learning rests upon the idea of an adaptive decision maker that 
selects an appropriate decision strategy from a repertoire (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988; 
Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Research Group, 1999). The selection of this strategy can either 
work in a top-down fashion, by analyzing the decision situation and its probabilistic structure 
(Beach and Mitchel, 1978; Payne et al., 1988; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), or in a bottom-up 
fashion via decision feedback (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006): Initially, decision makers select a 
strategy which they expect to perform well, but update their expectations depending on the 
feedback the strategy produces. If the feedback does not meet expectations, decision makers 
switch from non-adaptive strategies to more adaptive strategies. 
Empirical evidence shows first evidence of probabilistic strategy learning in 9-11-
year-old children (Mata, van Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011). Younger children aged 5-6 and 
8-9 showed not adaption of strategies to feedback (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014; 
2016; Lang & Betsch, 2018a and b, Betsch et al., 2018). But children dropped non-adaptive 
strategies, otherwise frequently used, when decision feedback indicated that they did not suit 
the decision environment (Lang & Betsch, 2018b).  
However, studies either provided limited learning opportunity (Betsch & Lang, 2013; 
Betsch et al., 2014; 2016, Lang & Betsch, 2018a), required children to learn very complex 
decision strategies (Betsch et al., 2018), or offered ambiguous feedback (Betsch & Lang, 
2013; Betsch et al., 2014; 2016; Lang & Betsch, 2018a and b, Betsch et al., 2018). Due to the 
probabilistic nature of environments, feedback is inherently ambiguous because even the best 
strategy does not always produce success, and even the worst strategy does not always 
produce failure. Nevertheless, probabilistic feedback environments can either strictly 
reinforce one strategy while other strategies perform noticeable worse—thus, differences in 
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strategy performance are extended—or they can rather leniently provide high pay-offs for 
various strategies (Hogarth, 2001). In such environments, learning of better decision strategies 
is not utterly important or easy to achieve (Hogarth, 2001; Hogarth & Soyer, 2011). Strict 
feedback environments allow to update strategy expectations more efficiently and might thus 
be more suited to initiate shifts towards more adaptive strategies in young children (Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006, cf. Siegler, 2006).  
In two studies, we focused on learning of simplifying decision strategies in strict but 
probabilistic feedback conditions. The first study investigates whether children learn the 
prominent, simple and highly selective Lexicographic strategy (LEX; Fishburn, 1974; Take-
the-Best, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996): The decision maker only considers information of 
the most important dimension and chooses the option that offers the highest value. When 
dimension weights are highly dispersed, that is, one dimension is much more important than 
others, this strategy is very efficient and allows fast and frugal decision making (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein 1996; Payne et al., 1988). 
Decision makers are sometimes reluctant to apply LEX, even when it is highly 
adaptive (e.g., Bröder, 2003; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Especially children younger than ten 
years of age struggle with LEX (e.g., Betsch et al., 2013, 2014, 2016; Mata, et al., 2011). In a 
second study, we investigated whether children learned a more holistic strategy, the Equal 
Weight-strategy, better than LEX (Payne et al., 1988). This decision strategy is also quite 
simple: it requires to count positive values for each option on all dimensions and choose the 
option with the maximum positive values. In contrast to LEX, it does not require to focus on 
one dimension and ignore other, potentially salient, dimensions, and thus, might 
accommodate children (Mata et al., 2011). When dispersion of probabilities is low, that is, 
when dimensions are nearly equally important, this strategy can be very successful (Payne et 
al., 1988). 
Study 1 
The first study’s goal is to demonstrate that 7-year-old and 9-year-old children learn to 
apply LEX from probabilistic decision feedback. We assessed children’s decision strategies, 
based on the outcomes of their choices, under two different feedback conditions: The lenient 
feedback condition maintained a priori stated differences in probability. LEX performed best 
in this environment, but competing strategies performed also better than chance. The strict 
feedback condition further dispersed differences in probability. LEX performed best, and 
competing strategies’ performances dropped to or below chance level. In a control condition, 
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we offered no decision feedback, but participants could use a priori stated probabilities to 
select an adaptive strategy.  
Method 
The most prominent paradigm for studying decision strategies is the probabilistic 
multi-cue environment (e.g., Payne et al.,1988; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1991, Lagnado et al., 
2006, Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). A child-friendly adaption allows to assess whether and what 
decision strategies children apply (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014; 2016; Lang & 
Betsch, 2018a and b, Betsch et al., 2018, Mata et al., 2011). Probabilistic information is 
provided a priori to decisions in terms of validities of different cues. Cues predict outcomes of 
different options, but the probabilistic relation between each cue and outcomes—the cue 
validity—determines how accurately the cue predicts outcomes and how its predictions 
should be weighted in decisions. 
We applied an environment with three cues and two options. Different animals 
represented cues and were assigned to specific cue validities, that is, p = .57 for the first and 
second cue and p = .88 for the third cue. In the decision phase, participants repeatedly chose 
between two options (i.e, houses) in order to achieve a positive outcome (i.e, treasure). For 
each decision, they could inspect cue values, which were either positive or negative (i.e., 
treasure, spider, Figure 1).  
Decision strategies. In order to solve this decision problem, participants can apply 
several decision strategies. LEX is adaptive to the environment and maximizes decision 
outcomes. It requires to consider the predictions of the most important dimension, that is, the 
high valid cue, exclusively. However, child participants might also apply strategies that are 
non-adaptive to the decision environment: The Equal Weight-strategy ignores the cue 
validities and prescribes to choose the option with the highest number of positive predictions. 
When cue validities are highly dispersed, ignoring differences in cue validities is non-
adaptive. Further non-adaptive strategies used by children are Take-your-Favorite— 
following the favored but low valid cue, and Option-Alternation—systematically switching 
between the two options (Lang & Betsch, 2018a). Finally, a Random Choice model guesses 
between the two options and captures unsystematic decisions.  
Feedback structure. In a control condition, no immediate feedback was provided. 
Two feedback conditions offered feedback immediately after each decision. Most 
importantly, feedback was uninformative on the two options (i.e., options on the right yielded 
positive outcomes equally often as options on the left); thus, option learning was non-adaptive 
and unsuccessful. Decision strategies in contrast differed in success. In the lenient feedback 
 Strategy Adaption in Children 83 
 
condition, LEX was the most successful strategy (in 80%), other strategies performed worse 
but not much worse (Equal Weight, 62%, Take-your-favorite, 60%, Option Alternation, 62%, 
Random, 66%). Like in previous studies, a priori provided cue validities (p1= .57, p2 =.57, p3 = 
.86) were maintained (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014; 2016; Lang & Betsch, 2018a 
and b). In the strict feedback environment, LEX likewise was most successful, but other 
strategies were yielding more negative feedback (Success rates, Equal Weight, 37%; Take-
your-favorite, 27%; Option Alternation, 50%; Random, 50%). Note that, consequently, the 
validities of the other cues dropped (from the observed validity prior to choices to p =.29 for 
the first and p =.34 for the second cue at the end of decision phase), while the validity of the 
high valid cue was constant across conditions. 
Prediction patterns. Cue values varied and were visible during the decision to 
facilitate encoding (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). We used two types of cue value patterns in 60 
decision trials, which were organized in three blocks and separated by short breaks (Figure 
1B-C). In the first pattern type, presented 12 times in each block, both low valid cues 
contradicted the high valid cue’s value. In the second pattern type, presented six times, one of 
the low valid cues contradicted the high valid cue’s value and the other was indifferent. In 
addition, we used filler items without contradiction between cues (relevant for identifying 
decision strategies). 
Design and sample. The sample consisted of 110 6 to 7-year-old children in grade 
one (46% female, M = 79.84 months SD = 5.55) 107 8 to 9-year-old children in grade three 
(48% female, M = 106.31 months SD = 5.34) and 99 21-year-old adult controls (67% female, 
M = 257.42 months SD = 35.83); all living in Germany. Excluding participants who could not 
correctly identify the high valid cue (one 7-year-old) or did not complete the study (two 
adults) left 109 7-year-olds (46% female, M = 79.78 months SD = 5.55), 107 9-year-olds and 
97 adults (66% female, M = 256.51 months SD = 34.97). The study applied a 3 (Age Group: 
7-year-olds vs. 9-year-olds vs. adults) × 3 (Feedback Environment: No Feedback, Lenient 
Feedback vs. Strict Feedback) between design. 
Procedure . The procedure was identical to previous research using the same 
paradigm (e.g., Lang & Betsch, 2018a). A trained experimenter supervised each participant in 
a separate cubicle of the lab using a desktop computer. The experimenter explained that the 
game’s purpose was to find as many treasures as possible, which paid for presents afterwards. 
She started the game with introducing the cues as follows: “You don’t have to find the 
treasures on your own; animals will be helping you. Do you see the animals on the screen? 
You are allowed to choose three of them to help you”. The first chosen animal was assigned 
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to the top row of the screen, the last chosen on the bottom row to ensure that participant’s 
liking of cues was not corresponding with validity. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Treasure Hunt Game. Participants first encoded each cue’s validity (A): The 
most valid cue correctly predicted outcomes in six out of seven times, resulting in six smart 
points (p = .86). In Study 1, both low valid cues gained four (p = .57, B), in Study 2, they 
gained five smart points (p = .71, C). Participants could inspect cue values before choosing 
between two options. Cue values changed for each choice resulting in different cue value 
patterns (e.g., Type 2 in B and Type 1 in C). In feedback conditions, participants revealed the 
option’s outcome immediately and earned a treasure point in case of a positive outcome.  
 
Encoding cue validities prior to choices. To ensure that even preschool-aged 
children were able to grasp the concept of cue validity, we framed it as smartness of animals: 
The experimenter explained that the house at the top of the board would hide a treasure or a 
spider and that the animals would predict hidden outcomes but differed in smartness (Figure 
1A). Each animal would earn smart points for correct predictions. The experimenter started 
with the animal placed on the top row, opened the door next to the cue and explained the 
meaning of its prediction (e.g., “The dog says there is a treasure in the house”). She then 
opened the house, revealed and explained the actual outcome, and granted a smart point to the 
cue (e.g., “There is a treasure in the house. The dog was smart and knew it. It gets a smart 
point”). In the following five trials, children identified correct predictions and granted smart 
points to the cue. For each smart point, the experimenter clicked on one of the point next to 
the cue that turned red. After seven trials, the experimenter summarized the cue’s validity by 
counting smart points together with the child and stating that it had received four out of seven 
smart points. Participants then observed predictions of the second and third cue and 
corresponding outcomes. To keep cue validities salient, we displayed the magnitude of smart 
points (i.e., four and six) next to each cue throughout the game (Figure 1). Participants 
identified the cue highest in validity as a manipulation check before decision making. 
Decisions. The experimenter explained that the participant should inspect the animals’ 
predictions, would make several decisions between two houses, and would receive a treasure 
point for each treasure found. Two training trials ensured that the children understood the 
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procedure and the information−board matrix. Participants then made 60 decisions between 
two options, organized in three blocks, with two short breaks after the 20th and 40th decision. 
Participants were either immediately informed about the outcome of their decisions in 
feedback conditions, or not informed until the end of the game in conditions without 
feedback. After the final decision, the manipulation check was assessed a second time and we 
assessed several judgments concerning the cues, which we will not further address in this 
paper. 
Overall the study took about 30 minutes to complete. All children were highly 
engaged until the end of the game and debriefed afterwards in accordance with their age. 
Participants were rewarded according to their choice performance with 2 to 5 prizes for 
children and 5-11 € for adults. The procedure for adults was similar to children’s, but adults 
were informed that they served as a control group in a children’s study in advance. 
Results 
We expected children in both age groups to profit from strict feedback and learning 
the simple Lexicographic strategy (LEX, i.e., decisions following the most valid cue’s 
predictions) over time. When feedback is more lenient, feedback should be less helpful for 
improving decision strategies. To detect change, we analyzed choice data on group level and 
on individual level. Collapsing choice data across individuals can disguise inter-individual 
differences in strategies (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). But it can be more sensitive for 
detection of small shifts in strategy use. Individual data analysis shows inter-individual 
differences, but detecting change requires participants to coherently apply their decision 
strategy. It can thus be less sensitive for detecting small shifts. 
Decisions in line with LEX. We assessed choices in line with LEX in the first, the 
second and the third block of decisions. Figure 2 shows the proportion of decisions in line 
with LEX over time for each feedback condition and age group. In both feedback conditions, 
decisions in all age groups aligned to LEX. Without feedback, only adults’ decisions were in 
line with LEX above chance level. Nine-year-olds performed around and 7-year-olds 
performed below chance level.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of choices in line with the Lexicographic strategy in Study 1. Bars 
represent 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. Dashed line represents chance level. 
 
We conducted a GLM ANOVA with Age Group and Feedback Condition as between 
and Decision Block (1-3) as within factor for child groups. A small main effect of age, F(1, 
210) = 8.72, p = .004 η2p = .04, indicated that older children generally chose more often in 
accordance with LEX; a larger main effect of feedback, F(2, 210) = 23.61, p < .001 η2p = .18, 
indicated that both child groups benefitted from feedback as expected, all other ps ≥.05. Older 
and younger children’s choices aligned to LEX equally good and very quickly, noticeable 
already in the first decision block (Figure 1). In line with expectations, both child groups 
profited slightly more from strict feedback when compared to lenient feedback; F(1, 145) = 
5.85, p = .017, η2p = .04, block, Huynh-Feldt-F(1,739; 260.022) = 3.61, p = .033, η2p = .02; all 
other ps ≥.21. 
Decision strategies. We further analyzed children’s individual decision strategies 
applied in the last block where feedback effects should be most pronounced1. We assigned 
participants to one of the considered decision strategies if their decisions in the last block 
fitted strategy predictions flawlessly. If this was not the case for any strategy, maximum 
likelihood classification determined the likelihood of the observed choices pattern when 
                                                 
1 We also performed the analysis for the last 40 decisions for each participant. This produces more reliable 
results because the number of decisions in which models predictions differ increases and allows to better 
distinguish between models. At the downside, adaption might occur later and would remain undetected. 
Therefore, we decided to rather limit the analyzed decisions to the last block. 
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applying each strategy with a constant error maximizing the likelihood (Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003). Each participant was thus assigned to the strategy which most likely produced the 
observed choice pattern. 
Table 1 provides the results. Without feedback, children mainly relied on non-adaptive 
strategies, such as Take-your-Favorite, Option Alternation and Equal Weight (69% in younger 
and 45% in older children). With feedback, the prevalence of the adaptive LEX-strategy 
increases within child groups. A binary regression for child groups tested whether LEX was 
more often applied with lenient feedback (41%) compared to without feedback (11%) but less 
often compared with strict feedback (46%). The analysis shows that children applied LEX 
more often compared with conditions without feedback, B = -1.62, p = .02, OR = .20, but not 
less often compared with strict feedback, B = -0.54, p = .74; Wald- χ2(2) = 5.67, p = .059; 
Constant, B = -0.61; all other ps ≥ .31; Nagelkerkes R² = .21. Accordingly, the small benefit 
of strict feedback on group level does not replicate in individual data analysis. 
Note, that older children were not generally more likely to apply LEX than younger 
children (40% vs. 27%). Although older children performed surprisingly well with strict 
feedback peaking in 62% of LEX-users, we obtained no interaction between age and feedback 
condition. Unexpectedly, adults were not exclusively using LEX without feedback, and 
likewise benefitted from feedback, χ2 (2, 97) = 20.14, p ≤ .001, Cramer’s φ = .45. 
Surprisingly, non-adaptive strategies were not reduced in feedback conditions, all ps ≥ 
.06. Even in strict feedback conditions, 41% of younger and 24% of older children relied on 
non-adaptive strategies such as Option Alternation, Take-your-Favorite and Equal Weight. 
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Table 1 
Decision strategies in Study 1 
    
No 
feedback 
  
Lenient 
feedback 
  
Strict 
feedback 
  Overall 
7-year-olds  n = 31  n =37  n = 41  n = 109  
  n % 
 n %  n %  n % Error 
Lexicographic  3 10  13 35  13 31  29 27 .17 
Equal Weight  3 10  5 14  5 12  13 12 .35 
Take-your-Favorite  3 10  1 3  1 2  5 5 .26 
Option Alternation  15 49  15 40  16 39  46 42 .19 
Random  3 10  3 8  6 14  12 11  
Unclassified   4 13   — —   — —   4 4   
9-year-olds  n = 36  n = 34  n = 37  n = 107  
  n % 
 n %  n %  n % Error  
Lexicographic  4 11  16 47  23 62  43 40 .17 
Equal Weight  2 6  1 3  1 3  4 4 .23 
Take-your-Favorite  2 6  4 12  2 5  8 8 .35 
Option Alternation  12 33  10 29  7 19  29 27 .27 
Random  15 42  3 9  4 11  22 25  
Unclassified   1 3   — —   — —   1 1   
Adults  n = 32  n = 31  n = 34  n = 97  
  n % 
 n %  n %  n % Error  
Lexicographic  17 53  23 74  34 100  74 76 .08 
Equal Weight  4 13  — —  — —  4 4 .14 
Take-your-Favorite  — —  — —  — —  — —  
Option Alternation  5 16  4 13  — —  9 9 .34 
Random  6 19  4 13  — —  10 10   
Unclassified   — —   — —   — —         
Note. Error = Mean error rate = the averaged proportion of strategy-incongruent choices. For 
example, adults diverge from the Lexicographic strategy in 8%, that is, in less than two out of 
20 choices. 
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Evaluations of cues after decisions. 91% (n = 99) of younger, 90% (n = 96) of older 
children and 98% (n = 95) of adults correctly selected the last as the most valid cue after they 
made their decisions, χ2 (2, 313) = 5.867, p = .053, Cramer’s φ = .05. Thus, failure to 
implement LEX cannot be explained by a failure in memorizing the dispersion of cue 
validities. 
Discussion 
7-year-olds and 9-year-olds learned to use the simple and adaptive Lexicographic 
strategy (LEX) in a highly dispersed probabilistic environment with decision feedback. 
Decisions on group level and individual decision strategies aligned to LEX when feedback 
reinforced its use. Unexpectedly, the benefit of a strict feedback environment was limited. 
Children learned LEX nearly equally well in lenient feedback conditions, where though LEX 
performed best, other strategies performed better than chance. But in contrast to previous 
unsuccessful attempts in young children’s strategy learning, a priori stated probabilities were 
more dispersed. Consequently, differences in strategy performance were already more 
pronounced and feedback favored LEX more vehemently in comparison to other decision 
strategies.  
We conclude, that children as young as seven can learn adaptive decision strategies 
from feedback under certain circumstances (see General Discussion). Nevertheless, 
feedback’s benefits were limited: Even with strict feedback, children’s decisions still diverged 
considerably from the strategies’ predictions on group level (cf. Figure 2); and many children 
still did not apply the adaptive LEX-strategy, and consistently held on to non-adaptive 
decision strategies (cf. Table 1). Those limitations might, however, specifically apply to LEX. 
Highly selective strategies, such as LEX, might be hard to learn for children, because 
inhibition of information is very challenging for younger children (Mata et al., 2011). Thus, 
they might learn decision strategies better that require to holistically integrate all dimensions. 
The Equal Weight-strategy integrates all cue value, yet is simple: it considers all cues’ values 
equally, regardless of their validity. When cue validities are low in dispersion, ignoring small 
differences in cue validities is adaptive and Equal Weight performs well. In the second study, 
we investigated, whether children learned the holistic Equal Weight-strategy better than the 
selective LEX-strategy. 
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Study 2 
We established a decision environment with low dispersion of cues before decisions 
(p1,2 = .71; p3 = .86). Crucially, we wanted to create an environment where a priori stated cue 
validities suggest that both LEX and Equal Weight can be applied successfully (based on the 
high validity of Cue 3, LEX can be expected to perform well: Since both other cues are also 
high in validity, it is also reasonable to neglect cue validities and apply Equal Weight). We 
further established two strict feedback conditions, one in which LEX was reinforced and one 
in which Equal Weight was reinforced2. In a control condition, we offered no feedback. The 
procedure and further material was identical to Study 1. 
Method 
The sample consisted of 92 7-year-old children in grade one (46% female, M = 81.83 
months SD = 6.73) 90 9-year-old children in grade three (37% female, M = 110.21 months 
SD = 7.65) and 77 22-year-old adults (67% female, M = 272.64 months SD = 30.01). We 
excluded participants that failed the manipulation check (four 7-year-olds, one 9-year-old and 
four adults) or did not complete the whole study (one 7-year-old). Thus, the final sample 
included 86 7-year-olds (43% female, M = 82.00 months SD = 6.79), 89 9-year-olds (40% 
female, M = 110.31 months SD = 7.63) and 72 adults (68% female, M = 274.14 months SD = 
29.64). 
The study applied a 3(Age group: 7-year-olds vs.9-year-olds vs. adults) × 3 (Feedback 
environment: No feedback vs. Feedback for LEX vs. Feedback for Equal Weight) between 
design. In both feedback conditions, feedback favored the most adaptive strategy quite 
vehemently (LEX 80% overall success rate, Equal Weight 75% success rate). Competing 
strategies performed below chance (Equal Weight, 37%; LEX 41%; Option Alternation 50%; 
Take-your-Favorite, 27%, 51%)3. The patterns and their ordering was identical to Study 1. 
Results 
We again analyzed decisions on group level. Figure 3 show decisions in line with LEX 
when it contradicted Equal Weight (Figure 1C). As expected, decisions adapt quickly to 
feedback resulting in more decision in line with LEX or with Equal Weight (i.e., choices in 
line with LEX decrease) in dependence on feedback. Interestingly, younger children’s 
decisions without feedback tended to align to Equal Weight. Older children and adults in 
                                                 
2
 We did not apply a feedback environment which only maintains cue validities as provided. Such feedback 
would be rather uninformative and we would not expect different decision behavior than without feedback. Note, 
that consequently, cue validities get more dispersed over time.  
3 Take-your-favorite was more accurate when feedback favored Equal Weight due to pattern constraints. But this 
works against our hypothesis, and should impede learning Equal Weight.  
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contrast, decided equally often in line with LEX and Equal Weight. This is expectable, 
because both strategies can be expected to perform well based on the a priori stated cue 
validities. 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of choices in line with the Lexicographic strategy (i.e., against the Equal 
Weight-strategy) in Study 2’ first prediction pattern. Bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence 
intervals. Dashed line represents chance level. 
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Adaptive decisions. For ease of comparison, we then analyzed adaptive decisions in 
feedback conditions. Adaptive decisions are in line with LEX when LEX is reinforced, and in 
line with Equal Weight when Equal Weight is reinforced. We expected adaption to be quicker 
and more efficient for Equal Weight. Figure 4 shows that all age groups adapted to feedback 
in both feedback conditions, but differ in children. 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of adaptive choices in feedback conditions, that is, LEX or Equal 
Weight in the first prediction patterns. Bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence intervals.  
 
An ANOVA on adaptive choices results in an effect of age, F(2, 161) = 36.96, p < 
.001, η2p = .32 with adults being more adaptive than older children, p < .001, but also older 
children being more adaptive than younger children, p =.005. Further main effects of block, 
and several interactions indicate that adaption was faster and more efficient in different 
feedback conditions.  
Separate analysis for each age group with ANOVAs on adaptive choices and Feedback 
and Block as factors provide a clearer picture of adaptivity: 7-year-olds adapted decisions 
stronger when feedback favored Equal Weight as supported by a main effect for Feedback 
Condition, F(1, 52) = 5.95, p = .018, η2p = .04, but not quicker as the lack of a Block-
Feedback interaction indicates, and no improvement beyond the first block; all other ps ≥.15. 
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9-year-olds also adapted stronger to feedback favoring Equal Weight, F(1, 61) = 5.81, 
p = .019, η2p = .09, their decisions continued to improve over blocks in both conditions, 
Huynh-Feldt-F(1.98, 130.75) = 21.89, p <.001, η2p = .26; and improved more rapidly when 
Equal Weight was favored, Block × Feedback Condition, Huynh-Feldt-F(1.98, 120.78) = 
6.02, p =.003, η2p = .09.  
Adults adapted equally well to both feedback environments, we obtained only an 
effect of block indicating that decisions in both conditions improved over blocks ; Block, 
Huynh-Feldt-F(1.66, 79.53) = 3.21, p <.001, η2p = .40, all other ps ≥ .055. 
Decision strategies. We conducted the same strategy classification method as in Study 
14. Table 2 provides the results. Without feedback, adults relied on either LEX or Equal 
Weight. Children used LEX and Equal Weight as well, but other decision strategies more 
frequently.  
In all age groups, the prevalence of the most adaptive strategy—LEX when feedback 
reinforced LEX, and Equal Weight when feedback reinforced Equal Weight—increased with 
feedback. Nearly all adults but only 43% of younger and 51% of older children applied the 
favored strategy. Comparing prevalence of adaptive strategies in feedback conditions shows 
that older children took up Equal Weight and LEX equally well, χ2 (1, 63) = 0.67, p = .797; 
but younger children used Equal Weight more often, χ2 (1, 54) = 6.135, p = .027, Cramer’s 
V = .01.  
  
                                                 
4 In this decision environment, it is further possible to distinguish Weighted Additive (Payne et al, 1988) from a 
Lexicographic Strategy and Equal Weight-strategy. We did not do that for two reasons: First, our main focus was 
to distinguish between simple decision strategies, therefore we focused on the most promising candidate from 
these two categories in children. Previously, children very rarely applied Weighted Additive even it was 
reinforced (Betsch et al., 2018). Second, the cue validities in feedback conditions change over the course of 
choices. If decision makers updated cue validities, Weighted Additive-predictions would start to converge to 
LEX predictions in “Feedback for LEX”-conditions, and to Equal Weight predictions in “Feedback for Equal 
Weight”-conditions. 
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Table 2 
Decision strategies in Study 2 
    
No 
feedback 
  
Feedback 
for LEX 
  
Feedback 
for EQW 
  Overall 
7-year-olds  n = 32  n = 27  n = 27  n = 86  
  n % 
 n %  n %  n % Error 
Lexicographic  2 6  7 26  — —  9 11 .13 
Equal Weight  8 25  2 7  16 60  26 30 .19 
Take-your-Favorite  4 13  3 11  4 15  11 13 .25 
Option Alternation  8 25  8 30  5 19  21 24 .21 
Random  2 6  7 26  2 7  11 12  
Unclassified   8 25   — —   — —   8 9   
9-year-olds  n = 26  n = 24  n = 39  n = 89  
  n % 
 n %  n %  n % Error  
Lexicographic  5 19  13 54  2 5  20 26 .15 
Equal Weight  4 15  — —  19 49  23 26 .14 
Take-your-Favorite  2 8  1 4  8 21  11 12 .27 
Option Alternation  12 46  9 38  6 15  27 30 .26 
Random  2 8  1 4  3 8  6 7  
Unclassified   1 4   — —   1 3   2 2   
Adults  n = 22  n = 26  n = 24  n = 78  
  n % 
 n %  n %  n % Error  
Lexicographic  9 41  25 96  — —  34 47 .08 
Equal Weight  10 46  — —  21 88  31 34 .06 
Take-your-Favorite  — —  — —  — —  — —  
Option Alternation  3 14  1 4  2 8  6 8 .37 
Random  — —  — —  1 4  1 1   
Unclassified   — —   — —   — —         
Note. Error = Mean error rate = the averaged proportion of strategy-incongruent choices. For 
example, adults diverge from the Lexicographic strategy in 8%, that is, in less than two out of 
20 choices. 
 
Importantly, younger children used Equal Weight frequently without feedback 
(25/32), and even more frequently with feedback, χ2 (1, 59) = 7.12, p = .008, Cramer’s V = 
.35, OR = 2.4. Use of LEX was low without feedback and increased but remained low with 
feedback (7/27), χ2 (1, 59) = 4.39, p = .036, Cramer’s V = .27, OR = 6. In contrast, older 
children, use LEX and Equal Weight equally often without feedback and increase use of both 
with feedback; LEX, χ2 (1, 50) = 6.61, p = .010 Cramer’s V = .36, OR = 2.8; Equal Weight, χ2 
(1, 65) = 7.581, p = .006, Cramer’s V = .34, OR = 3.2. 
Similar to Study 1, non-adaptive strategies were still frequently used by children and 
not reduced in feedback conditions, all ps ≥ .47. 
Evaluations of cues after decisions. Interestingly, feedback did not only initiate shifts 
in strategy use but also affected children’s evaluation of the cues and their validity: When 
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Equal Weight was favored, and accordingly the feedback schedule dropped the initially high 
validity of the last cue, only 52% of younger children chose the last cue as the most valid one. 
In comparison, 84% selected the last cue without feedback, and 85% when LEX was favored, 
χ2 (2, 86) = 10.53, p = .005, Cramer’s V = .35. The same pattern is found in older children, 
when feedback favored Equal Weigh, 36%; and LEX, 83%; without feedback, 85%; χ2 (2, 89) 
= 14.30, p = .001, Cramer’s V = 40; and adults, when feedback favored Equal Weight, 58%; 
and LEX, 100%; without feedback, 95%; χ2 (2, 72) = 19.56, p ≤ .001, Cramer’s V = .52.  
Discussion 
In the second study, we tested whether children learned the Equal Weight-strategy 
better than the Lexicographic strategy (LEX). And indeed, when feedback favored Equal 
Weight, 7 and 9-year-old children adapted decisions group level better: On individual level, 7-
year-olds applied Equal Weight more often with and without feedback compared to LEX, but 
9-year olds did not. Thus, it might be easier for younger children to make good decisions in an 
environment in which holistic strategies yield better results. This is not so clear-cut for the 
older children in our sample: they were more adaptive as a group, when Equal Weight was 
favored, but individually learned both strategies with equal success. 
General Discussion 
We investigated 7 and 9-year-olds’ adaption of decision strategies to probabilistic 
feedback. We found that 7-year-olds, 9-year-olds learned simple, but adaptive decision 
strategies from feedback. However, age-dependent deficiencies remained even under ideal 
circumstances: Even when adaptive decision strategies are not overly complex and feedback 
reinforces them strictly, only adults showed very good to perfect uptake of the most adaptive 
decision strategy, a considerable proportion of children still clung to inferior, non-adaptive 
strategies.  
Nevertheless, both studies clearly demonstrate that children learn decision strategies 
from probabilistic feedback. Evidence for successful learning of decision strategies had been 
limited to older children (Mata et al., 2011). Previous studies with children younger than nine 
showed no uptake of adaptive strategies in line with feedback (Betsch & Lang, 2013, Betsch 
et al., 2014; 2016; Betsch el al., 2018, Lang & Betsch, 2018a and b). Increased length of the 
decision phase cannot merely account for our findings because feedback benefits emerged 
early (e.g., compare LEX-decisions in Study 1’s block 1, see also Betsch el al., 2018, Lang & 
Betsch, 2018b, for similar lengths).  
We initially assumed that younger children only learn decision strategies in very strict 
feedback environments, which vehemently reinforce one simple strategy and simultaneously 
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discourage other strategies, especially non-adaptive strategies children otherwise rely on, 
(Lang & Betsch, 2018b). Thus, we expected children to predominantly shift strategies with 
strict feedback, when strategy performance quickly falls short of children’s, erroreous, high 
expectations. Increased discrepancies between strategies’ performances should, in line with 
reinforcement learning mechanisms (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998), 
facilitate strategy learning. 
Strict feedback was indeed slightly more beneficial (Study 1), but children learned 
adaptive strategies also with more lenient feedback. Importantly in comparison to previous 
research, lenient feedback, which maintained stated differences in probability, produced more 
pronounced differences in strategy performance (since a priori stated probabilities was more 
dispersed, other strategies failed more often than previously).  
One additional factor might further contribute to better learning: We increased the 
prevalence of one cue value pattern (Figure 1C). Cue values patterns varied from decision to 
decision, but this specific pattern was presented in 60% of choices. Previous studies, 
presented different cue value patterns equally often (e.g. in 33%; Lang & Betsch, 2018b; 16% 
of decisions, Betsch et al., 2018). Encountering one cue value pattern more frequently, might 
facilitate monitoring of strategy success and failure and lead to quicker shifts to adaptive 
strategies.  
Moreover, successful strategy learning depends on the properties of the reinforced 
strategy. We focused on two simple strategies, the Lexicographic strategy (LEX) and the 
Equal Weigh strategy. Younger, but not older children learned Equal Weight-strategy more 
frequently than LEX (see “Why Equal Weight is easier than LEX”). In line with previous 
research (Mata et al., 2011), this suggest that not all decision strategies are learned equally 
well, respectively at all, by children. Learning more complex decision strategies, such as 
Weighted Additive might be doomed to fail in young age groups because of the more 
complex cognitive operations (Betsch et al., 2018, but see Glöckner & Betsch, Lindow, Lang 
& Betsch, 2017, for effortless application of a Weighted Additive like process in adults and 
children). 
Why Equal Weight is Easier Than LEX 
Seven-year-olds but not nine-year-olds learned an Equal Weight-strategy better than 
LEX and also used it more often without feedback. This is in contrast to previous research 
showing that 9-11-year-olds still learned Equal Weight better (Mata et al., 2011). Several 
reasons might account for Equal Weight’s advantage: LEX requires to ignore all but the most 
important dimension. Children might fail allocating their attention to this one dimension and 
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shielding themselves from all others. Strategies that do not require to focus on and ignore 
information might thus benefit children (Mata et al., 2011). Our results do not support the 
notion that children cannot selectively attend to information. For example, in Study 1, 59% of 
children focused on their favorite cue’s prediction or on the previous trial’s decision and 
successfully ignored all other information (see also Lang & Betsch, 2018a). Thus, we think it 
unlikely, that children are incapable of selectively considering information for decisions.  
Rather, we think that two other factors might create an advantage for Equal Weight in 
comparison to LEX: First, LEX is a probabilistic strategy; its application requires to order 
dimensions according to their importance, here that is, the probabilistic relation between cue 
and outcome, the cue validity. Thus, its application at least requires to acknowledge the 
importance of probability for subsequent decisions. Recent research suggests, that although 
children are well aware of distribution of cue validities, they are not aware of its relevance for 
decision outcomes (Lang, 2018). Equal Weight in contrast, allows to ignore probabilistic 
relations between cues and outcomes.  
Second, children might already enter the decision problems with a stronger preference 
for Equal Weight than for LEX. When a strategy is already expected to perform well, it will 
initially be used more often and consistent uptake in feedback environments is more likely 
(Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). In line with this, younger children applied Equal Weight more 
often than LEX without feedback. Potentially, younger children might prefer majority rules 
because they are fast and frugal in everyday decisions. However, research on the question 
shows mixed findings (e.g., Burdett, Lucas, Buchsbaum, McGuigan, Wood, &Whiten, 2016). 
Attribution of Decision Feedback 
Feedback mutably affects and sometimes even decreases cognitive performance 
(Bangerts-Drowns, Kulik, Kulil, & Morgan, 1991, Fyfe & Rittle-Johnson, 2015, Hattie & 
Timperley, 2007; Harvey & Fischer, 2005; Karelaia & Hogarth, 1998, Kluger & deNisi, 1996; 
Narciss & Huth, 2004, Shute, 2008,). Crucially, how individuals engage with feedback from 
the environment determines what they learn. One important factor for learning is feedback 
attribution. Especially, in multi-cue decisions, feedback can be attributed to different aspects 
of the decision environment: options, strategies and cues. For example, children could either 
attribute feedback to correct option-choice (“I found a treasure because I’ve chosen the right 
house.”) or to correct selection of strategy (“I found a treasure because I’ve followed the 
majority/ the smartest animal”). Research in adults suggests that feedback attribution is 
volatile (Bröder, Glöckner, Betsch & Link, 2013): In probabilistic multi-cue decisions, adults 
attributed decision feedback to options and to strategies depending on subtle changes in 
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feedback presentation. Importantly, in our studies, feedback format did not specifically invite 
attribution to decision strategies. Previous research with children suggested that children aged 
5-6 attribute feedback to options (Lang & Betsch, 2018a). Children’s success in strategy 
learning suggests that they attribute feedback to their decision strategy as well. Potentially, 
variation of feedback format further improves strategy learning, for example when children 
are rewarded for correct strategy application regardless of the actual outcome or elaborate on 
feedback themselves (Luwel, Foustana, Papadatos & Verschaffel; 2001; Siegler, 2007).  
Children’s evaluation of cues suggests that they attributed feedback to cues’ 
performances, at least on a rudimentary level. When asked to indicate the most valid cue, 
children’s selected the initially high valid cue less often when feedback decreased its validity 
(Study 2). Altogether, this provides first evidence for children attributing decision feedback in 
various ways. 
Mechanisms of Strategy Adaption 
The idea of a repertoire of decisions strategies evokes the problem of adaptive strategy 
selection. This adaption can work in a top-down fashion (Beach & Mitchell, 1979; Payne et 
al., 1988): Decision maker can consider the specifics of the decision environment (e.g., the 
distribution of probabilities or the complexity, e.g., the number of options) and weight costs 
(e.g., time and cognitive efforts) and benefits (expected performance) of available strategies. 
It can likewise work in a bottom-up fashion: decision makers gradually update strategy 
expectations in line with feedback and eventually shift to better strategies (Rieskamp & Otto, 
2006; Shaffrer & Siegler, 1998).  
Although, children aged seven successfully adapted strategies in a bottom-up fashion, 
we observed very little to no adaption in a top-down fashion. For illustration, consider 
conditions without feedback. Distribution of probabilities was established before the first 
decision, thus weighting of costs and benefits is normatively possible. In line with this, half of 
adults used LEX without feedback. Children in contrast, seldom used a strategy adaptive to 
stated probabilities without feedback. Overall, children benefitted more from feedback than 
from being informed about cue validities a priori (see Hogarth et al., 2011 for an overview in 
adults). 
Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to demonstrate that adaption of decision strategies works in 
children under nine. Children aged seven and nine successfully learned adaptive decision 
strategy when feedback vehemently reinforced simple decision strategies (LEX, Equal 
Weight). It illustrates, that under ideal circumstances, that is, in highly dispersed probabilistic 
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environments and when adaptive strategies are not too complex to perform, feeding back 
decision outcomes improves children’s, otherwise deficient, decision making, even in 
complex probabilistic environments.  
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Abstract 
Three studies investigate whether children at the age of six and nine utilize probabilities 
assigned to cues in judgments. They show that probability utilization in judgments emerges 
late and follows the same developmental trajectory as in decisions: Probability utilization is 
absent in 6-year-olds and emerging in 9-year-olds. Children’s judgments show that their 
expectations of outcomes are not informed by probability until late elementary school age. 
Results remain consistent across studies and are unaffected by experience of participants or 
scale formats used to assess judgments. The findings contradict the notion that children utilize 
probabilities in judgments earlier than in decisions and highlight that deficits in probabilistic 
judgments persist until the age of nine. 
Keywords: Probability learning, probabilistic inference, judgment and decision-
making 
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Utilization of Probabilistic Cues in Children’s Judgments 
Utilizing probabilistic information correctly in judgment and decision making is a 
developmental challenge for children. In decisions, children do not exploit probabilistic 
information during the preschool period; this ability only emerges at elementary school age 
and continues to develop until late school age (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch, Lang, Lehmann, 
& Axmann, 2014; Betsch, Lehmann, Lindow, Lang, & Schoemann, 2016; Cassotti, Aïte, 
Osmont, Houde, & Borst, 2014; Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & van Aken, 2014; Levin & Hart, 
2003; Levin, Weller, Pederson, & Harshman, 2007; Mata, van Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011; 
cf. Levin, Hart, Weller & Harshman, 2007; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008). In judgments, 
however, children seem to consider probability at an earlier age (Acredolo, O'Connor, Banks, 
& Horobin, 1989; Anderson & Schlottmann, 1991; Schlottmann & Tring, 2005). For 
example, when 5-year-olds judge expected values of gambles their expectations are informed 
by the gamble’s winning probability and they even integrate probability and value 
normatively correct (Schlottmann, 2001). 
Decision tasks are often complex: They display multiple options and require children 
to successfully perform a sequence of processes in this environment (Betsch & Haberstroh, 
2005). Decision makers must evaluate multiple options, compare those evaluations, and form 
behavioral intentions based on this comparison: for example, to choose the option highest in 
expected value, and reject others. They must then implement these intentions successfully 
while shielding all these processes from internal and external noise, such as intrusion of 
salient but irrelevant information. Thus, decisions may suffer from children’s deficient 
working memory and executive functioning (Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012; cf. Brand, 
Recknor, Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 2007 for executive function and decisions). This might 
explain why children often fall back on complexity-reducing strategies in decisions and 
ignore probability (Lang & Betsch, 2018a; Mata et al., 2011; Reyna & Brainerd, 1994). 
Judgments tasks, on the other hand, are less challenging: They require one evaluation 
at a time, no comparison of evaluations, no deduction, and no implementation of behavioral 
intentions. Performance in judgments can thus differ considerably from performance in 
decision making tasks (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971); and children might utilize probabilities 
in judgments while not yet utilizing them in decisions (Anderson, 1991; Reyna & Brainerd, 
1994; Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). 
This paper investigates whether children consider probability for judgments in 
probabilistic inference tasks. In this paradigm, children consistently neglect probability in 
decisions until the age of nine (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014, 2016; Lang & 
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Betsch, 2018a). Thus, it is well suited to investigate whether children utilize probability in 
judgments earlier than in decisions. 
Probabilistic inference tasks mimic real-world decision problems in which available 
pieces of information—the cues—are probabilistically related to future decision outcomes 
(Brunswik, 1956). For example, whether a dog will be friendly and can be approached or will 
be dangerous and should be avoided cannot be predicted with certainty, but cues such as a 
wagging tail, perked-up ears and a relaxed mouth are probabilistically related to future dog 
behavior. These cues differ in their validity; that is, some cues predict outcomes better than 
others: A wagging tail in dogs can also indicate aggression and might thus not be a high valid 
cue. Normatively, available cues should be used to evaluate choice options and to optimize 
decisions (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
Adults master these tasks in varying contexts: They integrate multiple cues in 
accordance with the cues’ validities or systematically rely on the most informative cue when 
appropriate (e.g., Bröder, 2000). Children below the age of nine, however, do not utilize cue 
validities for decisions. At the age of five to six, all children neglect cue validities in 
decisions; at the age of eight to nine, the majority of children neglect cue validities; and even 
older children’s behavior diverges from adults’ (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014, 
2016; Lang & Betsch, 2018a; Mata, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011). 
If children consider cue validities in judgments at an early age, this would support the 
notion of different developmental trajectories for judgments and decision making and might 
narrow down causes for children’s deficient decisions. Based on previously reported superior 
performance in judgment tasks, children are expected to utilize cue validities in judgments 
earlier than in choices. Probability utilization should characterize judgments of 6- and 9-year-
olds and adults, but judgments should become more accurate with age. Three studies use a 
child-friendly probabilistic decision paradigm, in which judgments were integrated. Decisions 
are not analyzed in detail but serve as a standard of comparison (see Lang & Betsch, 2018a, 
2018b, for detailed analysis of decision data). 
Method 
Research Paradigm 
The task is an adaption of the classic MouseLab Paradigm in adult decision making, in 
which three probabilistic cues predict binary outcomes of two options (Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1988; Figure 1C). The cues’ binary predictive values can be used to infer options’ 
expected value and maximize choice outcomes. Cues differ in their predictive validity: The 
first cue predicts outcomes correctly in three, the second cue in four and the third cue in five 
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out of six cases (corresponding to p = .50, .66 and .83; Phase 1 in Procedure; Figure 1A). 
Participants encoded these differences in validity by observing the relative frequencies of 
correct predictions of each cue. Frequency formats are easier to understand than stated 
probabilities (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). This allows even very young children to encode 
probabilistic information. To further facilitate recall, the probabilistic information was 
depicted graphically next to each cue as a magnitude of smart points; one for each correct 
prediction (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The research paradigm Figure shows stimulus material of the studies. During the 
encoding of cue validities (A), each cue predicts an outcome six times. If the prediction is 
correct, participants grant a smart point to the cue. Smart points subsequently represent each 
cue’s validity (B, C). Participants predict outcomes for three fictional decision makers that 
play the game following one specific cue (B). Judgments are assessed a second time after the 
decision phase (C) and assessed on different scales (D). In the decision phase (C), participants 
repeatedly choose between two options and can inspect cue predictions before each choice. 
Cue predictions vary from choice to choice. Choice outcomes are available in feedback 
conditions.  
 
Participants were then familiarized with the probabilistic decision game: the Treasure 
Hunt. It required repeatedly choosing between two options (i.e., houses), which could yield 
positive (i.e., treasures) or negative outcomes (i.e., spiders). For each decision, cue predictions 
could be inspected to optimize decisions. The probabilistic structure prescribed to follow the 
most valid cue’s prediction to maximize outcomes. 
 
Judgment Measurement 
To assess children’s utilization of probability in judgments, researchers test whether 
their expectations of outcomes are informed by available probabilistic information. For 
example, children may encounter a fictional player of probabilistic games with varying 
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winning probabilities. They then predict outcomes or a related variable (e.g., happiness of the 
player) for different games (Anderson, 1991; Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & Tring, 2005; 
Kalish, 2010; cf. Lagattuta & Saffran, 2013). We adapted this approach for the probabilistic 
inference task: Children encountered fictional players of the Treasure Hunt who played the 
game by relying either on the first, the second or the third cue (see Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, 
& Shanks, 2007, for similar procedures in adults). Children then predicted how many 
treasures each player would find. Normatively, predictive judgments should be informed by 
the cues’ validities; that is, participants should expect better outcomes when the player relied 
on a more valid cue that predicted outcomes more accurately. 
Young children are not yet able to provide stated probability judgments, but they can 
use nonverbal, context-adapted rating scales to express their predictions as graded expectancy 
(Acredolo et al., 1989; Anderson & Schlottmann, 1991; Ebersbach, 2009; Kalish, 2010; 
Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & Tring, 2005). On two graphic scales visually similar to a 
bar chart, participants predicted outcomes as the frequency of treasures for each fictional 
player. The sample size was varied additionally: Participants judged how many treasures a 
player would find when looking for a treasure six times on the 6-treasure scale, ranging from 
0 to 6 treasures, and when looking for a treasure ten times on the 10-treasure scale, ranging 
from 0 to 10 treasures (Figure 1D). Normatively, frequency judgments should follow 
expected value calculations (EV = cue validity × number of times the game is played, e.g., 
.5×6 = 3). Correct predictions on the 6-treasure scale corresponded to correct predictions of 
the respective cue and thus to the magnitude of smart points associated with it (i.e., three, 
four, five). Relying only on smart point magnitudes can yield correct judgments on the 6- but 
not on the 10-treasure scale. Comparing judgments on both scales allows to test whether 
children only predict the magnitude they associate with each cue (e.g., only predict three 
treasures for the cue with three smart points, magnitude estimation hypothesis; Hoemann & 
Roess, 1982; Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). 
Experience 
Making correct predictions requires not only utilization of cue validities but also 
building up a valid mental model of the task using non-probabilistic information (e.g., 
knowing that only one option can be chosen in each trial). Incorrect understanding of the task 
can disguise correct utilization of probabilistic information (Anderson, 1991). Thus, 
predictive judgments were assessed before and after participants repeatedly played the 
Treasure Hunt themselves.  
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The availability of decision outcomes during the game varied: Without feedback, 
participants encoded all the relevant probabilistic information —the cue validities— in 
advance. For correct judgments, they must figure out logically how it affects the chance of 
outcomes. With feedback about decision outcomes, children can also actively engage with the 
probabilistic environment and learn how accurately cues predict outcomes through their own 
actions in the game. This should facilitate correct predictive judgments. 
Study 1 
Study 1 applied a 3 (age group: 6-year-olds vs. 9-year-olds vs. adults) × 2 (time of 
measurement: before vs. after choices) × 2 (feedback: no feedback vs. feedback) design. Time 
of measurement was varied as a within-subjects factor. Despite age-dependent differences in 
predictive judgments, all age groups should be sensitive to cue validities. Further, 
experiencing choices, in particular when feedback was included, should improve predictive 
judgments in child age groups. 
Procedure 
A trained experimenter supervised each participant and explained that the game’s 
purpose was to find as many treasures as possible, which could be traded for presents 
afterwards. The experimenter started the computer game by introducing animals that served as 
cues as follows: “You don’t have to find the treasures on your own; somebody will help you. 
Look, do you see the animals on the screen? You are allowed to choose three of them to help 
you play the treasure hunt.” Participants then selected three out of the eight animals. The first 
chosen animal was placed on the top row of the screen, the last chosen on the bottom row to 
ensure that individual preference was never positively correlated with cue validity (Figure 
1A).  
Phase 1: Encoding cue validities. The concept of cue validity was framed during the 
game as the smartness of the animals. Accordingly, the experimenter explained that animals 
would predict hidden outcomes of a house but differed in smartness. Supervised by the 
experimenter, children encoded differences in cue validities: The experimenter started with 
the animal placed on the top row; she opened the door next to the cue to uncover the cue’s 
prediction (e.g., “The dog says there is a treasure in the house.”). Then she revealed the actual 
outcome by opening the house (e.g., “There is a treasure in the house.”), and explained that 
for this correct prediction the animal was granted a smart point. In the following five trials, 
the participant was asked to indicate whether the animal should be granted a smart point. No 
child had difficulties in identifying correct predictions and granting smart points accordingly. 
For each smart point, the experimenter clicked on a point next to the cue which turned red 
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(Figure 1). After six trials, the experimenter summarized the cue’s validity by counting smart 
points together with the child and stating that it had received three out of six smart points. 
Similarly, predictions of the second and third cue and corresponding outcomes were observed. 
Each cue’s validity was displayed during the whole game by the corresponding magnitude of 
smart points (i.e., three, four and five, Figures 1B, C). Participants had to identify the most 
valid cue as a manipulation check before choices and were excluded if they failed to do so. 
Phase 2: Predictive judgments before choices. The experimenter first explained the 
choice procedure in detail. She then presented the first of three fictional players following the 
predictions of the first animal (Figure 1B): “This is Tim. He plays the treasure hunt game just 
like you. He plays with the same animals, the dog, the giraffe, and the horse. Tim is only 
interested in what the dog says. The other animals do not interest him at all. Tim only relies 
on the dog.” While explaining, the experimenter pointed to the boy’s picture and the 
corresponding cue (Figure 1B). She continued to explain that the boy looked for a treasure six 
times—to make this clear to the child the experimenter slowly counted with her fingers from 
one to six—and placed the 6-treasure scale in front of the child (Figure 1B). The experimenter 
explained the meaning of each scale value. Children then made their predictive judgments by 
pointing to the corresponding treasure bar. Next, the experimenter presented the 10-treasure 
scale in a similar fashion. The procedure was then repeated for other fictional players 
following the medium and high valid cue (named Max and Hannes; order was 
counterbalanced; all names are common German names for boys). 
Phase 3: Choices. Experimenters ensured in two training trials that the child 
understood the game. Participants then played the game 24 times, each time choosing between 
two options. They were either immediately informed about the outcome of the chosen option 
in feedback conditions, or not informed in conditions without feedback. The feedback 
structure matched the encoded cue validities; for example, positive predictions by the high 
valid cue yielded successful choices in 83% (n = 20) of trials. 
Phase 4: Judgments after choices. After having played the game, participants 
provided the same predictive judgments as before. Additionally, participants’ recall of cue 
validities was assessed. First, they pointed out the high and medium valid cue and then judged 
the cue validities on a Graphic-stick scale, which is visually similar to the treasure scales used 
for predictive judgments (adapted from the Wooden-stick scale, Schlottmann, 2001; adapted 
by Lindow, 2014; Figure 1). Experimenters again carefully explained the scale and 
participants pointed to scale values to indicate their judgment of each cue’s validity.  
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Finally, participants were rewarded with prizes contingent on their choice 
performance. The whole study took about 25 minutes. 
Procedure for adults. Adults were informed in advance that they served as a control 
group in a children’s study and would receive money instead of prizes. Otherwise, the 
procedure was identical. 
Sample 
Eighty 6-year-olds (49 female, M = 69.2 months, SD = 5.3), 62 9-year-olds (28 female, 
M = 104.4 months, SD = 4.7), and 53 adults (39 female, M = 258.59 months, SD = 31.96) 
participated. Two 6-year-olds, two 9-year-olds, and three adults were excluded because they 
did not complete the study or data were missing. Seven 6-year-olds and one adult failed the 
manipulation check. The final sample included 71 6-year-olds (46 female, M = 69.1 months, 
SD = 5.3), 60 9-year-olds (27 female, M = 104.5 months, SD = 4.7), and 49 adults (36 female, 
M = 267.5 months, SD = 31.3). Child participants were recruited from German schools or 
kindergartens with varying socioeconomic background. Parents consented to children’s 
participation. Adult participants were students of different majors. 
Results 
Mean predictive judgments. Figure 2A displays mean judgments on each scale as a 
function of cue validity. Visual inspection reveals that only adults’ judgments closely matched 
the normative values on both scales. Small confidence intervals demonstrate the low variance 
in adults’ judgments. Nine-year-olds’ predictive judgments discriminated between cues—that 
is, they expected better outcomes for more valid cues—but diverged considerably from 
normative values and displayed more variance. Six-year-olds’ judgments did not 
systematically discriminate between cues. Their judgments consistently exceeded older 
children’s and adults’ judgments; that is, 6-year-olds seemed to be over-confident and 
generally expected better outcomes. However, the judgments on the 10-treasure scales show 
that all age groups adapted their judgments to the corresponding sample size; that is, children 
did not only stick to mental magnitudes associated with cues. 
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 Figure 2. Judgments in Study 1 as a function of cue validity. Figure shows predictive 
judgments on the 6-treasure scale (Range: 0–6) and the 10-treasure scale (Range: 0–10) 
before choices for all participants; and judgments on both scales after choices for participants 
in each feedback condition. Bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. 
 
Sensitivity and accuracy of predictive judgments. Whether judgments were 
sensitive to cue validities was assessed by calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between judgments and normative expectations for each age group. High correlations indicate 
that participants in this age group relied on cue validities normatively; medium correlations 
indicate that participants considered cue validities but their judgments diverged from 
normative expectations. If participants did not rely on cue validities, no correlation is 
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expected. The root-mean-square deviations (RMSD) from normative expectations served as a 
measure of accuracy. Lower values indicate higher accuracy. 
Table 1 displays sensitivity and accuracy for each age group. Adults were highly 
sensitive to cue validities and accurate in their predictive judgments, 9-year-olds were 
sensitive to cue validities but less accurate than adults, and younger children were insensitive 
to cue validities and the least accurate. Two ANOVAs revealed that age strongly affected 
accuracy on the 6-treasure scale, F(2, 174) = 102.64, p < .001, η
G
2  = .47, as well as on the 10-
treasure scale, F(2, 174) =174.58, p < .001, η
G
2  = .57. 
Irrelevance of experience. The ANOVAs further tested whether the accuracy in 
children’s judgments improved with decision experience and with or without outcome 
feedback. The 6-treasure scale showed a marginally significant effect of Time, 
F(1, 174) = 3.64, p = .058, η
G
2  = .005; and two interaction effects, Time × Feedback, 
F(1, 174) = 3.24, p = .074, η
G
2  = .01; and Time × Feedback × Age, F(2, 174) = 2.37, p = .097, 
η
G
2  = .01, all other ps ≥ .49. Separate analyses for each group revealed that 6-year-olds and 
adults were not affected by feedback on either scale, all ps ≥ .30. Nine-year-olds’ judgments 
on the 6-treasure scale were more accurate without feedback, MNo feedback = 0.79, 95% 
Bootstrap1 CI [0.54, 1.05]; MFeedback = 1.05, [0.84, 1.30]; Time, F(1, 58) = 3.23, p = .078, 
η
G
2  = .01; Time × Feedback, F(1, 58) = 5.82, p = .019, η
G
2  = .23; and more sensitive, 
MNo Feedback = 0.51, [0.34, 0.67], MFeedback = 0.33, [0.12, 0.51]. Sensitivity and accuracy on the 
10-treasure scale was unaffected by feedback condition, all ps ≥ .26. 
Discrimination between cues. Younger children’s failure to consider cue validities in 
predictive judgments was not due to memory deficits. Most individuals successfully recalled 
how cues differed in validity. 78% of 6-year-olds (n = 55), 80% of 9-year-olds (n = 48) and 
96% of adults (n = 47) correctly identified the high, medium and low valid cue, 
χ2(2, N = 180) = 7.83, p < .02, Cramer’s V = .21. Figure 2B shows mean judgments of cue 
validities on the Graphic-stick scale and Table 1 presents respective sensitivity indices. All 
age groups discriminated between and were sensitive to different cue validities in both 
eedback conditions, though children less so than adults.
                                                 
1 All CIs are based on 10000 bootstrap samples. 
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Table 1 
Sensitivity and accuracy of predictive judgments in Studies 1 and 2. 
Study   Scale   Time   6-year-olds   9-year-olds   Adults 
  
     
Sens. 95% CI Acc. 95% CI 
 
Sens. 95% CI Acc. 95% CI 
 
Sens. 95% CI Acc. 95% CI 
1 
 
6-treasure 
 
Before 
 
.13 [.01, .25] 1.90 [1.72, 2.06] 
 
.37 [.24, .51] 1.10 [0.89, 1.32] 
 
.79 [.64, .92] 0.25 [0.13, 0.40] 
    
After 
 
.09 [-.03, .22] 1.83 [1.63, 2.03] 
 
.42 [.29, .54] 0.91 [0.74, 1.09] 
 
.89 [.85, 94] 0.21 [0.11, 0.33] 
  
10-treasure 
 
Before 
 
.10 [-.04, .23] 3.30 [3.08, 3.51] 
 
.38 [.23, .51] 1.88 [1.65, 2.12] 
 
.76 [.62, .87] 0.80 [0.62, 1.10] 
    
After 
 
.04 [-.09, .18] 3.29 [3.05, 3.54] 
 
.28 [.13, .42] 1.94 [1.71, 2.17] 
 
.83 [.77, .89] 0.73 [0.61, 0.88] 
  
Graphic-stick 
 
After 
 
.56 [.46, .65] — 
  
.68 [.58, .77] — 
  
.86 [.81, .90] — 
 
                    
2 
 
6-treasure 
 
Before 
 
.09 [-.04, .23] 1.91 [1.73, 2.08] 
 
.38 [.23, .49] 1.02 [0.84, 1.18] 
 
.89 [.82, .96] 0.13 [0.05, 0.21] 
    
After 
 
.05 [-.08, .19] 2.04 [1.83, 2.22] 
 
.49 [.39, .59] 0.99 [0.83, 1.17] 
 
.92 [.89, .95] 0.14 [0.07, 0.22] 
  
10-treasure 
 
Before 
 
.19 [.05, .31] 3.02 [2.78, 3.25] 
 
.33 [.22, .44] 2.00 [1.82, 2.24] 
 
.78 [.71, .85] 0.82 [0.68, 0.99] 
    
After 
 
.07 [-.06, .21] 3.34 [3.07, 3.60] 
 
.35 [.23, .46] 1.96 [1.73, 2.22] 
 
.83 [.78, .87] 0.76 [0.66, 0.87] 
    Graphic-stick   After   .35 [.23, .48] — 
 
  .70 [.62, .77] — 
 
  .81 [.77, .85] — 
 
Note. Before = Before choices; After = After choices; Sens. = Sensitivity = Pearson Correlation Coefficients for each age group; 
Acc. = Accuracy = Mean RMSD for each age group. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped with 10000 samples. 
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Discussion 
Children were exopected to utilize cue validities for predictive judgments earlier than 
in decision making. However, while all age groups discriminated between cues based on 
encoded validities, whether and how accurately participants used this information to predict 
outcomes varied according to age. As expected, adults’ judgments were highly sensitive, 
accurate and close to normative expectations; 9-year-olds’ predictions were also sensitive to 
cue validities but less accurate. Six-year-olds did not consider cue validities at all in their 
judgments, but were generally over-confident; that is, they expected better outcomes than 
older children and adults. 
Experience did not increase children’s utilization of cue validities in predictive 
judgments. Even after participants had made their own decisions and experienced actual 
outcomes they did not rely on this information when predicting outcomes. However, learning 
opportunities were limited: 24 trials may not provide enough experience and monitoring the 
relationship between cue predictions and choice outcomes was restricted to their own decision 
outcomes. Thus, the feedback was fragmentary and possibly not suited to experience 
differences in cues’ accuracies correctly (Fiedler, 2008). A second study, therefore increased 
the number of choices and fully informed participants about outcomes of chosen and non-
chosen options. 
Study 2: Experience 
The 24 trials of the choice phase were replicated three times in a randomized order. In 
addition, a full feedback condition was added resulting in a 3 (age group: 6-year-olds vs. 9-
year-olds vs. adults) × 3 (feedback: no feedback vs. selective feedback vs. full feedback) × 2 
(time of measurement: before vs. after choices) design. In full feedback conditions, 
participants inspected the chosen and the foregone option’s outcome immediately after each 
choice. Otherwise, the procedure and data analysis were identical to Study 1. Age-dependent 
differences in sensitivity and accuracy of judgments should replicate, but children’s 
judgments should be more sensitive and accurate when they made 72 decisions, each 
displaying cue predictions and full outcomes. 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 81 6-year-olds (34 female, M = 68.61 months, SD = 5.15), 91 
9-year-olds (55 female, M = 107.25 months, SD = 8.64), and 85 adults (66 female, 
M = 253.20 months, SD = 38.52) from the same subject pool. One 6-year-old and one 9-year-
old were excluded because they did not complete the study. Eight 6-year-olds and three 
9-year-old failed the manipulation check and were excluded. The final sample consisted of 72 
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6-year-olds (31 female, M = 68.89 months, SD = 5.27), 87 9-year-olds (52 female, 
M = 106.91 months, SD = 8.45) and 85 adults. 
Results 
Mean predictive judgments. Figure 3A displays predictive judgments. The results 
were very similar to Study 1. Adults’ judgments closely matched normative values. Adults 
and 9-year-olds discriminated between cues; 6-year-olds did not but, again, displayed over-
confidence in all judgments. Predictions on the 10-treasure scale were higher in all age 
groups, illustrating again that children did not simply rely on the mental magnitudes of smart 
points. Obviously, children’s judgments varied between feedback conditions, but importantly, 
6-year-olds did not systematically discriminate between cues in any feedback condition, while 
9-year-olds did so in every feedback condition. 
Sensitivity and accuracy of predictive judgments. Age-dependent differences in 
sensitivity and accuracy were replicated (Table 1). ANOVAs on accuracy yielded equal effect 
sizes for age on both scales; 6-treasure scale, F(2, 232) = 186.31, p < .001, η
G
2  = .55, all other 
ps ≥ .31; 10-treasure scale, F(2, 233) = 156.44, p < .001, η
G
2  = .51.1 
Irrelevance of experience. In line with visual inspection of Figure 3A, sensitivity and 
accuracy after decisions were not improved and did not differ between feedback conditions in 
any age group, all ps ≥ .20. So contrary to expectations, even after an increased number of 
decisions in which all possible outcomes were experienced, judgments did not reflect more 
consideration of cue validities. 
Discrimination between cues. 67% of 6-year-olds (n = 48), 78% of 9-year-olds 
(n = 68) and 95% of adults (n = 81) correctly identified the high, medium, and low valid cue 
at the end of the game, χ2(2, N = 180) = 7.83, p < .02, Cramer’s V = .21. Figure 3B shows 
mean judgments of cue validities on the Graphic-stick scale. All groups’ judgments were 
sensitive to differences in cue validities. Again, this makes it unlikely that younger children’s 
memory deficits can fully explain the insensitivity in predictive judgments, even though their 
performance was inferior to adults with 6-year-olds worse than 9-year-olds (Table 1). In 
general, the recall of cue validities was worse than in Study 1, which might be due to 
extended duration of the second experiment.  
                                                 
1 In addition to Age, an interaction between Age and Time, F(2, 232) = 3.58, p = .029, η
G
2  = .007 was obtained, 
all other ps ≥ .20. It indicated that accuracy varied before and after the choices as a function of age group. 
Specifically, 6-year-olds’ generally inaccurate judgments were even more inaccurate after they made choices 
themselves, t(72) = -2.16, p = .034. 
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Figure 3. Judgments in Study 2 as a function of cue validity. Predictive judgments as a 
function of cue validity for each scale (A). Displayed are judgments for all participants before 
choices and judgments after choices for participants in each feedback condition. Below, 
judgments for cue validities are shown as a function of cue validity for each feedback 
condition (B). Bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. 
  
 Probabilistic Cues in Children’s Judgments 119 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 were replicated; increased learning opportunities with more 
decision trials and full display of all outcomes did not alter these findings. The final study 
ensured that the poor performance was not due to the scales. The treasure scales displayed 
bars of treasures but also included numeric values to facilitate normatively correct responses 
(Figure 1D). Numeric values, however, might have impeded intuitive processes and induced 
analytical thinking (Anderson, 1991; Reyna & Brainerd, 1994; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). 
Thus, it cannot be ruled out that children are be able to utilize cue validities for predictive 
judgments intuitively (Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012), but not to map these judgments on 
numeric scales. Study 3 therefore varied the scale format for predictive judgments using an 
intuitive and analytical scale. If children can intuitively utilize cue validities, predictive 
judgments should improve on the intuitive scale format. 
Study 3: Scale Format 
The study replicated the selective feedback condition of Study 1, but predictive 
judgments were assessed only once after choices. Analytical judgments used the same 
treasure scales as in previous studies. Intuitive judgments employed the non-numeric Graphic-
stick scale for predictive judgments (Figure 1D). The study thus implemented a 2 (age group: 
6-year-olds vs. 9-year-olds) × 2 (scale format: Graphic-stick vs. Treasure scales) between-
subjects design.  
Sample 
Forty-two 6-year-olds (20 female, M = 70.46 months, SD = 4.92) and 41 9-year-olds 
(28 female, M = 110.93 months, SD = 6.57) from the same subject pool participated in the 
study. Six 6-year-olds and one 9-year-old were excluded because they failed the manipulation 
check. The final sample consisted of 36 6-year-olds (16 female, M = 70.54 months, 
SD = 4.82) and 40 9-year-olds (28 female, M = 110.90 months, SD = 6.66). 
Procedure 
The procedure for analytical judgments on the treasure scales was identical to Study 
2’s feedback condition. For intuitive judgment condition, children used the Graphic-stick 
scale for predictive judgments and judgments of cue validities. The scale minimum for the 
former was introduced as finding no treasures, the scale maximum was introduced as finding 
as many treasures as possible, the scale values between as each means finding a few more 
treasures. Children were discouraged from counting the sticks. Beyond this, instructions were 
identical in both conditions. Children predicted success when following one specific cue in 
six choices and in ten choices, respectively. 
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Results 
Mean predictive judgments.  Figure 5 shows mean predictive judgments for the two 
conditions. Nine-year-olds, but not 6-year-olds, discriminated between cues in predictive 
judgments regardless of the scale. Six-year-olds’ judgments displayed over-confidence on 
both scales. Interestingly, 9-year-olds’ judgments on the Graphic-stick scale closely matched 
predictions derived from analytically calculating the expected value as a product of the cue 
validity and sample size (i.e., mean judgments ranged between the scale values of six and ten 
for predicted outcomes in ten decisions). 
Sensitivity of predictive judgments. Six-year-olds’ judgments were insensitive to 
cue validities on all scales, rTreasure scale, 6 choices = .05, 95% Bootstrap CI [-.28, .28], rGraphic-stick 
scale, 6 choices = -.18, [-.42, .37], rTreasure scale, 10 choices = .14, [-.12, 37], rGraphic-stick scale, 10 choices = .07, 
[-.19, .32]. Nine-year-olds’ judgments were sensitive to cue validities on all scales, rTreasure scale, 
6 choices = .50, [.28, .70], rGraphic-stick scale, 6 choices = .54, [.33, .73], rTreasure scale, 10 choices = .43, 
[.19, 62], rGraphic-stick scale, 10 choices = .51, [.33, .69]. 
Discrimination between cues. 75% of 6-year-olds and 93% of 9-year-olds could 
point out the high, medium and low valid cue at the end of the game, χ2(2, N = 76) = 9.78, 
p = .008, Cramer’s V = .36. Mean judgments of cue validities on the Graphic-stick scale 
reflected the encoded cue validities in both age groups, r6-year-olds = .41, 95% Bootstrap CI 
[.23, .56], r9-year-olds = .66, [.54, .77], but older children outperformed younger children.  
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Figure 4. Judgments in Study 3 as a function of cue validity.Predictive judgments for six 
choices (A) on the 6-treasure scale in the analytical-judgment condition and on the Graphic-
stick scale in the intuitive-judgment condition. Predictive judgments for ten choices on the 10-
treasure scale and Graphic-stick scale (B). Cue validity judgments are displayed as a function 
of cue validity (C) for the analytical-judgment condition on the left and intuitive-judgment 
condition on the right. 
 
Discussion 
In Study 3, predictive judgments were either assessed on the partly numeric treasure 
scales or on a more intuitive scale, the Graphic-stick scale. On both scales the results from 
Studies 1 and 2 were replicated: 6-year-olds’ judgments were insensitive to cue validities 
while 9-year-olds’ were sensitive. Thus, the poor performance of younger children cannot be 
attributed to an unsuitable scale that prohibits the expression of correct intuitive judgments. 
Intriguingly, 9-year-olds’ predictions seemed to be derived from analytical processes rather 
than from intuition, even when intuitive predictions were encouraged by the procedure. Both 
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age groups recalled the differences in cue validities successfully, even though older children’s 
recall is more accurate. 
Summary of Results 
Summarizing findings in a small-scale meta-analysis provides better estiamations of 
the observed effects in four largely similar studies (N = 664; Cummings, 2012). The 
additional study is not reported here, but was identical to Study 1 with the exception that 
during the choice phase, the cue predictions were hidden and had to be uncovered by 
participants.2 All analyses were computed using the metafor Package in R (Viechtbauer, 
2010). 
Age-Dependent Differences in Cue Utilization 
Adults are highly sensitive for cue validities in their predictive judgments, 9-year-olds 
are less sensitive, and 6-year-olds are insensitive. The data consistently showed large 
correlation coefficients for adults, medium-sized correlations for 9-year-olds and no 
correlation for 6-year-olds (Table 1). We additionally analyzed sensitivity for subsamples of 
6-year-olds, excluding individuals with invariant judgments or individuals with false recall of 
cue validities in direct questions or on the Graphic-stick scale. However, neither of those 
subsamples showed sensitivity in predictive judgments. 
A meta-analysis estimated the proportion of individuals in each age group that 
consistently utilized cue validities normatively in predictive judgments, that is, individuals 
whose judgments were sensitive to cue validities on the 6- and 10-treasure scales, and adapted 
to sample size.3 2% of 6-year-olds, 31% of 9-year-olds, and 83% of adults utilized cue 
validities in this way (see Table 2). Thus, although group-level analyses showed sensitivity in 
9-year-olds, only a minority of children that age were truly consistent in cue utilization like 
the vast majority of adults. 
  
                                                 
2 Study 4’s sample, 56 preschoolers (23 female, M = 68.0 months, SD = 7.3), 53 elementary schoolers (24 
female, M = 107.6 months, SD = 5.8) and 55 adults (45 female, M = 282.00 months, SD = 44.72). 
3 That is, more treasures are predicted when the game is played ten times. On the non-numeric Graphic-stick, no 
adaption to sample size is expected normatively, thus, all subjects with sensitive judgments were included.  
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Table 2 
Results of random effects meta-analyses of judgment data 
Proportions of normative cue utilization 
  6-year-olds   9-year-olds   Adults 
Study   %   95% CI   %   95% CI   %   95% CI 
1  1  [0, 4]  28  [17, 40]  86  [76, 95] 
2  4  [0, 9]  32  [22, 42]  82  [74, 90] 
3  0  [0, 5]  34  [26, 43]  —   
4  5  [0,11]  28  [16, 40]  82  [71,92] 
RE-Model   2   [0, 4]   31   [26, 37]   83   [78, 89] 
I²   16%   0%   0% 
             
Experience effect on cue utilization 
  6-year-olds   9-year-olds   Adults 
Study, Scale   q   95% CI   q   95% CI   q   95% CI 
1, 6-treasure  -.16  [-.43, .12]  -.22  [-.52, .08]  .14  [-.19, .47] 
1, 10-treasure  -.01  [-.28, .26]  .16  [-.13, .46]  -.01  [-.34, .32] 
2, 6-treasure  -.01  [-.33, .32]  -.22  [-.52, .08]  -.14  [-.44, .17] 
2, 10-treasure  .09  [-.23, .42]  -.01  [-.31, .29]  .50  [.19, .81] 
4, 6-treasure  .07  [-.24, .37]  -.14  [-.45, .18]  .10  [-.21, .41] 
4, 10-treasure  .16  [-.15, .47]  -.44  [-.76, -.13]  .10  [-.21, .41] 
RE-Model  .01  [-.11, -.14]  -.14  [-0.30, .03]  .11  [.06, .29] 
I²   0%   43%   45% 
Note. RE-Model = Random Effects Models, are in boldface; I2 indicates the percentage of 
variation due to heterogeneity; CI = Confidence Interval; q = Cohen’s q = difference of 
Fisher-z-transformed sensitivity after decisions with and without feedback.  
 
Utilization in Judgments vs. in Decisions 
 Several criteria can be considered to determine whether participants utilized 
probabilistic cues in decisions (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014, 2016, 2018; Lang & 
Betsch, 2018a; see these articles for detailed descriptions of the respective evaluative criteria). 
The first criterion, performance above chance level, prescribes (in the established non-
compensatory decision environment) to choose in line with the most valid cue’s predictions in 
more than half of the decisions. Only 6-year-olds did not achieve this (Table 3). 
A stricter criterion requires participants to systematically utilize probabilistic cues in 
decisions, which only 7% of 6-year-olds, but 35% of 9-year-olds and 97% of adults did. An 
even stricter criterion requires participants to use probability-based decision strategies that 
consider cue validities, and are described in the decision literature (Lexicographic and 
Weighted Additive Rule, e.g., Payne et al., 1988). These strategies are very rarely found in 
6-year-olds, but in 24% of 9-year-olds and 60% of adults (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
Results of random effects meta-analyses of decision data 
Above chance performance 
  6-year-olds   9-year-olds   Adults 
Study   d   95% CI   d   95% CI   d   95% CI 
1  -0.35  [-0.69, -0.02]  0.37  [0.01, 0.73]  2.18  [1.68, 2.68] 
2  -0.55  [-0.88, -0.22]  0.48  [0.18, 0.78]  2.61  [2.20, 2.02] 
3  -0.70  [-1.17, -0.22]  0.42  [-0.02, 0.86]  —   
4  -0.35  [-0.72, 0.03]  0  [-0.37, 0.37]  1.5  [1.41, 1.59] 
RE-Model  -0.46  [-0.65, -0.28]  0.32  [0.11, 0.54]  2.10  [1.45, 2.74] 
I²   95%   30%   84% 
             
Proportions of systematic cue utilization 
  6-year-olds   9-year-olds   Adults 
Study   %   95% CI   %   95% CI   %   95% CI 
1  17  [8, 26]  42  [29, 55]  98  [94, 100] 
2  10  [3, 17]  42  [37, 47]  99  [97, 100] 
3  0  [0, 5]  38  [33, 43]  —   
4  5  [0, 11]  21  [17, 25]  89  [81, 97] 
RE-Model  7  [0, 14]  35  [24, 46]  97  [92, 100] 
I²   73%   72%   67% 
             
Proportions of probability-based strategies 
  6-year-olds   9-year-olds   Adults 
Study   %   95% CI   %   95% CI   %   95% CI 
1  0  [0,3]  15  [5, 25]  47  [32, 62] 
2  1  [0, 4]  40  [29, 51]  71  [61, 80] 
3  6  [0, 11]  28  [14, 41]  —   
4  0  [0,3]  13  [4, 22]  60  [47, 73] 
RE-Model  3  [0,8]  24  [11, 36]  60  [47, 74] 
I²   63%   82%   73% 
Note. RE-Model = Random Effects Models, are in boldface; I2 indicates the percentage of 
variation due to heterogeneity; CI = Confidence Interval. 
 
Arguably, a comparison of utilization in judgments and decisions lacks the same 
criterion. Additionally, utilization in decisions varies considerably between studies whereas 
utilization of judgments varies less (see I2 in Table 2 and 3). But whether the criterion for 
decisions is above-chance or systematic utilization of cue validities, or the use of probability-
based strategies, probability utilization is absent in 6-year-olds’ and emerging in 9-year-olds’ 
decisions. Thus, and most importantly, the same developmental pattern characterizes the 
utilization of probabilistic cues in judgments and in decisions: absence in 6-year-olds and 
emergence in 9-year-olds. 
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Irrelevance of Experience 
We suspected that children’s utilization of probabilistic information in judgments 
would improve if they experienced decision outcomes themselves. However, providing 
outcomes did not benefit judgments. A comparison of Fisher-z-transformed sensitivity in 
conditions with selective feedback with conditions without feedback obtained overall no 
effect of experiencing outcomes (Table 2). Even when children gained experience with the 
probabilistic game through their own actions and encountered feedback that reproduced 
provided cue validities, their expectations of outcomes did not become more accurate.  
Overconfidence in 6-Year-Olds 
Unexpectedly, 6-year-olds’ judgments exceed those of older children and adults 
indicating that younger children overall expected better outcomes (Figures 2–4). This age-
dependent over-confidence was consistent and stable across studies: 6-year-olds compared to 
9-year-olds, RE Model6-treasure scale, d = 0.36, CI [0.18, 0.56]; I
2 = 0%; RE Model10-treasure scale, 
d = 0.67, [-0.07, 1.40], I2 = 74%; compared to adults, RE Model6-treasure scale, d = 0.79, 
[0.61, 0.97], I2 = 21%; RE Model10-treasure scale, d = 1.08, [0.57, 1.59], I
2 = 59%. 
Analysis of individual data patterns provides further explanations: 21% of 6-year-olds 
indifferently selected the maximum scale value in all judgments, RE Model, 21%, [15, 27], 
I2 = 16%. When these individuals were excluded, 6-year-olds’ judgments no longer exceeded 
those of 9-year-olds and only slightly those of adults. Younger children’s over-confidence at 
the group level is thus mainly caused by a subsample of 6-year-olds that chose scale maxima 
in all judgments. 
General Discussion 
In three independent studies, 6-year-olds, 9-year-olds and adult controls were 
confronted with a probabilistic inference game with three cues differing in validity (p = .5, 
.66, .83). Participants encoded cue validities in advance and then judged the expected 
outcomes when playing the game relying on each of the cues. We expected children’s 
judgments to reflect probability utilization already at the age of six and to only become more 
accurate with age. Results did not support this hypothesis: 6-year-olds fully and 9-year-olds 
partly neglect probability in judgments. A small-scale meta-analysis demonstrates that the 
observed developmental pattern is very stable and not affected by decision experience. 
Additionally, it was independent of the scale format used for judgments. 
The results not only contradict the notion that children utilize probabilities in 
judgments earlier than in choices—in fact, they match those observed in decision making in 
the same environment very closely (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014, 2016; Lang & 
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Betsch, 2018a)—they also contradict previous findings showing that children at the age of 
five rely on winning probabilities for evaluating gambles (Acredolo et al., 1989; Anderson & 
Schlottmann, 1991; Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & Tring, 2005). On the other hand, they 
are in line with research showing that, although children encode co-variation in variables, they 
do not automatically utilize probabilistic relations for predictions (Kalish, 2010).  
Probabilistic information was available in different formats. Children observed a 
sequence of cue predictions that were either correct or false, and assigned smart points for 
each correct prediction. Probabilistic information was thus learned in a supervised fashion and 
represented by the magnitude of smart points. This resembles previous research where 
probabilistic information is demonstrated and then offered in a summarized and salient format 
to use it in judgments (e.g., Schlottmann, 2001). In addition, children were further able to 
actively engage with the probabilistic environment and experience outcomes of their own 
actions. The feedback structure additionally entailed the probabilistic information and 
reflected it during choices children made themselves. We expected children to benefit from 
this additional experience but this was not the case. Regardless of whether children received 
only a summarized format of probability or could acquire experienced-based formats through 
their own actions, they did not utilize this information until the age of nine. The probability 
format did not affect the developmental trajectory from age six to nine. 
Challenging Probabilistic Environments 
The reported studies demonstrate that demands of the decision process (e.g., forming 
and implementing choice intentions, consistently applying choice strategies) cannot account 
for previously observed probability neglect as it also characterizes judgments. Consequently, 
eligible causes must account for deficient performance in judgments and in decisions. Two 
specific aspects of the environment—high complexity and low contiguity—are potential 
candidates (Schlottmann, 2011; Wohlwill, 1968). 
The paradigm creates high complexity in two ways. First, imagine, for example, a 
simple gamble. There, the probabilistic information is embedded in the frequency distribution 
of a single variable; that is, the outcome of said gamble. In probabilistic inferences, on the 
other hand, the probabilistic information is embedded in the relation of two variables (cue 
predictions and outcomes) and only the contingency of both is informative. While children 
had no difficulties encoding probabilistic relations between the two variables, utilizing them 
for predictions requires an understanding of the conditional probability p (positive 
outcome | positive cue prediction). In line with this, Kalish (2012) observed in a similarly 
complex paradigm that 7-year-olds were able to encode the probabilistic relationship between 
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a bird’s diet and the color of its eggs but not to use this information consistently to predict egg 
colors.  
Second, the environment provides a highly complex stimulus field to navigate 
through: Three cues each with an assigned probability, two options, and additional irrelevant 
information, such as the position of cues or the animals representing the cues. Valid 
judgments require prioritizing of relevant information, which is harder for younger children 
(Lang & Betsch, 2013). Performance may be generally better in perceptually poor 
environments that offer only relevant information, for example, when only one option with a 
probability and a value is displayed (e.g., Schlottmann, 2001). 
The environment further offers low contiguity between probability and the variable to 
be judged (see Wohlwill, 1968 for the role of contiguity in children’s inferences). That is, 
probabilities are assigned to cues, but must be used to infer outcomes of choices between 
options. Low contiguity is not inherent to probabilistic inference tasks. Recall the attempt to 
predict dog behavior from its body language, such as a wagging tail, perked-up ears, and a 
relaxed mouth. These cues are part the dog itself and thus a high contiguity between the 
probability assigned to those cues and future dog behavior exists. Other cues might also be 
helpful but more distal; for example, whether the dog is behind a fence or the behavior of its 
owner. In experimental settings, high contiguity can be established by the presentation format 
(options as cue-compounds, e.g., von Helversen, Mata, & Olsen, 2010) and by the 
experimental procedure. For example, when probabilities are used as anchor points, it creates 
proximity between the probabilistic information and the variable to be judged, in this case an 
expected value (e.g., Schlottmann, 2001). As spatial and temporal contiguity facilitates 
associative learning and children’s inferences about causal structures (Renaux, Riviere, 
Craddoc, & Miller, 2017; Bühner, 2005) it may likewise facilitate probability utilization in 
judgments and decision making. Challenging environments that are low in contiguity, on the 
other hand, require to mentally construct proximity between probability and the variable to be 
judged and may impede probability utilization. 
The probabilistic inference environment is both high in complexity and low in 
contiguity and might therefore hinder probability utilization in judgments as well as in 
decisions. Future research must validate this assumption by demonstrating that varying 
complexity and contiguity affects probability utilization. 
Over-Confidence and Invariant Judgments in 6-Year-Olds 
The analysis of individual subjects revealed that the over-confidence observed in 
judgment by 6-year-olds at the group level was mainly caused by a subsample of children that 
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constantly predicted the maximum number of favorable outcomes. This behavior has also 
been found in other probabilistic judgment tasks and is even quite common when children rate 
emotion or motivation (e.g., Kalish, 2010; Schlottmann, 2001; Chambers & Johnston, 2002). 
In order to make a judgment, information must be integrated to form a value representation 
which then needs to be mapped to a behavioral response; for example, to an available scale 
value (e.g., Birnbaum, 1978). Thus, invariant responses can be due to invariant value 
representations or to a failure in mapping. As children made outcome predictions and judged 
cue validities on the same scale (Study 3), but showed invariant responses only in the former 
case. Presumably, these 6-year-olds really represented maximum values invariantly; that is, 
they expected only positive outcomes. This suggests that they might have been unable to 
consider the whole sample space of outcomes (positive treasures & negative spiders). 
Realizing that different outcomes are possible is the first challenge for children when dealing 
with probabilistic environments (Bryant & Nunes, 2012; Piaget & Inhelder, 1975) and might 
be especially difficult when the response format highlights one possible outcome but requires 
consideration of both (we specifically asked to predict treasures and did not mention spiders). 
Thus, children that did show variant responses might at least acknowledge the possibility of 
different outcomes, even when they could not quantify their probability yet. 
Another factor that might have contributed to the large proportion of invariant 
responses (21% over all studies) is that children were not trained to correctly use the scales. 
Consider, for example, Anderson & Schlottmann’s procedure (1990; Appendix A, 
Schlottmann, 2001). Children were provided with anchors (p = 0; .5; 1) and trained to choose 
the corresponding scale values (minimum, middle, maximum) when judging happiness of a 
player. Such training may greatly reduce invariant responses, encourages consideration of all 
possible outcomes, and even boosts children’s utilization of probability. 
Conclusion 
Until late elementary school age, children neglect probabilities in decisions when they 
are assigned to cues (Betsch & Lang, 2013; Betsch et al., 2014, 2016, 2018; Lang & Betsch, 
2018a; Mata et al., 2011). This paper shows that children neglect probability likewise in 
judgments. Reasons for probability neglect are therefore not due to specific demands of the 
decision process, but may affect both judgments and decisions similarly. Children’s 
judgments show that their expectations of outcomes are not informed by probability assigned 
to cues at the age of six, but that starts to emerge at the age of nine. In similar areas, 
probabilistic judgments are mastered by younger children and earlier than probabilistic 
decisions (cf. Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). When probability is assigned to cues, its 
 Probabilistic Cues in Children’s Judgments 129 
 
utilization emerges later, and judgments and decisions are equally deficient until the age of 
nine. 
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In the following sections, I report results of meta-analyses of all studies included in 
this thesis to summarize and discuss the main findings. All analyses were calculated using the 
metafor package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010). I first overview effects of feedback and age on 
children’s decisions, decision strategies and judgments, and then address alternative accounts 
for age or feedback effects. Preschoolers of Studies 1-3, and 6, and 1st graders of Studies 4 
and 5 were summarized to younger children (aged 5-7), and compared with older children 
(aged 8-10) and adults. Note that children attended the first grade not longer than three 
months when the data was collected. 
Feedback Benefits Decision Making 
Articles 1-3 investigate the effect of feedback on decisions. Participants either 
experienced the decision’s outcome or it was delayed until the end of the task. Feedback 
mutually affects performance in decisions and other cognitive tasks (Bangerts-Drowns, Kulik, 
Kulil, & Morgan, 1991; Fyfe & Rittle-Johnson, 2015; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Jessup, 
Bishara, & Busemeyer, 2008; Karelaia & Hogarth, 1998; Kluger & deNisi, 1996; Lejarraga & 
Gonzalez, 2011; Narciss & Huth, 2004; Newell & Rakow, 2007; Shute, 2008). Initially, we 
assumed that providing feedback would decrease children’s utilization of probabilistic 
information, because feedback causes cognitive overload, distracts children from 
probabilities, or invites exploration. But this assumption must be rejected: Providing feedback 
did not decrease utilization of probabilistic information in any age group or study. 
In contrast, feedback benefitted choices in all age groups. Figure 1 shows the effect of 
selective compared to no feedback on decisions in line with the high valid cue (i.e., this equals 
normative decision making when probabilities are highly dispersed). Weighted effect sizes for 
each age group (black diamonds in Figure 1) indicate that feedback increased decisions in line 
with the high valid cue. Age was included as a moderator in the analysis, but all groups 
benefitted equally from feedback, Q(1) = 0.057, p = .811. 
Feedback format moderated the effect of selective feedback instead, Q(1) = 26.93, 
p < .001. I distinguished between feedback that maintained a priori stated differences in 
probabilities (in Studies 1-3, 4) and feedback that further increased the dispersion over time, 
and strictly reinforced the Lexicographic decision strategy (LEX, Studies 4-5). The latter was 
more effective. Note, that this should be interpreted cautiously. Besides feedback format, 
other factors varied between studies, such as the variation of cue value patterns (i.e., Studies 4 
and 5 entailed less variation in cue value patterns compared with Studies 1-3) or salience of 
the most valid cue (i.e., in Studies 4 and 5, both other cues were equal in validity, thus, the 
differing validity of the high valid cue was more salient). In addition, a direct comparison of 
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feedback that maintained stated probabilities and one that further dispersed them, only yielded 
a small benefit of the latter (Study 4, see Article 3 for discussion). 
 
Figure 1. Forest plot for selective feedback effects on decisions. Figure shows Cohen’s d for 
decisions with selective feedback compared with decisions without feedback. The dependent 
variable is decisions in line with the high valid cue. The figure shows weighted effect sizes for 
each age groups without including feedback format as a moderator (black diamonds) and with 
feedback format as a moderator (grey diamonds). It further shows the overall effect size for 
all age groups; maintains = maintains stated probabilities; reinforces = reinforces the 
Lexicographic strategy, RE Model = random effects model for the specified group. 
 
In adults, the feedback effect was unexpected and unpredicted by decision theories. 
According to normative theory and is subjective variants, rational decisions makers should—
regardless of feedback—maximize outcomes by calculating the weighed sum of cue values 
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and choose the option with the highest expected value (Edwards, 1954; Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). 
From the perspective of adaptive decision making, the a priori established dispersion 
of probabilities suggested the use of a Lexicographic strategy (LEX, except in Study 5 where 
other strategies such as Equal Weight were also adaptive); adults should have applied this fast 
and frugal heuristic, and followed the predictions of the most informative cue. This 
mechanism does not rely on feedback (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
Research shows that adults profit from feedback, when stated probabilities are difficult 
to process or when decision maker’s cognitive abilities are constrained (Brand, Laier, 
Pawlikowski, & Markowitsch, 2009; Hogarth & Soyer, 2011). However, the stated 
probabilities established a quite simple cue hierarchy suggesting LEX as the most adaptive 
strategy. A closer look at adults’ decisions with and without feedback reveals that adults 
especially deviated from LEX when both the other cues contradicted its prediction (e.g., Type 
3 pattern in Studies 1-3) and no feedback was provided. This tendency was reduced with 
feedback. In line with prior research, this illustrates that adults neglect simple strategies and 
prefer more complex strategies such as weighted-additive under some circumstances (Bröder 
& Schiffer, 2003; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Importantly, this unexpected finding in adults 
highlights the significance of adult controls when evaluating children’s decision making.  
In children, both detrimental and beneficial effects of feedback on decisions are 
conceivable. Contrary to initial expectations, feedback did not cause deviations from 
normative or descriptive decision models. Instead, children neglected probabilities to a large 
degree in the presence and absence of feedback. Feedback moderately benefitted decisions in 
children, but the effect varied considerably between studies, leading to large heterogeneity in 
the meta−analysis. I2-values indicate that the percentage of variability reflecting real 
differences between studies instead of sampling variability was large; without feedback 
format as moderator, I2Younger = 84%; I
2
Older = 74%; I
2
Adults = 82%. The analysis of individual 
decision strategies provides further insight into how children profited from feedback. 
Age and Feedback Effects on Decision Strategies 
Analyzing decisions at the group level can disguise inter-individual differences in 
decision strategies (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). In group analysis, this is reflected in large 
standard deviations when analyzing, for example, choices in line with LEX. Therefore, I used 
individual choice patterns to determine each individual’s decision strategy (Bröder & 
Schiffer, 2003). The maximum likelihood approach allows to identify the strategy that most 
likely produced the choice pattern, assuming that the strategy application was flawed. 
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Importantly, I did not only search for decision strategies prominent in adult decision making 
but also for child-specific decisions strategies. 
Article 1 shows first evidence for such child-specific and non-adaptive strategies. 
Children do not rely on probabilities but on irrelevant information, such as which cue was 
favored or which option has been chosen in the preceding decision. Article 2 shows that such 
non-adaptive strategies dominate at age 6, co-exist with adaptive strategies at age 9, but are 
rare in adults. Additionally, non-adaptive strategies are reduced when outcomes of decisions 
and counterfactual outcomes are displayed. Article 3 investigates whether, when and which 
feedback increases adaptive strategy use. Altogether, this investigation of decision strategies 
offers three new insights: 
First, decision strategies are applied in all age groups, but the prevalence of strategies 
changes with age. One major contribution of our studies is showing consistently, that children 
do not make decisions without any systematic plan. Instead, they apply decision strategies that 
are non-adaptive to the probabilistic decision environment, and do not maximize outcomes. 
Preliminary evidence for children relying on normatively irrelevant information when making 
decisions has been reported previously (see Brainerd, 1981, for alternating options and van 
van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Bredman, & Huizenga, 2012, for suboptimal strategies in 
gambling tasks). But it should be recognized, that children systematically utilize this 
information to make decisions. In other areas of cognitive research, it is widely acknowledged 
that inferior strategies exist in children and affect the development of better ones (see 
Björklund, 2018, for an overview). Here, we show that the developmental trajectory from 
inferior to better strategies likewise applies to the domain of probabilistic decision making. 
Also in line with this research, non-adaptive and adaptive strategies co-exist in one age group 
resulting in large inter-individual differences in decision performance (Crowley, Shrager, & 
Siegler, 1997; Siegler, 2007). 
Strategy use in preschool-aged children suggests that they are generally capable of 
rule-based decision making. When children do not use adaptive strategies, but can use non-
adaptive ones, they are not merely failing in consistent strategy application. Other reasons for 
lack of adaptive strategies must be considered. The adaptive decision making approach would 
argue that either probabilistic strategies are not part of children’s repertoire, or if they are, 
children fail in prioritizing them over others. 
Second, as Article 3 demonstrates, the prevalence of adaptive decision strategies is 
increased by feedback. Table 3 reports proportion of adaptive strategies in each study and age 
group as well as estimations for proportions over all studies. It shows that this feedback effect 
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varies considerably between studies. Feedback effects on performance depend on a variety of 
individual and environmental factors (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008; Kluger & deNisi, 1998). In 
line with this, the observed feedback effects depended on the feedback format (selective vs. 
full, Study 3; strict vs. lenient, Study 4), and on the reinforced strategy (Lexicographic vs. 
Equal Weight, Study 5). Clearly, not all feedback is equally helpful. 
In a follow-up study, we further tested whether adaptive strategy use can also be 
improved by instruction. We informed children that LEX would perform best in the task and 
explained in detail how the strategy worked (Lang & Betsch, 2018a). We found increased 
LEX-use in 9-year-olds, before the induction = 36%, 95% Bootstrap CI [23; 49]; after 
induction = 58%, CI [44; 72]. At the group level, decisions in line with LEX also increased, 
t(58) = -5.33, p < .001, 95% CI [0.35;1.10], d = 0.71. Accordingly, feedback learning and 
instruction affected strategy use, but only in a limited fashion. 
Third, non-adaptive strategies are equally prevalent with and without feedback. Table 
4 shows the proportions of non-adaptive strategies in each study and estimations across all 
studies. Non-adaptive strategies were only reduced when the decision’s outcome and the 
counterfactual outcome were displayed (i.e., full feedback condition in Study 3). Since only 
one study tested the effect of full vs. selective feedback, results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
This begs the question whether selective feedback is suited to reveal strategies as non-
adaptive, at least in environments where experiencing one outcome does not allow to infer the 
other outcome (Fiedler, 2008). Selective feedback depends on the participant’s choices: Like 
in many real-world situations, the decision’s outcome is experienced, but the outcome of 
choice alternative remains unknown. However, based on assumptions of outcome 
distributions, this non-experienced outcome might be mentally constructed (Elwin, Juslin, 
Olssen, & Enkvist, 2007). For example, children might construct the non-experienced 
outcome as the expected value for the non-chosen option, which would be equal or less than 
the outcome of the chosen option (otherwise participants would choose the other option). 
Misbeliefs in strategy success could thus be easily maintained even when the strategy fails. 
Imagine, a child that believes that following the favored, but low valid, cue is an appropriate 
strategy. If the strategy produces a negative outcome, the child might assume that the choice 
alternative would have produced a negative outcome as well and keep up the strategy. This is 
no longer possible, when children experience both outcomes. 
Clearly, so far we know very little about whether children engage in such inferences 
about non-experienced outcomes at all. We do, however, know that children compare chosen 
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to non-chosen alternatives and devalue the latter when making choices (Egon, Santos, & 
Blum, 2007; McCormack, O’Connor, Beck, & Feeneya, 2016). Thus, a child might have 
some notions about non-experienced choice alternatives, which might affect their future 
decisions. 
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Table 1 
Proportions of adaptive strategy users 
Younger children 
Study Control condition   %   95% CI   Feedback conditions   %   95% CI 
1 No feedback  0  [0, 6]  selective, maintain  0  [0, 6] 
2 No feedback  0  [0, 6]  selective, maintain  3  [0, 8] 
3 No feedback  0  [0, 6]  selective, maintain  9  [0, 21] 
       full, maintain  9  [0,22] 
4 No feedback  10  [0, 20]  selective, maintain  35  [20, 50] 
       selective, reinforce LEX  32  [18, 45] 
5 No feedback  31  [15, 48]  selective, reinforce LEX  26  [10, 42] 
       selective, reinforce EQW  60  [41, 78] 
RE-Model  6  [0, 15]     20  [7, 34] 
I²     80%       91% 
            
Older children 
Study Control condition   %   95% CI   Feedback conditions   %   95% CI 
1 No feedback  12  [0, 24]  selective, maintain  15  [1, 29] 
2 No feedback  16  [4, 29]  selective, maintain  14  [2, 26] 
3 No feedback  31  [14, 48]  selective, maintain  40  [23, 57] 
       full, maintain  50  [31, 69] 
4 No feedback  11  [1, 22]  selective, maintain  47  [30, 64] 
       selective, reinforce LEX  62  [46, 78] 
5 No feedback  35  [16, 53]  selective, reinforce LEX  54  [34, 74] 
       selective, reinforce EQW  49  [45, 64] 
RE-Model  20  [10, 27]     41  [28, 54] 
I²     53%       80% 
            
Adults 
Study Control condition   %   95% CI   Feedback conditions   %   95% CI 
1 No feedback  61  [43, 79]  selective, maintain  59  [41, 77] 
2 No feedback  40  [20, 57]  selective, maintain  57  [36, 77] 
3 No feedback  71  [63, 89]  selective, maintain  82  [68, 96] 
       full, maintain  59  [40, 77] 
4 No feedback  53  [36, 71]  selective, maintain  74  [59, 90] 
       selective, reinforce LEX  100  [92, 100] 
5 No feedback  86  [72, 100]  selective, reinforce LEX  96  [88, 100] 
       selective, reinforce EQW  88  [74, 100] 
RE-Model  63  [47, 79]     79  [63, 87] 
I²     77%       30% 
Note. Table shows proportions of adaptive strategy users in conditions without feedback on 
the left and in different feedback conditions on the right; maintain = feedback maintains stated 
probabilities, reinforce LEX, EQW = feedback reinforces the Lexicographic or Equal Weight 
strategy; RE = random effect model; studies with 0% and 100% are excluded from the model; 
I² measures heterogeneity between studies, lower values indicate less heterogeneity. 
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Table 2 
Proportions of non-adaptive strategy users 
Younger children 
Study Control condition   %   95% CI   Feedback conditions   %   95% CI 
1 No feedback  11  [0, 23]  selective, maintain  21  [6, 35] 
2 No feedback  56  39, 73]  selective, maintain  41  [25, 56] 
3 No feedback  60  [41, 78]  selective, maintain  57  [37, 76] 
       full, maintain  18  [2, 36] 
4 No feedback  58  [41, 76]  selective, maintain  43  [27, 59] 
       selective, reinforce LEX  42  [27, 56] 
5 No feedback  38  [38, 55]  selective, reinforce LEX  48  [30, 66] 
       selective, reinforce EQW  33  [16, 51] 
RE-Model  44  [25, 63]     37  [28, 46] 
I²     86%       57% 
            
Older children 
Study Control condition   %   95% CI   Feedback conditions   %   95% CI 
1 No feedback  15  [2, 28]  selective, maintain  19  [4, 34] 
2 No feedback  39  [22, 55]  selective, maintain  21  [6, 36] 
3 No feedback  28  [11, 444]  selective, maintain  7  [0, 16] 
       full, maintain  14  [1, 27] 
4 No feedback  39  [23, 55]  selective, maintain  41  [25, 57] 
       selective, reinforce LEX  24  [10,39] 
5 No feedback  54  [35, 73]  selective, reinforce LEX  42  [22, 62] 
       selective, reinforce EQW  41  [21, 61] 
RE-Model  34  [21, 48]     25  [15, 34] 
I²     69%       71% 
            
Adults 
Study Control condition   %   95% CI   Feedback conditions   %   95% CI 
1 No feedback  0  [0, 7]  selective, maintain  7  [0, 17] 
2 No feedback  0  [0, 7]  selective, maintain  4  [0, 13] 
3 No feedback  0  [0, 6]  selective, maintain  0  [0,6] 
       full, maintain  14  [1, 28] 
4 No feedback  16  [3, 28]  selective, maintain  13  [1, 25] 
       selective, reinforce LEX  0  [0, 0] 
5 No feedback  14  [0, 28]  selective, reinforce LEX  4  [0, 12] 
       selective, reinforce EQW  8  [0, 20] 
RE-Model  15  [5, 24]     3  [0, 8] 
I²     15%       0% 
Note. Table shows proportions of non-adaptive strategy users; maintain = feedback maintains 
stated probabilities, reinforce LEX, EQW = feedback reinforces the Lexicographic or Equal 
Weight strategy; RE = random effect model; studies with 0% and 100% are excluded from the 
model; I² measures heterogeneity between studies, lower values indicate less heterogeneity. 
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Methodological Limits of Strategy Assessment 
An outcome-based method allows to identify strategies non-verbally and undiluted by 
sequential search processes (see Betsch, Funke, & Plessner, 2011, for a discussion). Despite 
its benefits, it also entails some downsides of particular relevance with child participants: 
First, it requires a critical number of decisions for which predictions of investigated strategies 
differ (e.g., Bröder, 2002 for this separation problem). Still, child participants can only cope 
with a limited number of decisions even when breaks are included (e.g., Mata, van Helversen, 
& Rieskamp, 2011 for effects of fatigue). Here, the number of decisions was much lower 
compared with adult studies, which resulted in less reliable differentiation of strategy models. 
Moreover, only strategies that were defined a priori and applied consistently over a 
defined period of decisions (e.g., in the last block) could be identified. It is very likely that 
some children used other strategies or switched between two or more strategies (see 
Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2013, and Siegler, 2007, for application of 
multiple strategies in adults and children). Presumably, children’s strategic decision making is 
thus still underestimated. 
Further, outcome-based strategy assessment does not differentiate between deliberate 
and intuitive strategy application. However, this differentiation is crucial for dual-process 
frameworks, which assume very different developmental trajectories for intuitive and 
deliberate decision making (Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002; Klaczynski, 2005; Schlottmann & 
Wilkening, 2012; Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2010; cf. Reyna & Brainerd, 2011).  
When strategies are applied in a deliberate fashion, children should be able to 
explicate their strategies (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Walsh & Gluck, 2016). In a follow-up 
study (replication of Study 3’s feedback condition, Lang & Betsch, 2018b), we asked 20 
9-year-olds which decision strategies they used. Only one child indicated deciding “with 
feeling”, all others clearly described one of the considered decision strategies: 35% indicated 
they followed the smartest animal (= LEX), 40% indicated they followed the smartest animal 
but not if the other animals contradicted it (= weighted-additive with uncorrected cue 
validities), 20% indicated that they switched from one option to the other (= option 
alternation). Further research must show, if this matches actual decision behavior and also 
applies to younger children, but preliminarily, it points to rather deliberate strategy use. 
Interestingly, this is in line with children’s decisions in non-probabilistic environments, where 
most children could at least partially report strategies (Lindow, Lang & Betsch, 2017).  
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Age and Feedback Effects on Judgments 
The fourth article exclusively investigates children’s utilization of probabilities in 
judgments. Previous developmental research suggests that probability utilization in judgments 
is easier and therefore emerges earlier than in decisions (Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012). 
However, the same developmental pattern—probability neglect at age six and emerging 
utilization at age nine—characterizes judgments in our studies. 
In each study, we measured whether children utilized differences in cue validities 
when predicting outcomes for a decision maker following the first cue, the second, the third, 
respectively. This is an analogical adaption of previous research where preschool-aged 
children were able to predict successes for players of gambles with differing winning 
probabilities (Schlottmann, 2001). One of this analogy’s shortcoming, however, might be that 
the game’s complexity affects probability utilization (Wilkening & Anderson, 1991). 
Specifically, children might be able to anticipate playing a gamble with a specified probability 
but not following a cue with a specified validity. 
In a follow-up study (Lang & Betsch, 2018b), we showed decisions in line with each 
cue to 9-year-olds before they predicted outcomes. For example, children observed the first 
decision makers choosing in line with the first cue several times, and then predicted outcomes 
for these choices. Previous results were replicated. 9-year-olds were sensitive to cue 
validities; their judgments were correlated with normative predictions, indicating that they 
expected better outcomes for decisions with more valid cues, r6-treasure-scale = .50, 95% 
CI [.27, .69], r10-treasure-scale = .33, CI [.05, .58]. But in individual analysis, only a minority 
(17%) used cue validities consistently in all judgments. 
A second shortcoming might be that the stimulus field for judgments was more 
complex: For example, children were confronted with two options instead of one. This 
reflects that probability utilization per se is more complex in some situations than in others 
(see Article 4 for a discussion). But as Schlottmann & Wilkening (2012) point out, reducing 
the stimulus field so that probability is the only information left might be the most effective 
way to ensure its utilization in children. 
Article 4 further shows that feedback did not improve children’s judgments. Even after 
plenty of experience with the Treasure Hunt and with observing cue-outcome contingencies in 
feedback conditions, children did not expect better outcomes for decisions in line with more 
valid cues. Interestingly, predictive judgments were neither improved in Studies 4 and 5, 
despite the adaption of decision behavior. Consider for example, that in Study 4’s strict 
feedback condition, 27% of younger, 60% of older children and 85% of adults consistently 
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expected better outcomes for the high valid cue before decisions, in comparison with 24% of 
younger children, and 51% of older children, and 97% of adults after decisions.  
In line with this, in complex tasks adults also sometimes adapt their decision behavior 
to the probabilistic structure, but not their judgments (Evans, Clibbens, Cattani, Gluck, 
Shohamy, & Myers, 2002; Franco-Watkins, Derks, & Dougherty, 2003; Harries, Evans, & 
Dennis, 2000, cf. Lagnado, Newell, Kahan & Shanks, 2006). This supports dual-process 
theories’ claim that decision are guided by implicit and judgments by analytical system (e.g., 
Sloman, 1996). 
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Table 3 
Proportion of normative judgments 
Younger children 
    No feedback   Feedback   Overall 
Study   %   95% CI   %   95% CI   %   95% CI 
1  4  [4, 11]  7  [0, 17]  5  [0,12] 
2  0  [0, 6]  3  [0, 8]  1  [0, 4] 
3  4  [0, 11]  4  [0, 10]  4  [0, 9] 
4  19  [5, 34]  23  [15, 31]  23  [15, 31] 
5  19  [5, 33]  37  [19, 55]  26  [17, 35] 
6  —    —    0  [0,7] 
RE-Model               11   [15, 21] 
I²           94% 
             
Older children 
    No feedback   Feedback   Overall 
Study   %   95% CI   %   95% CI   %   95% CI 
1  39  [19, 59]  19  [4, 33]  28  [16, 40] 
2  29  [13, 45]  28  [11, 44]  28  [17, 40] 
3  31  [14, 48]  33  [20, 45]  32  [22, 42] 
4  50  [33, 67]  54  [45, 63]  54  [45, 63] 
5  42  [23, 62]  50  [29, 71]  58  [48, 68] 
6  —    —    34  [26, 43] 
RE-Model               39   [29, 50] 
I²           85% 
             
Adults 
    No feedback   Feedback   Overall 
Study   %   95% CI   %   95% CI   %   95% CI 
1  77  [64, 94]  85  [72, 99]  82  [71, 92] 
2  85  [71, 98]  87  [74, 100]  86  [76, 96] 
3  82  [67, 97]  83  [73, 92]  82  [75, 90] 
4  94  [86, 100]  96  [92, 100]  96  [92, 100] 
5  86  [72, 100]  92  [82, 100]  76  [66, 86] 
6  —    —    —   
RE-Model               85   [78, 92] 
I²           62% 
Note. Table shows proportions of individuals whose utilization of cue validities in judgments 
were in line with normative expectations, that is, they expected better outcomes for decisions 
in line with more valid cues. Criteria differed between studies due to variation in stated cue 
validities; Studies 1-3, 6: jcue1 > jcue2 > jcue3 & j6-treasure scale > j10-treasure scale; Studies 4, 5: 
jcue1 > jcue3 & jcue2 > jcue3 & j6-treasure scale > j10-treasure scale; RE = random effect model; atudies with 
0% and 100% are excluded from the model; I² measures heterogeneity between studies, lower 
values indicate less heterogeneity. 
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The Relation Between Probability Utilization in Judgments and Decisions 
Assessment of both utilization of probability in judgments and decisions allows to 
investigate whether normative integration of probability in judgments is associated with better 
decision making. For this analysis, I concentrated on older children because only this age 
group showed considerable variance in judgments and decisions: Approximately one third to 
one half of the children’s judgments aligned to normative expectations and likewise around 
the same proportion used adaptive decision strategies. 
We compared the proportion of adaptive decisions (i.e., in line with the high valid cue; 
we excluded one condition of Study 5, where other strategies were also successful) between 
children whose judgments followed normative standards (i.e., they expected better outcomes 
for decisions in line with more valid cues) and those whose judgments did not. Across all 
studies, children that used cue validities normatively for judgments, made slightly better 
decision than their peers (Figure 2). However, the overall effect was small, varied 
considerably between studies, Q(5) = 19.15, p < .001, I2 = 75%, and did not reach significance 
in single studies. 
This is in line with scarce empirical findings showing that the association between 
judgment and decision may be rather lose in children (Schlottmann & Tring, 2005). However, 
future research with larger samples of older children should illuminate this issue further. 
 
 
Figure 2. Forest plot for the effect of normative judgments on adaptive decisions in older 
children. Figure shows Cohen’s d for 9-year-olds without normative judgments compared to 
9-year-olds with normative judgments. 
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Stability of Age Effects in Judgments and Decisions 
Overall, we found stable age effects in decisions and in judgments: no probability 
utilization in younger children and partial probability utilization in in a subgroup of older 
children. This pattern of results has been replicated in other studies that used the same 
paradigm in German samples (Betsch, Lang, Lehmann, & Axmann, 2014; Betsch, Lehmann, 
Lindow, Lang & Schoemann, 2016; Betsch, Lehmann, Jekel, Lindow, & Glöckner, 2018) as 
well as in a Japanese sample of 9-year-olds. Direct comparison between German and Japanese 
3rd graders revealed no differences in decisions or judgments (Lang, Eisen, & Betsch, 2018c). 
Probability utilization nevertheless varies with environmental factors. For example, in 
Studies 4 and 5 where the criterion (for judgments that were defined as accounting for 
probability differences) was less restrictive, probability utilization in judgments obviously 
improved (Table 3, see annotation). It is unclear though, whether increased salience of 
validity differences might have further facilitated probability utilization. Further, children’s 
adaptive strategy use in decision increases considerably, when the non-probabilistic Equal 
Weight strategy was included as an adaptive strategy (Table 1, Study 5). Finally, 
manipulating environmental factors, such as demands of information search (Studies 1 & 2), 
dispersion of probability (Studies 4 & 5), and number of trials (Studies 2 & 3) clearly affected 
children’s decisions and decision strategies. It did not, however, substantially increase 
probability utilization on any measure. 
Alternative Accounts for Age-Dependent Differences 
Here I discuss possible explanations for the observed performance differences between 
age groups or feedback conditions inherent to the research paradigm. 
Information Encoding 
For a meaningful comparison of different age groups, all children must be able to 
encode the relevant information, such as cue values. However, in information-board studies it 
is conceivable that children, unfamiliar with tables, might not be able to correctly encode the 
information in the matrix, and simply disregard it. We addressed this by using an information-
board matrix that had only pictorial values and was not overly complex. Children at preschool 
age can handle information boards with up to four dimensions and three options (Lindow et 
al., 2017). Further, in each study, we assessed whether children understood the matrix. 
Decoding the information-board. Before the first decision, the experimenter 
explained the matrix and the child indicated the meaning of each pictorial cue value in at least 
one training trial verbally and by pointing. Table 1 shows that only a negligible proportion of 
children could do this correctly. 
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Table 4 
Percentage of children that could not interpret the information-board matrix correctly 
Study    Age Group 
 Younger  Older 
1  5  4 
2  3  0 
3  3  1 
4  8  0 
5  7  0 
6   7   3 
 
Encoding of differences in cue validities. A main benefit of the Treasure Hunt is the child-
friendly presentation of probabilistic relations. Using a guided sampling procedure and 
graphical representations, we ensured that all children encoded probabilities correctly. 
Accordingly, children of all age groups were able to choose the most valid cue based on 
differences in cue validity (see low drop-out rates in all studies). 
Note, that cue validity was framed as smartness of animals for children (i.e., we asked, 
Which animal was the smartest?; Which was the second smartest?; How smart was this 
animal?). Conceivably, children might have encoded and recalled only differences in 
smartness, without relating them specifically to differences in validity. However, children 
assigned smart points for correct predictions themselves and every single child correctly 
indicated when to assign a smart point. Thus, I think it unlikely that children did not grasp that 
animals’ smartness in the game depended on correctly predicting outcomes. It is, however, 
possible that they forgot this during the game, and later only recalled differences in smartness 
rather than in prediction accuracy. 
To explore this issue further, we coded children’s answers when asked after the game 
why the last (i.e., high valid) cue was “the smartest”. Most children referred to the number of 
smart points, younger: RE-Model, 73%, 95% CI [67, 79], I2 = 37%; older: RE-Model, 63%, 
[56, 70], I2 = 57%; adults: RE-Model, 65%, [56, 73], I2 = 61%. However, a small proportion 
also spontaneously referred to the number of correct cue predictions, younger: RE-Model, 
10%, [6,15], I2 = 47%; older: RE-Model, 19%, [15, 23], I2 = 0%; adults: RE-Model, 28%, 
[24, 33], I2 = 0%. 
In a follow-up study with older children (Lang & Betsch, 2018b), we specifically 
tested whether children were able to reproduce differences in correct predictions for each cue. 
Children indicated how often each cue’s predictions were correct on the familiar graphic-
stick-scale (see Article 4 for display of the scale). Mean estimates were correlated with 
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normative values, Pearson’s r = .66, 95% Bootstrap CI [64; 82], and 72% of children, [50; 89] 
correctly reproduced the cue hierarchy. I conclude, that most children remembered until after 
the game, which cue’s predictions were more valid. Yet, this is to be replicated with younger 
children. 
Altogether, I think, that age-dependent differences in encoding or recalling of 
differences in probabilities may contribute to, but cannot fully explain lack of utilization. 
Every age group successfully encoded and to a large extend recalled differences in cue 
validities in various manipulation checks. 
Children’s motivation 
Another factor contributing to age or feedback effects might be children’s motivation. 
To ensure, that all children were highly motivated to maximize outcomes, we repeatedly 
informed participants, that they would be rewarded contingent on their performance in 
decisions. For each treasure found, children received a treasure point and could trade them for 
prizes afterwards. Although, incentives might affect only older children’s performance 
(Varghese & Nielsen, 2013), we rewarded all children in the same way. Additionally, we 
assessed extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. 
Measuring children’s motivation is tricky, especially with a simple and brief method 
(the studies took quite a long time even without further measurements). Children often 
indicate indifferently that they are highly motivated (see Chambers & Johnson, 2002, for an 
overview). Nevertheless, we attempted to measure children’s motivation during the game by 
adapting the short version of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory, which has been used in a 
German sample of children (Deci & Ryan, 2013; Wilde, Bätz, Kovaleva, & Urhahn, 2009). 
We assessed the factors enjoyment and perceived competence, each with three items. 
Children indicated their answer on the familiar Graphic-stick scale. 
Cronbach’s alpha indicated poor internal consistency especially in the younger age 
group for both factors and in all studies, αs ≤ .74. Presumably, some of the items were not 
meaningful to younger children (e.g., Wie unterhaltsam war das Spiel?, How entertaining was 
the game?). Thus, we report only results for the linguistically simplest item of each factor 
(Wie viel Spaß hat dir das Spiel gemacht? How much fun was the game?; Wie gut warst du in 
dem Spiel?, How good were you at playing the game?).  
Further, we assessed how much children were looking forward to the prizes provided 
for performance as a proxy for extrinsic motivation (Wie sehr freust du dich mit deinen 
Schatzpunkten Preise zu kaufen? How much do you look forward to buying prizes with your 
treasure points?). 
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Motivation with and without feedback. Overall, children indicated to be highly 
motivated in all conditions. Importantly, whether decision feedback was available or not did 
not affect children’s reported enjoyment, RE-Model, d = -0.12, CI [-0.43, 0.19], I2 = 74%; 
perceived competence, RE-Model, d = 0.14, CI [-0.09, 0.37], I2 = 74%; or extrinsic 
motivation, d = 0.08, CI [-0.09, 0.25], I2 = 1%. This suggests that feedback did not affect 
children’s motivation.  
Age-dependent differences in motivation. Additionally, we tested for an age effect 
on enjoyment, perceived competence and extrinsic motivation in children. Age only affected 
children’s perceived competence: Younger children felt more competent than older children, 
despite their worse performance, RE-Model, d = 0.77, 95% CI [0.61, 0.93], I2 = 16%. 
However, a significant proportion of children indifferently selected maximum scale 
values. This may indeed reflect high motivation but can also be a result of demand effects or 
inappropriate scale use in children and reduce the validity of motivation assessment (see 
Chambers & Johnston, 2002, and Article 4 for a discussion).  
Irrespective of this restriction, the data suggests that children were highly motivated, 
intrinsically and extrinsically. Thus, I am confident, that all children tried to perform well in 
the decision game, and doubt that children’s failure in probability utilization or strategy 
application can be explained by a lack of motivation. 
Further evidence for this claim stems from an additional study with 9-year-old 
children: In this study (Lang & Betsch, 2018d), children first made decisions and gained 
treasure points for each correct decisions. In a second part they lost treasure points for false 
decisions. While children were highly motivated to avoid losing treasure points, their 
decisions resembled our findings here: Only a proportion of children relied on adaptive 
decision strategies and minimized losses. 
The Role of Executive Functions 
Executive functions, such as working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive 
flexibility develop considerably during preschool and elementary school age and are an 
important predictor for decision making in developmental studies (Diamond, 2006; Miyake et 
al., 2006; Weller, Levine, Rose, & Bossard, 2012; see Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & 
Brand, 2014, and Steinbeis & Crone, 2016, for adolescents and adults). However, one study 
using the Treasure Hunt with 9-year-olds showed no association between performance in 
multiple executive function tasks and probability utilization (Lehmann & Betsch, 2018). 
Thus, it stands to reason that all children at age nine have sufficient executive functioning to 
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succeed in the game and that other factors must be responsible for inter-individual 
differences. 
Conclusions 
In a series of studies, I investigated children’s judgment and decision making in a 
probabilistic inference paradigm. Focusing on two major points, the work in this thesis shows 
the following: 
The Development of Probability Utilization 
Children at the ages of 5-7 and 8-9 encode differences in probabilistic relations 
between cues and outcomes successfully. They can further utilize this probabilistic 
information to choose the most valid of several cues. But most children until the age of nine 
fail to utilize probabilistic relations to form informed expectations of outcomes and to choose 
options that maximize outcomes. This probability neglect is very robust, decreases 
considerably from age five to nine, and follows the same developmental trajectory in 
decisions and judgments. This finding contrasts research showing that children at preschool 
age and even infants utilize probability in various contexts (see Schlottmann & Wilkening, 
2012, for an overview).  
From a developmental perspective, dual-process frameworks account for 
heterogeneity by assuming that intuitive probability utilization is available early in life, while 
analytical utilization develops later. When environments are “merciful”, they allow children’s 
intuitive capabilities to flourish (Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2012, p. 77). So why might the 
environment created in our studies not be “merciful”? Presumably, two environmental 
factors—high complexity of the stimulus field and low contiguity between probability, which 
were assigned to cues, and options’ outcomes, which should be predicted, might require an 
analytical approach for successful probability utilization (Wohlwill, 1968; see Betsch et al., 
2018, and Article 3 for discussions). Preliminary evidence suggest that the older children that 
successfully utilized probability, applied an analytical processing mode (Article 4 and Lang & 
Betsch, 2018b). Further research must show, whether variations of these environmental 
factors affects probability utilization as expected. 
From a decision making perspective, the results support models of adaptive decision 
making (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 
1988), which assume a repertoire of decision strategies. They add a developmental component 
by showing the trajectory from non-adaptive to adaptive strategies during elementary school 
age. However, the results also contradict the assumption that decision makers tend to reduce 
complexity (Gigerenzer et al., 1999, Simon, 1954). Though the dispersion of stated 
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probabilities invited the use of complexity-reducing strategies such as the Lexicographic 
strategy, a substantial proportion of individuals did not do this. Adults and in part older 
children tended to integrate more information than necessary in a more complex weighted-
additive fashion (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). 
The Complex Role of Decision Feedback 
Feedback effects are small. Decision feedback benefits children’s probabilistic 
decision under very specific circumstances and to a limited extend. When the outcome 
distribution vehemently reinforces simple but adaptive decision strategies, their prevalence is 
increased, but less adaptive strategies are not eradicated. Overall, three separate feedback 
effects were found in children: 
First, we obtained the over-responsiveness to options. Younger children only 
reluctantly chose options again after failure. Further research must show whether this also is 
the case at the level of decision strategies (that is, whether children only reluctantly apply a 
decision strategy after failure). Second, we obtained strategy switches in relation to feedback. 
Children increasingly applied decision strategies that yielded better outcomes with feedback. 
Third, we obtained preliminary evidence of changes in perceived cue validity in dependence 
on feedback. When the feedback schedule decreased a cue validity (that is, the cue predictions 
became less accurate over time), children’s perception of cue validities changed accordingly. 
Children seem to attribute feedback to different elements of the decisions—options, 
strategies and cues. Large inter-individual differences suggest that these attributions may be 
volatile and moderated by attentional processes (Bröder, Glöckner, Betsch, Link, & Ettlin, 
2013; Roelfsema, van Oooyen, & Watanabe, 2010). A model of feedback learning in complex 
decision, such as probabilistic inferences, should aim to separate them. 
From a decision making perspective, the results support the assumption that 
individuals adapt strategies through decision feedback (Beach and Mitchel, 1978; Gigerenzer 
et al., 1999; Payne, et al., 1988; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). But they illustrate likewise that 
feedback processing is more complex even at preschool age. Besides updating of strategies, 
other process, such as updating of expectations for options and cues must be accounted for 
(see Bröder et al., 2013, for a discussion). 
From a developmental perspective, the research confirms sensitivity towards feedback 
at every age, but also developmental differences in feedback processing, such as over-
responsiveness to negative outcomes (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2012). Feedback is suited to 
improve children’s decision making, but clearly, not all feedback is helpful for children. 
Further research must clarify what feedback can benefit decisions. 
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As always, more research is needed to replicate and extend the findings and tie up all 
the remaining loose ends. Still, the majority of parents and educators that supported our 
research over the years, asked for advice on children’s decisions. Of course, evidence-based 
advice must be given cautiously and cannot be informed by a single study. However, I think 
that some preliminary pieces of advice might be justified and helpful: 
First, children should make decisions. Even at preschool age children can handle 
decisions in a very systematic fashion. Their strategies are not always suited to the decision at 
hand, but that does not hinder the process of decision making—however, the outcomes might 
not be optimal. Strategies get better with age and can also be improved from outside, for 
example by feedback or instruction. Ideally, adults should let children make their own 
decisions (without too high expectations for results), but help the child to analyze decision 
situations, possible strategies, and outcomes. 
Second, searching for information is hard. Children’s decision quality is severely 
impaired when they have to search for the choice-relevant information, not only in 
probabilistic but also in deterministic environments (Betsch et al., 2016; Lindow & Betsch, 
2018). In contrast, when relevant information is available beforehand, decisions get better in 
older children. Accordingly, relevant information should always be made available for 
children. Parents or educators should actively collect relevant information for or with the 
child. Further research on children’s active information search suggests that encouraging to 
ask questions, might be a good method to engage children in information search (Legare, 
Mills, Souza, Plummer, & Yasskin, 2003). 
Third, children do not necessarily use important information in decisions. 
Naturally, children might consider different information to be important for decisions, than 
adults. But knowing something and using it in decisions are two different things. Adults 
should explicitly state when a piece of information is relevant for a decision. For example, 
explain how it might affect decision outcomes. 
This research on children’s probabilistic judgment and decision making has revealed 
several deficits and some capabilities of young children. When evaluating this, we should 
keep in mind, that even many adults’ probabilistic judgments and decisions are deficient. 
Similar to adults, acknowledging children’s difficulties creates opportunities to create 
decision situations that children can handle successfully.  
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